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GLOBAL SCIENCES IN THE NAME OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

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The genesis of ethnic relations between the peoples of the European Union on the example of the Italian society's transformation in the Middle Ages

Abstract:

The issues of historical parallelism of events are relevant at all times because researchers are trying to find cyclically repeated processes in history that help to analyze the course of these processes at the present stage of society's development, extrapolating the past to the present. The problems of the relationship of nations in the European Union, which are carefully veiled by the EU leadership, have historically ancient origins in the struggle for territories, resources, logistical benefits and political alliances. The genesis of these contradictions is clearly shown in the example of Italy as the heiress of the Roman Empire. The study aimed to identify the complex influence of ethnic migration processes that affected the Apennine Peninsula in the period from the 4th to the 12th centuries, which led to a deep social, economic and political transformation of Italian society and the creation of a basis for relations with neighbouring peoples. The origins of ethnic and cultural contradictions laid down in the period from the 4th to the 12th centuries formed in the local first nations a fairly stable wariness and relative negativism towards neighbouring ethnic groups that became descendants of migrants from the Early and Upper Middle Ages from the East and North. To solve these problems, historical, social and economic, comparative and logical research methods were used, which helped draw the necessary conclusions and conclusions. The materials of the article are intended for scientists, students and researchers in the field of the ethnology of Europe and the Apennine Peninsula.

Keywords:

European ethnic groups, Roman Empire, Holy Empire, Italy, Apennine Peninsula.

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Aktualizace parametrů vývoje efektivního ekonomického myšlení s cílem motivovat společnost k financování inovativních aktivit

Anotace:

Otázky historické souběžnosti událostí je relevantní za všech okolností, protože vědci se snaží najít cyklické opakující se procesy v dějinách, které pomohou analyzovat průběh těchto procesů je v současné fázi vývoje společnosti, extrapolace minulosti do současnosti. Problémy se vztahy národů v Evropské Unii, které pečlivě skrýval vedením EU, mají historicky starověké počátky boje o území, zdroje, logistické výhody a politických uskupení. Na příkladu Itálie jako dědice Římské říše se jasně projevuje geneze těchto rozporů. Cílem studie bylo zjištění komplexní vliv etnických migrační procesy ovlivňující národy, Apeninský poloostrov po 4-12 staletí, které vedly k hluboké sociálně-ekonomické a politické transformace italské společnosti a vytvořit základ vztahů k navazujícím národům. Začleněny do 4-12 století počátky etnických a kulturních rozporů tvořily v místních přirozených národech dost stabilní bdělost a relativní negativismus k sousedním etnosům, které se staly potomci migrantů Brzy a Horní Středověku se na Východ a na Sever. Pro řešení úkolů byly použity historické, socioekonomické, srovnávací a logické výzkumné metody, které pomohly učinit nezbytné závěry a závěry. Materiály článku jsou určeny pro vědce, studenty a výzkumníky v oblasti etnologie Evropy a Apeninského poloostrova.

Klíčová slova:

etnosy Evropy, Římská říše, Svatá říše, Itálie, Apeninský poloostrov.

Introduction

The issues of historical parallelism of events are relevant at all times because researchers are trying to find cyclically repeated processes in history that help to analyze the course of these processes at the present stage of society's development, extrapolating the past to the present.

The analysis of 'stations' (events of the present time) based on similar 'archions' (events of the past time, historically related to 'stations') helps to apply a more objective approach to explaining the current situation and predict the processes that may occur in the future as a variation, i.e., 'versions'.

The problems of the relationship of nations in the European Union, which are carefully veiled by the EU leadership, have historically ancient origins in the struggle for territories, resources, logistical benefits and political alliances. Peoples have a unique identity, significant differences in mentality and historical memory. So, at the social level, there is a hidden or semi-hidden psychological reaction to neighbouring peoples and countries.

The genesis of these contradictions (historical quasars) is clearly shown in the example of Italy as the heiress of the Roman Empire. Ethnic tensions and misunderstandings of the needs of neighbouring and migrating peoples are clearly understood in the complex social and economic transformation of the territory in the period from the 4th to the 12th centuries, superimposed on the motley migration map of numerous peoples of the East and North. Similar processes are taking place at the present stage of the existence of the European Community, especially in the Mediterranean region.

The subject of the study was the society of the Apennine Peninsula, which felt the processes of ethnic influence during the Middle Ages.

The study aimed to identify the complex influence of ethnic migration processes that affected the Apennine Peninsula in the period from the 4th to the 12th centuries, which led to a deep social, economic and political transformations of Italian society and the creation of a basis for relations with neighbouring peoples.

Based on this goal, the following tasks were solved in the course of the study:

- analyze the main historical stages of the social, economic and political transformations of Italian society in the Middle Ages;
- identify the fundamental and hidden reasons for the historical formation of the attitude of Italian society to neighbouring peoples;
- assess the ethnic genesis of the transformation of Italian society.

To solve these problems, historical, social and economic, comparative and logical research methods were used, which helped draw the necessary conclusions and conclusions.

During the study, there were used materials of the leading researchers in the field of European ethnology, society and economy of the Middle Ages such as R. Collins, F. Curta, S.A. Epstein, G. Henderson, G. Holmes, E. James, D. Power, and personal scientific works of the author.

1. The period of the Great Migration of peoples (from the 4th to the 6th centuries)

In 410, the Goths, led by leader Alaric I, captured the Roman Empire and Rome itself. He was supported by the slaves and most of the imperial troops, which consisted of Germans. However, the Goths soon left the Apennine Peninsula. The reason for their hasty departure was the extremely severe decline of agriculture in this territory. Large centres have long existed at the expense of

food supplied from other provinces. The conquerors moved to the southern part of Gaul, where they founded their kingdom, dividing the space between their warriors. This was the beginning of the era of the Peoples Great Migration, which affected almost all areas of the late Roman Empire. The gradual cooling of the climate in Northern Europe has led to a reduction in areas suitable for animal husbandry, in particular cattle breeding. Therefore, many tribes of Eastern Europe and Scandinavia moved to Central Europe. In the second half of the 5th century, vast areas of the Western Roman Empire were liberated, and a large number of Germanic tribes began to move to them.

Within two centuries, the map of Europe has completely changed in terms of ethnicity and administrative division. The fertile valleys were divided into barbarian kingdoms. Their rulers were completely independent or subordinated only to Byzantium. The population of the barbarian peoples grew steadily. The demographic explosion was associated with several factors:

- obtaining new land to expand farmland;
- warmer climate with mild winters and warm, humid summers;
- the absence of a multi-stage supreme power with a large number of tax items.

The cultural and linguistic interpenetration of the Barbarians and the Romans became dominant in favour of the former, which led to the dissolution of the Romans and their assimilation. This led to the death of the Latin language and the Romanization of the barbaric rather rigid languages.

In this process of barbarization of the territory of the former Roman Empire, there were both positive and negative sides. A positive process can be attributed to the emergence of new cultures and the beginning of the formation of new nations. On the other hand, there was a sharp decline in European culture at the beginning of the millennium, which was completely based on Latin culture. The Huns were particularly unstable in their habitation. At first, the Empire resorted to the help of the Huns in the fight against the barbarians, but then it began to feel the power of their state, which very quickly became an important political force. In 434, under the leadership of Attila, the Huns conquered vast lands in Eastern Europe and established their empire in the former Roman region of Pannonia, now Hungary. However, already in 451, the troops of Attila were defeated on the Catalaunian fields by the outstanding Roman general Aetius. Two years later, Attila died, and the rapid decline of his young empire began. At about the same time, other contenders for the creation of a separate state appeared on the Iberian Peninsula. These were the Vandals and the Sews, who had been forced

to move south from the acquired lands due to the huge influence of the Huns. The Vandals fought wars in North Africa in 428-438 and could establish their state with its capital in Carthage. From there, they regularly attacked the lands of the Empire, and in 455, even capturing Rome, subjected it to complete devastation. In the mid-6th century, the Vandal state ceased to exist, dissolving into the Byzantine Empire.

In the mid-5th century, the Ostrogothic state, which had previously been destroyed by the Huns, was also revived. The Ostrogoths did not assimilate into the territory of the Roman Empire but sought an alliance with Byzantium. In 488, the Ostrogothic king Theodoric the Great attacked the Empire under Odoacer. Taking advantage of the non-interference of Byzantium, he conquered the entire Empire and several German regions. Ravenna became the capital of the new Ostrogothic Kingdom. Theodoric tried to restore the greatness of the Roman Empire. He restored all the state institutions of the Great Empire. There were two main political forces – the Gothic and Roman nobles, who were constantly in conflict with each other. With the death of Theodoric, the decline of the Ostrogothic state began. The internecine war escalated, and the disintegration of the institution of power began. In 534, Byzantium was able to introduce troops into the territory of the Empire. The Gothic War ended with the destruction of the Apennines. However, after a few years, Byzantium had to retreat before a new pretender to the Roman lands. The new political force was the German tribes of the 'longbeards' (the Lombards), who had come there earlier.

Thus, at the initial stage during the Dark Ages of the Middle Ages, there was a constant movement of the Eastern, Central and Southern European people, which led to a complete change in the political map of the former Great Roman Empire. These changes completely destabilized the situation in the state, sharply worsened the economic situation within the territory and led to complete ruin. Historians often refer to the period from the 4th to the 6th centuries – the Migration Period or better known as the 'Barbarian' Invasions. These migrations led to a greater extent to the collapse of the centuries-old economic system. However, this process was natural and inevitable. The old civilization had to give way to younger and newly emerging states, many of which could not last more than a century. It was a time of the formation of new political and economic systems.

2. The Age of Lombard Expansion (from the 6th to the 8th centuries)

It is impossible to understand the origins of the ethnic development of the territory of modern United Europe without considering those periods of the existence of the Roman Empire when the leading force on its territory was the peoples who came. One of these was the Lombards, a branch of the German tribes. The Lombards at the early 1st century CE lived on the left bank of the lower Elbe. By the 5th century, their tribes had moved to Pannonia. In 568, shortly after the death of Emperor Justinian, the Lombards entered the Po Valley. From them later arose the name of the province of Lombardy. Many of the Lombards had served in the Apennine Peninsula as mercenaries and were aware of the wealth of the area and the weakness of the Roman garrisons. In 586, led by King Alboin, they invaded Northern Italy. Their contingent numbered no more than 200 thousand people, along with women, children, and the elderly. At first, they moved along the rivers of the territory of modern Northern Italy, bypassing large cities. Then it was the turn of the towns. Milan, Spoleto, Benevento and other centres fell. King Alboin began the siege of Pavia, which offered a stubborn resistance. The Lombards made Pavia their capital. They occupied the Po Valley and the inland mountain areas with rich pastures, the duchies of Spoleto and Benevento. However, they did not recapture the coasts of the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas from the Empire. The journey by land between Ravenna, where the emperor's viceroy was, and Rome, where the Pope's residence was, was now interrupted. Unlike the Goths and Burgundians, the Lombards were almost not Romanized, did not know the Roman laws, still had strong family ties. Sources describe them as "a people even more savage than the rest of the wild Germans". Along with the Lombards, other tribes invaded the peninsula – the Saxons, Suevi, Gepids, Proto-Bulgars and Slavs.

In the mid-7th century, the main part of the territory of modern Italy was under the rule of the Lombards. Byzantium was left with a small territory. However, the Lombards settled most densely in Northwestern Italy. Their conquests led to the destruction of a large part of the old slave-owning nobility. The 8th-century Lombard historian Paul the Deacon noted that the conquest itself and the beginning of the rule of the Lombards were accompanied by the extermination and expulsion of the noble Romans. Under the second king of the Lombards, Clef, not only the nobility suffered but also the middle-class people. An important consequence of this conquest was the fragmentation of the large slave-holding latifundium in the northern and middle part of the peninsula. Having conquered a significant part of the Apennine Peninsula, the Lombard

leaders could not share power in any way. Each duke threatened his closest neighbours. Finally, in the face of the looming threat of invasion from the north of the Franks, the Lombards elected Otari king. However, five years later, he was poisoned. They more gradually absorbed the rich culture of the defeated Empire. Among the Germanic barbarians, skilled artisans and educated officials appeared. In the Otari tomb, researchers found original products of the Lombard masters, including a tray where the chicken family pecks at the golden grains. Theodolinda, the widow of King Otari, married Agilulf, Duke of Turin, who was elected king of the Lombards. According to legend, on the orders of Theodolinda, the so-called (iron) crown of the Lombards was made especially for the coronation of Agilulf, consisting of six gold plates decorated with precious stones and mounted on an iron hoop made from another 'Crucifixion Nail', which later crowned all the kings of Italy up to Napoleonic times. Theodolinda herself came from a Bavarian royal family and was a Christian who supported the Roman Church. It allowed the pope to establish contacts with her and begin to slowly incline the Lombards to his faith. In the meantime, the Lombards periodically besieged Rome, only receiving large compensation. Pope Gregory, later called the Great, had difficulty reaching peace with them. However, the main problem for the Lombard kings was the struggle for power with their dukes. Only King Rotary, the son-in-law of Theodolinda, managed to significantly limit the power of the dukes by the mid-7th century and introduce the first legislative acts in the kingdom, written in the image and likeness of the Roman ones. In these laws, the Romans were provided with virtually no rights, and the highest race was declared only the Lombards, who had long established themselves on the peninsula.

The Lombard Kingdom's political system in the period of the 7th and 8th centuries was characterized by the disappearance of tribal institutions and the emergence of an early feudal state. Having conquered the peninsula, having destroyed the old municipal system of the Roman Empire, the Lombards had to organize state power to subdue the local population and establish the rule of the military nobility over the ordinary commoners. The general assembly of the Lombards was no longer assembled. There were only meetings at which laws were promulgated. The king, elected by the nobility, had the highest military and judicial power, the right to mint coins. He established taxes and duties and had the right of a mundium concerning all subjects. His power was ensured by the fact that he was the largest owner in the country. In favour of the royal power were court fines, duties, part of the wergeld. However, the peculiarity of the Lombard kingdom was to maintain the strong power of the dukes next to the royal power.

The dukes assembled a military militia, had their squads, had judicial power, and received court fines. The kings tried to limit the power of the dukes and arrogate to themselves the right of their appointment.

After the death of King Clef, the dukes, having fortified themselves on the peninsula, ruled independently for ten years from 574 to 584 and significantly strengthened their positions. The Dukes of Spoleto and Benevento were particularly independent. However, the danger from the Franks and the Byzantines forced them to elect a king again. But for the royal power to have material support, they had to give the king half of their lands. So, the royal lands began to be wedged into the ducal possessions. To strengthen their position, the kings appointed Gastalds to their estates, who served as the king's judicial and political temporary agents and managers of the royal estates. There were constant disagreements between the dukes and the Gastalds.

The Lombard king, like the Frankish king, ruled with the help of the closest servants of the palace mayor, the head of the stables, and the dukes. The people played almost no role in court decisions. The army at first had the character of a general militia but, in the 8th century, due to the devastation of the population, all free people were divided into three groups based on property and, accordingly, were armed differently. The greatest power of the royal power of the Lombards reached under Liutprand. He managed to subdue the Dukes of Spoleto and Benevento and to capture Ravenna. However, to weaken the dukes, Liutprand widely distributed the church lands to private individuals, which led to a further weakening of the central government.

Already in the 7th century, the Lombards began to assimilate the Latin language, customs and clothing of the local population, the Italian people not only were not destroyed by the barbarian conquerors but managed to assimilate the Germanic elements. The conditions were different in the Byzantine regions. The Exarchate of Ravenna, the Pentapolis of Ancona, the Roman Ducat, Liguria until the mid-7th century, Apulia, Bruttia, and Naples remained under Byzantine rule. The Byzantine military administration, i.e., the exarch, and the civil administration, i.e., the tribunes, were extremely mercenary. In the period from the 6th to the 8th centuries, the Byzantine regions saw a slow evolution of large Roman land ownership. The estate was still divided into two parts: the master's land, cultivated by slaves and colonists, and the peasant allotments. However, slavery began to soften. The slaves planted on the land began to merge with the colonists and tenants into one group of the dependent peasantry. Unlike the Lombard regions, there was almost no free population and free, independent communities in the

period from the 6th to the 8th centuries. With the general naturalization of the economy, foreign trade was developed in the Byzantine regions. The ports of the southern part of the peninsula-maintained trade relations with Sicily, the Aegean coast and Constantinople.

The struggle of the Lombard kings for the subjugation of the entire peninsula was not crowned with success, as they met with resistance from the papacy, acting in alliance with the Frankish state. At the end of the 8th century, the Lombard Kingdom was conquered by Charlemagne and became part of the Carolingian Empire. According to the Treaty of Verdun in 843, the territory of the former Lombard Kingdom was again separated, but this time as a combination of separate duchies and feudal possessions.

Thus, the Lombards thoroughly destroyed the remnants of the rule of the Roman Empire on the territory of the peninsula. They minimized the assimilation of culture and the institution of state power, consolidating for two centuries their order of government, based on the strong power of the dukes and the coordinating essence of the centre. Economic relations began to be built anew, trade relations with other territories of Europe and the Mediterranean changed depending on the political relations between the Lombards and their neighbours – Byzantium.

3. The Barbarization of Europe under the Empire of Otto (the 9th and 10th centuries)

The next stage of the ethnographic development of Europe and the Roman Empire was the Barbarian domination period and the Ottonian Empire existence. In the second half of the 9th century and the first half of the 10th century, barbarian troops descended on Western Europe. Vikings landed on the west coast. Central Europe, especially Germany, was invaded from the East. At the beginning of the 9th century, the Hungarians, who were already nomadic in the southern foothills of the Urals, moved to the Black Sea region and at the end of the century, they moved west and captured the Danube Plain. From there, they raided Germany, reaching the Apennine Peninsula and the eastern regions of the territory of modern France. The need to repel the enemy was particularly acute in Germany. The royal power in Germany possessed quite considerable military and financial resources since it retained a free population to a greater extent. But the German kings had powerful opponents in the person of the dukes. Charlemagne tried to abolish the duchies, but these areas, inhabited by the descendants of various Swabians, Bavarians and Saxons, survived. With the collapse of the Carolingian

Empire, the power of the dukes increased. It was they who chose the kings or approved their heirs, with their consent, the Saxon dynasty ascended to the German throne. The second king of that dynasty, Otto I (936-973), set about strengthening the state. He sought support from the petty knights and ecclesiastical landowners who wanted to find the sovereign's protection from the dukes. An important pillar of Otto's power was the church. This organization was powerful: bishops had to keep a vow of celibacy and could not pass on their offices and possessions by inheritance. Following the established practice, the king himself appointed bishops.

Otto I suppressed the rebellions of the dukes, dissatisfied with the strengthening of his power. Some of them placed in closer dependence on himself, others he removed from power and appointed in their place members of his family or bishops. The strengthening of the central government has produced tangible results. In 955, the Hungarians were defeated on the Lech River near Augsburg, and they did not resume their raids. Later, in 1000, the leader of the Hungarians, Gaik, was baptized under the name of Stephen and became the first king of Hungary. In the Otto I's era, German pressure on the Slavs, primarily the Polabians, who lived along the Elbe River, increased. These peoples did not create a single state and fought not only with the Germans but also among themselves. Since the time of Charlemagne, Germany has fought 175 wars with the Slavic peoples for 367 years. Wars have been especially active since the beginning of the 10th century. Then the Germans captured the Slavic stronghold of Branibor (since then Brandenburg). The lands, captured from the Slavs, were transformed into the Brandenburg Mark, or border region, which later played a huge role in the history of Germany. Appointed by Otto I, the first Margrave of Brandenburg, Hero the Iron, invited 30 Slavic princes to a feast and ordered them to be killed. The result was an uprising in the Slavic lands. The Germans had to leave these territories, which they managed to finally conquer in the 11th century only.

Strengthening his power with the help of the bishops, Otto could not help but interfere in the affairs of the popes, to whom these bishops were subordinate in ecclesiastical matters. Taking advantage of the strife among the Italian princes, he invaded the Apennine Peninsula and in 956 took the crown of Italy. At that time, the papal power in Rome was extremely weakened. It was controlled by Italian magnates. This increased the discontent of the population of Rome. The newly elected Pope turned to Otto for help. He entered Rome in 962. The Pope placed the crown of the Roman emperors on the German king, and the German royal and Imperial crowns have since become inseparable. The Western Roman

Empire was restored for the second time after 800. This newly formed state was later called the Holy Roman Empire. It differed not only from the ancient Roman Empire but also from the Carolingian state. In addition to Germany, Italy and parts of the Kingdom of Lothar, it includes the lands of the Polabian Slavs, i.e., the Slavic peoples who lived along the Elbe River, and the modern Czech Republic, which were conquered by the Germans in the tenth century. The Empire core was the Germanic peoples. Otto I sought full power over the church and recognition of his title by the Byzantine emperors. He appointed popes and demanded their obedience. He married his son, the future Emperor Otto II, to the Byzantine princess Theophano. The fruit of their marriage was Otto III (983-1002), who became emperor in three years old. At the age of fourteen, in 994, he assumed independent rule over Germany and the Empire. Under the influence of his mother, he intended to remake his state in a Byzantine, strictly centralized way. Entrusting the administration of the German lands to his aunt, he began to implement his projects.

All that Otto III accomplished was at the time of about the year 1000. Contemporaries, relying on obscure words of Scripture, believed that in 1000, the End of the World would come. The confusion of minds affected many, and Otto III was one of them. The young man seriously believed that he could be the last emperor. From his point of view, the end of earth's history was to be the restoration of a great, truly Christian empire led by a great, truly Christian emperor. Until the reign of Otto III, the emperors, his grandfather, father, and Charlemagne were German kings, and they appeared in Rome from time to time to confirm their rank and restore order in the church. Otto III moved his residence to Rome, feeling like a true Roman emperor. He sealed his documents with a special seal with the inscription 'Renewal of the Roman Empire', established a complex hierarchical system of court and state ranks, borrowed from Byzantium, and celebrated the triumph on the model of the ancient emperors. In the construction of the Christian empire, he was assisted by his teacher Herbert of Aurillac, a man of low birth, one of the most educated people of the era, a philosopher, mathematician, musician and astronomer. Otto raised Gerberg to the papal throne under the name of Sylvester II in the following year.

The Romans could hardly bear the presence of the Germans in the Eternal City and raised riots. Otto reproached them for this. The Romans refused to accept the benefits, and Otto and Sylvester were forced to leave Rome. Otto died unexpectedly at the age of 22 during a campaign against Rome. His successor immediately withdrew his troops from Italy. Another attempt to restore the

Empire failed. It was the last attempt to recreate the Empire in its perfect form. Subsequent emperors did not forget about the claims to the role of the Christian world head, to power over the church and Italy. But they justified these rights by the fact that the German kings were also Roman emperors. Rome remained a dream, an idea, a political myth, but not the real seat of the emperors, who made only coronation campaigns there.

Thus, the brief era of the Ottonian rule brought only some changes to the state of society of the Roman Empire and the peoples who inhabited the peninsula. The creation of the Holy Empire did not change the situation of the Apennine Peninsula peoples, which remained only nominally the political centre of Europe and the entire Mediterranean. In reality, the peninsula territory continued to sink into the abyss of economic, social and administrative crisis, caused not so much by the constant fragmentation of the provinces into small duchies and city-polises, but by the influence of people's alien to them in mentality, identity and values.

4. High Middle Ages Period (from the 10th to the 14th centuries)

The Italian lands throughout the Dark Ages had no political independence. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the fertile lands of the Apennine Peninsula became a tasty morsel for many conquerors. The Lombard Kingdom played a positive role in the history of Northern Italy. The unity of these regions was not broken even when the Franks destroyed the Lombards and annexed the Italian lands to their possessions. The Papal region, which was under the full control of the church, did not lose its cultural and economic connection with the rest of the northern Italian regions. The relative political stability and integrity led to a revival of various crafts and agriculture in Northern Italy. Later, when Italy was separated from the Frankish Empire, the cities of the northern and central regions provided it with an unprecedented cultural and economic rise, which brought Italy in the period from the 12th to the 15th centuries, during the High Middle Ages, to the first place in Western Europe.

Around the same time as the Lombard conquest in the North and South Italy came under Byzantine rule. In military and political terms, the southern Italian regions were much weaker than the northern ones – the Byzantine emperors had enough worries in the Middle East. They were not able to hold the land in the Apennines. In the 9th century, Sicily, and then much of the south of the peninsula, was conquered by the Arabs. The Normans came there a century later. The frequent change of dominant peoples had to affect the cultural identity of the

southern Italian regions, but it also led to political instability and economic underdevelopment. Southern Italy at the beginning of the Early Middle Ages was formed mainly as an agricultural region. The gap between the North and South eventually became a deep chasm. Italy suffered from feudal fragmentation much more than all other European countries.

The history of Italy as an independent European state began after the division of Verdun secured the Italian possessions of the Franks to Lothair. However, Italy did not exist as a single state until the mid-19th century. The history of Italy in the Middle Ages, in the Renaissance and in Modern Times is the history of individual city-states and regions that sometimes led an independent policy, then found themselves under the control of stronger neighbours. However, by the 10th century, an ethnic community had already developed on the territory of Italy, and in political and economic terms, the territory developed in the same way as other monolithic countries of Western Europe.

Allodial land ownership passed into the Frankish Kingdom and was widespread in Italy. A feature of the Italian economy in the period from the 9th to the 11th centuries was the development of commodity-money relations. The land became an object of purchase and sale. Not only local landowners but also large feudal lords bought plots from ruined small owners. Many residents of the cities treated the purchase of arable land as an extremely profitable investment. Hired peasants in Italy worked mainly in the fields owned by the inhabitants of the cities. Due to this, there was no complete division of land between the noble feudal lords in the provinces in Italy. Independent peasant farms of various forms of land ownership played a more important role in Italian agriculture than in other countries. The rise of agriculture in the Italian lands was rapid. It created a solid foundation for further economic growth throughout the country.

Another important factor in the rapid economic development of Italy after 1000 was the preservation of the Apennine Peninsula of many cities founded in the Roman era. Barbarian raids, decades-long epidemics, wars, and famines have undermined the role of cities in society, but they have not destroyed them. Therefore, during the period of economic recovery, Italy had an excellent base for the handicraft industries' development. In the ancient era, Italian cities were mainly shopping centres. In the Middle Ages, their economic functions changed dramatically. Trade in the cities, of course, has not disappeared. But the entire trading system of the Middle Ages was rebuilt anew, without reference to the trade and transport system of antiquity. Antiquity traded 'horizontally' on the geographical map, while the Middle Ages traded 'vertically'. Therefore, most

transport routes need to be re-established. In the 9th century, the most important commercial and industrial point in northern Italy was Pavia, the royal residence. This city was located in an extremely convenient location, in the basin of the Po River, the most important northern Italian trade artery. Pavia hosted the largest fairs in Western Europe every year. In all major Italian cities at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries, numerous corporations of artisans were created. These organizations, which aimed to protect free artisans from the authorities and large feudal lords, soon turned into workshops, self-governing bodies of citizens, which played an exceptional role in the political life of Italian cities in the period from the 12th to 14th centuries.

The cities of Northern Italy are famous for their weaving industries. In the 10th century, the best European fine cloth was produced in Lucca, Genoa, Milan, and Verona. Gradually, a kind of specialization emerged among the Italian cities. Milan was famous for weapons production, Genoa, Verona, and other centres of northwestern Italy for cloth. Coastal port towns were actively involved in international trade. On the west coast, the main commercial port was Genoa, which maintained its position on the sea for several centuries. In the east, at this time, the star of Venice was rising, and the development of cities led to a rapid general economic rise in Italy. But economic growth, in this case, played a negative political role. Since the Italian regions did not have a single political centre in the period from the 9th to the 11th centuries, each city conducted its policy, and a desperate struggle developed between them. Both merchants and artisans worked primarily for buyers from other countries. Consequently, the domestic market in Italy did not simply exist for a long time. Economic disunity also led to political disunity.

From a formal point of view, Italy was a kingdom. Representatives of some noble Italian families tried to ascend to the throne of Italy after the death of the last king of the Carolingian dynasty. After several years of wars between the pretenders, the German king Otto appeared in Italy. However, the German emperors, starting from the 11th century, were not interested in Italy as a territory of economic development. Consequently, in Italy, political and economic life resembled a motley diagram by the beginning of the High Middle Ages. The central and northern regions of Italy were more actively involved in European politics than the South. The 12th and 13th centuries were the period of the birth of national identity for Italy. The main problem on the way to the country unification, dreamed of by the best minds of Italy, was the language. No other country in Europe, whose language grew out of Latin, had so many local dialects.

Often, in two neighbouring villages, people spoke two completely different dialects. The secular literary tradition originated in Sicily, where there was a brilliant school of poetry. Then the centre of literary creativity moved to Central Italy, to Bologna, and later to Florence. There a new literary movement was born, called the ‘sweet new style’. From the school of stylists came Dante Alighieri, the greatest Italian poet, the creator of the classical literary Italian language. The Stylists wrote in the Florentine dialect, and this dialect formed the basis of the literacy language. Dante, followed by Petrarch and Boccaccio, formed a practical grammar in the Italian way. They did not write a single textbook that set out clear rules and regulations. They were developed practically, and they were equal to most of the writers and poets of Italy in the following centuries. However, even a single literary language did not unite the Italians into a single state. In the South, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies lived its life, virtually ruled from France. In the centre of the country, the Tuscany region was first strengthened, the centre of which was Florence. Lombardy, one of the regions of Northern Italy, was also strong in economic and political terms. In the east and west of the country, the two general merchant republics of the Middle Ages – Venice and Genoa – developed a rapid activity.

Thus, the Italian society and the peoples who inhabited the peninsula during the previous 15-20 centuries felt the strongest influence of the alien peoples of the East and North. It led to the emergence of persistent dissatisfaction with their position in the European community in general and the Mediterranean community particularly. As a result, the social, economic and political transformations that took place in the period from the 10th to 14th centuries also shaped the ethnic transformations of Italian society.

Discussion

The correlation issue of the past with the present for predicting the future processes is the most difficult in scientific analysis. Therefore, in the framework of this study, it is necessary to focus deeper on solving the following problems:

1. Creating a method for a more correct ratio of ‘archions’ and ‘stations’ to minimize the generation of ‘versions’, i.e., future processes within the period under study.
2. Creation of a comprehensive map of the migration of the peoples of Europe and the East in the European space from the 4th to 14th centuries based on modern advances in genetics.

3. Drawing up a correct and unbiased psychological map of the average representative of each stratum of society in a region or territory at each historical stage of the development of Europe.

The solution of these scientific directions will contribute to a more comprehensive analysis of the problems of combining national identity and genetically formed relations of neighbouring peoples concerning each ethnic group.

Conclusion

The eight centuries of the Early and High Middle Ages, which gradually transformed the Roman Empire into the Holy Empire, radically influenced the situation of the Apennine Peninsula indigenous peoples, later united by a single name of the Italian nation. The tribes that inhabited the peninsula in the 2nd millennium BC and dominated there for 20-25 centuries gradually found themselves on the margins of ethnic dominance. The reason for this was several migration waves that radically changed the economic and political situation of the region and the social status of the peoples.

The newcomers from the East and partly from the North adopted the high culture of the Apennine Peninsula peoples. However, they tried to preserve their identity. It caused a fundamental rejection of most of the indigenous population from the assimilating ones. As a result, this led to a social conflict of the new alien ruling elites of the local nobility. However, thanks to its favourable geo-economic position, Italy retained favourable preferences, which later allowed us to talk about the revival of civilization in the form of the richest city-polis, which concentrated all the achievements of science and art in Europe.

Nevertheless, the origins of ethnic and cultural contradictions laid down in the period from the 4th to 14th centuries formed in the local first nations a fairly stable wariness and relative negativism towards neighbouring ethnic groups that became descendants of migrants from the Early and Upper Middle Ages from the East and North.

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Intolerance across generations: the relation of the Slovak majority to the Jewish minority before, during and after the fall of the communist regime (selected aspects) (in Slovak)

Abstract:

The paper presents the theoretical basis of the issue of existence and application of intolerant attitudes of the majority population in relation to the minority Jewish community in Slovakia. We focus primarily on selected aspects of intolerance against Jews – specifically Slovak nationalism (i.e., political clericalism) and Jewish antisemitism. The starting point of the article is quantitative and qualitative research of Slovaks' attitudes in the past, in which several experts revealed a negative stereotypical and negative perception of “difference”, which is understood as “not Slovak”, event. not “ours”. We point out that the given attitude extends across generations and across periods (before communism, during it and after communism, i.e., to the present). Subsequently, the text presents the observations that emerged from the survey itself. The aim of the qualitative survey was to describe and analyse the opinions and attitudes of respondents in relation to Jews in Slovakia.

Keywords:

intolerance, Jews, Slovaks, attitudes, communism, research, personal experience.

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Netolerancia naprieč generáciám: Vzťah slovenskej majority k židovskej menšine pred, počas a po páde komunistického režimu (vybrané aspekty)

Abstrakt:

Príspevok predstavuje teoretické východiská problematiky existencie a uplatňovania netolerantných postojov majoritného obyvateľstva vo vzťahu k minoritnej židovskej obci na Slovensku. Sústreďme sa predovšetkým na vybrané aspekty netolerancie voči Židom –

špecificky slovenský nacionalizmus (t. j. politický klerikalizmus) a antisemitizmus. Výhodiskom príspevku sú v minulosti realizované kvantitatívne aj kvalitatívne výskumy postojových orientácií Slovákov, v ktorých viacerí odborníci odhalili negatívne stereotypné a odmietavé vnímanie “odlišnosti”, ktorá je chápaná ako “nie slovenská”, event. nie “naša”. Poukazujeme nato, že daný postoj sa ťahne naprieč generáciami a naprieč obdobiami (pred komunizmom, počas neho aj po komunizme, t.j. do súčasnosti). V nadväznosti nato text predkladá pozorovania, ktoré vzišli v rámci vlastného prieskumu. Cieľom kvalitatívneho prieskumu bol popis a analýza názorov a postojov respondentov vo vzťahu k Židom na Slovensku.

Kľúčové slová:

netolerancia, Židia, Slováci, postoje, komunizmus, prieskum, osobná skúsenosť.

Úvod

Medzinárodná legitimita moci komunistických strán vo východnej Európe vychádzala z výsledkov druhej svetovej vojny – z porážky nacizmu a víťazstva komunizmu. Vychádzajúc zo záverov *Jaltskej konferencie* (a na nej ustanovených dohôd z februára 1945) sa na pozadí studenej vojny ‘slobodný západný svet’ živil antikomunizmom a ‘komunistický východný svet’ zase antiimperializmom a antikapitalizmom. Oba ideologické tábory vyhlasovali, že sú v radikálnom konflikte a len máločo, ak vôbec niečo, majú spoločné. Slováci tento súboj vnímali predovšetkým ako súbor hodnôt. Navyiac, v postoji k Židom boli Slováci reprezentantmi východného bloku a jeho ideí, zatiaľ čo Židia boli príslušníkmi ‘nepriateľského bloku’.

Po dlhé desaťročia ostával imperializmus a kapitalizmus, v myslí Slovákov obrovským nepriateľom komunistických ‘hesiel’ o *spoločnej delbe práce, socializme s ľudskou tvárou, spoločnom vlastníctve výrobných prostriedkov* a pod. Pravdou je, že stále existuje mnoho tých, ktorí za komunizmom smútia, hlásiac zlyhanie demokracie, ktorá sľubovala harmonické spolunažívanie, toleranciu, náboženskú slobodu, dialóg, otvorenosť a napredovanie. Veľké očakávania sa nenaplnili. Nepodarilo sa uskutočniť ‘harmóniu’ tam, kde sú prítomné relatívne pravdy a hodnoty. A tak nám, slovami Hrehovej, nielen dejinná ale aj súčasná skúsenosť ukazuje, že v perspektíve každodennej morálnosti, od ktorej závisia medziľudské vzťahy aj vzťahy medzi rôznymi kultúrami a náboženstvami (či samotný ľudský život), nie je relativita možná (Hrehová, 1990). Vyúsťuje do ľahostajných postojov a tým o. i. podporuje aj netoleranciu, xenofóbiu, agresiu a rasizmus.

1. Slováci a netolerancia vo svetle relevantných výskumov

Uvažujúc o negatívnych postojoch Slovákov voči Židom v kontexte posledných generácií, predstavuje zaujímavý názor Vago. Autor je presvedčený, že

to boli predovšetkým postkomunistické zmeny, ktoré sa hlboko dotkli Slovákov, a to na citlivom mieste – v slovenských rodinách. Podľa autora sa rodiny po páde komunizmu stali nositeľmi predstavy o “večnom prefíkanom Židovi”, ktorý riadi krajinu aj svet. Pozadie tohto názoru vysvetľuje autor nasledovne. Mnohých vysokopostavených funkcionárov počas komunizmu, ktorí boli Židmi, striedali v nových vedúcich pozíciách po roku 1989 ich deti. Antisemitizmus hovoril o otcoch, ktorí “privodili komunistický teror” a o deťoch, ktoré už ‘obrozené a demokratické’ pokračujú “konštituovaním postkomunistickej elity”, ovládajúc ekonomiku a médiá; k *Protokolom sionských mudrcov* sa pridáva ‘generačný prídavok’, t.j. *Protokol sionskej mládeže*. Osud detí nežidovských funkcionárov z čias komunizmu sa samozrejme nespomína, aby sa nenarušil stereotyp (Vago, 2000).

V kontexte akéhosi ‘dedičstva’ postojov majority voči kultúrnej, nábožensky a inak diverzným skupinám existujú na Slovensku ale i také štúdie, ktoré takéto generačné dedičstvo nepotvrdzujú či ho dokonca vyvracajú. Jednou z takýchto štúdií je kvantitatívny výskum autora Jána Vlacha, ktorý sa venoval prenosu hodnôt z rodičov na ich vysokoškolskú mládež a prostredníctvom výskumu potvrdil výrazné rozdiely v preferenciách jednotlivých hodnôt medzi populáciami detí (aj v závislosti od pohlavia) a rodičov. Mládež má väčší záujem o altruistické hodnoty voči druhým a o vzťah k svojmu okoliu (prírode a spoločnosti). Vysokoškoláci so svojimi rodičmi nezdieľajú ani konzervatívne hodnoty, ktoré sú u rodičov výrazné (Vlach, 2006). Príklon skúmaných vysokoškolákov k *altruistickým hodnotám* považujeme za pozitívne, nakoľko altruistické správanie dáva dôraz na obojstranné obohacovanie, čo je základným predpokladom aj pre mierovú existenciu náboženstiev, medzináboženský dialóg a pod.

Kdesi na pomedzí oboch autorov stojí zahraničná štúdia Ronalda Ingleharta a Wayne Bakera, ktorí si všímajú *zmeny v spoločnosti* v čase, kedy jedna generácia strieda druhú. Ak sa spoločnosť napríklad rozvíja a ekonomicky silnie, podľa autora postupuje smerom k demokracii a rešpektu ľudských práv, pričom sa odkláňa od tradičných hodnôt zameraných na konzerváciu súčasného stavu. Spoločnosť sa mení nie preto, lebo sa zmenili hodnotové systémy v generácii, resp. prevládli názory a vplyv staršej generácie na mladšiu, t.j. vplyv rodičov na deti. Spoločnosť sa mení preto, lebo sa medzičasom vymenili ľudia; t.j. staršiu generáciu vystriedala mladšia. Podstatné však je, že hodnoty v oboch generáciách ostávajú podľa autorov štúdie pomerne stabilné (Inglehart & Baker, 2001). To opäť potvrdzuje generačný vplyv (aj v otázkach netolerancie).

Naviac, v tomto kontexte upozorňuje Kvasničková, že ak je minulosť jednej generácie sporná alebo nedoriešená, potom sa nevyriešené problémy nanovo

vracajú a v obnovovaných aj nových kontextoch vytvárajú priestor na netoleranciu (Kvasničková, 2005). Dochádza k prestupu netolerantných postojov, stereotypov aj predsudkov z generácie na generáciu, a to má podľa autorky nie raz dokonca stúpajúci charakter. Okrem iných tak aj napr. Vašečka predstavuje *generačný vplyv* ako neodmysliteľnú základňu pre vznik neznášanlivých postojov. Autor vyslovuje príklad, v ktorom uvádza, že veľká časť mladých ľudí žijúcich v časoch vojnového Slovenského štátu a v období po ňom vytvorila svoju generačnú spolupatričnosť nielen spoločným prežívaním obdobia Slovenského štátu, ale aj rovnakými (t. j. netolerantnými) postojmi voči Židom. Tieto postoje sa stali stavebnými tehličkami ich generačnej identity; teória obdobne platí pre všetky generácie (Vašečka, 2013). Spomedzi mnohých odborníkov hodnotí vnímanie 'odlišnosti' u Slovákov v súčasnosti už spomínaný Vašečka, ktorý uvádza, že Slovensko sa bráni *cudzím prvkom* a chce mať všetkých *podobných sebe*. Podľa Vašečku sú menšiny na Slovensku objektom tzv. *rasistického paradoxu* zo strany väčšinovej spoločnosti; majorita ich síce vyzýva k integrácii, no táto ponuka sa v spoločenskom a mediálnom diskurze vyznačuje asimilačnými tlakmi – majorita chce mať všetkých na svoj obraz.

Na vysokú mieru netolerantnosti a (neprijateľnej) sociálnej vzdialenosti Slovákov vo vzťahu k menšinám (predovšetkým voči Židom, Arabom, černochoom a Rómom, pozn.) opakovane poukazujú závery eurobarometrov (TASR, 2018; Redakcia Aktuality.sk, 2016). Obdobné zistenia prinášajú aj ďalší odborníci, ktorí sa zhodujú na tom, že medzi Slovákami je prítomný výrazný odpor voči religiózne a etnicky diverzným skupinám; v kontexte religiozity voči moslimom a Židom; z pohľadu etnicity najmä voči Rómom (Macháček, 2007; Gallová-Kriglerová et al., 2009; Chudžíková, 2011; Polonský & Novotný, 2011; Krivý, 2001; Kamenec, 2005; Hargašová, 1995 etc.). Napokon aj podľa *Inštitútu pre verejné otázky* preukazujú bežní Slováci viditeľne kritický postoj a vysoký sociálny dištanc voči akejkoľvek 'odlišnosti', a to aj na personálnej úrovni (Inštitút pre verejné otázky, 2017).

Stručne, o netolerancii majority voči židovskej minorite možno hovoriť aj ako o dôsledku generačného vplyvu, čo potvrdzujú aj výskumy. Tie pripomínajú, že ak je minulosť jednej generácie sporná alebo nedoriešená, potom sa nevyriešené problémy nanovo vracajú a v obnovovaných aj nových kontextoch vytvárajú priestor na netoleranciu. Otázkou ostáva, aké oblasti sú pre slovenskú verejnosť vo vzťahu k židovskej menšine nevyriešené a pod zdanlivým tichom čakajú na svoj návrat. Je nenávistný postoj k Židom v našich kultúrnych, náboženských,

sociálnych a ďalších kontextoch už nadobro ukončený, alebo máme očakávať jeho renesanciu?

2. Vzťah slovenskej majority k židovskej menšine pred komunizmom

Hradská poukazuje na komunitu Židov ako na sprvoti utláčanú a zakríknutú menšinu, ktorá v 19. storočí zažíva hospodársku prosperitu aby sa napokon stala “obetným baránkom”, zodpovedným za všetky neduhy a problémy vtedajšej slovenskej spoločnosti. Podľa Hradskej sa slovo “Žid” medzi Slovákami už v 19. storočí (a ďalej) stotožňovalo so slovom *úžerník*. Prevažovali tendencie hľadiť na Židov cez prizmu ich majetkového postavenia v spoločnosti; negatívne vášne vzbudzovala hospodárska moc Židov a ich hospodárska expanzia. K stereotypizácii Židov na Slovensku prispelo aj presvedčenie väčšiny o tom, že Židia udávali Slovákov, rozširovali neslovenskú tlač, nadŕžali Maďarom (t. j. boli považovaní za organickú súčasť maďarského židovstva) a budili medzi Maďarmi nenávisť voči slovenskej vláde aj voči národu (Hradská, 2014). Krekovičová a Panczová dodávajú, že názor majority, že Židia sa usilujú byť oporou maďarským politickým, kultúrnym a hospodárskym elitám ich staval do pozície “nepriateľov slovenského nacionalizmu” (Krekovičová & Panczová, 2013).

Mešťan taktiež pripomína špecifickú podmienku šírenia nacionalizmu a židovského antisemitizmu na Slovensku v období pred komunizmom. Poukazuje na politický klerikalizmus niektorých katolíckych cirkevných predstaviteľov (vrátane prezidenta štátu), v období počas druhej svetovej vojny. Za politickým klerikalizmom, ktorý sa na Slovensku ukazuje naprieč generáciami, stojí prípad slovenského prezidenta a katolíckeho kňaza Jozefa Tisa, ktorý bol odsúdený za vlastizradu a popravený; do svojej smrti odmietal odsúdiť zločiny nacistického Nemecka, vrátane idey koncentračných táborov.

Dodajme, že po skončení Druhej svetovej vojny žilo na Slovensku (t.j. v obnovenom Československu), napriek smutne známym dôsledkom ‘riešenia’ židovskej otázky ešte stále približne 30 tisíc Židov (Klein-Pejšová, [online]).

Stručne, hospodársku prosperitu Židov koncom 19. a v prvej polovici 20. storočia strieda ťaž prenesenej zodpovednosti za všetky neduhy a problémy vtedajšej slovenskej spoločnosti. Židia boli tými, ktorí mali *vždy veľké zásoby*. Vyčítalo sa im, že udávali Slovákov, rozširovali neslovenskú tlač, nadŕžali Maďarom a pod. Aj prax potvrdzovala, že na Slovensku žili ako cudzinci, t. j. od Slovákov iní a odlišní – jazykovo, hospodársky aj nábožensky. V očiach majority sa sčasti pravdivo, sčasti ako dôsledok prepracovanej propagandy,

formoval nelichotivý obraz Žida ako úžerníka, obchodníka, krčmára, okrádača, mudrlanta, špekulanta a predovšetkým vykorisťovateľa. Napriek každodenným prejavom netolerancie a režimovým opatreniam ostáva na Slovensku po vojne približne 30 tisíc Židov.

3. Vzťah slovenskej majority k židovskej menšine počas komunizmu

Okrem nacionalizmu a antisemitizmu, ktoré na Slovensku reprezentoval politický klerikalizmus a jeho otvorená podpora nemeckej Tretej ríše, to bol predovšetkým komunistický režim, ktorý prispel k definitívnemu odchodu vojnu preživších Židov zo Slovenska do cudziny (a k malému počtu Židov na Slovensku v súčasnosti; cca 3 tisíc).

Po nástupe komunistickej strany v roku 1948 bolo jedným z prvých opatrení štátne obmedzenie práva občanov na slobodu vierovyznania. Až dnes vidíme, že toto ústavné právo bolo zo strany komunistov významne porušované a nerešpektované až do konca diktatúry v roku 1989. Za čias najsilnejšieho komunizmu dochádzalo až k viditeľnému útlaku a k deklarovanej neslobode v otázke náboženského vierovyznania. Komunizmus sa, slovami Budila, stal “vážnou kresťanskou herézou” (Budil, 2006).

Život kresťanov pulzoval ďalej – usídlený a koncentrovaný v podzemných štruktúrach tzv. Tajnej cirkvi. Očividne ale na Slovensku v danom období absentovali akékoľvek iné svetové náboženstvá, vrátane judaizmu, rovnako ako nové náboženské hnutia; hoci, slovami Orbanovej, mali v iných Európskych krajinách už vytvorené svoje pevné štruktúry a spoločenské zázemie (Orbanová, 2009).

Pretrvávajúce nacionalistických, rasových a antisemitských nálad v myslení časti obyvateľstva na Slovensku pretrvávalo aj v období komunizmu. Podľa Mešťana nato mali vplyv predovšetkým dva faktory. Bola to asimilačná politika komunistického režimu vo vzťahu k menšinám (i Židom) a už vyššie spomínané a stále živé obviňovanie Židov z účasti na maďarizácii Slovákov (Mešťan, 2000). Asimilačná politika bola postavená na zásadnom popieraní protižidovských zásahov zo strany štátu, vrátane popierania existencie antisemitizmu. Komunisti dali netoleranciu, namierenej proti Židom na Slovensku ‘novú’ podobu – stáli v nikdy nepriznanej, a predsa zjavnej a otvorenej opozícii voči antisionizmu a štátu Izrael.

Povedané stručne, v období komunizmu dochádza vo vzťahu majority a Židov na Slovensku k prehlasovaniu myšlienok nacionalizmu a antisemitizmu. Tie podporoval aj štát: vo vojenskom období hlásal tzv. politický klerikalizmus a po vojne ideológiu komunizmu. Predovšetkým komunizmus ale prispel k definitívnemu

odchodu Židov zo Slovenska, nakoľko komunisti ohrozili aj právo občanov na slobodu vierovyznania. Židia stratili poslednú nádej na slobodný a pokojný život, ktorého súčasťou je aj náboženstvo. Na Slovensku v danom období úplne chýbali iné náboženstvá; nehovoriac už o medzináboženských aktivitách a vzťahoch. V štyridsať ročnom období komunistickej totality pretrváva podľa odborníkov najmä obviňovanie Židov z účasti na maďarizácii Slovákov. Obvinenia plne podporuje (aj) voči Židom sústredená asimilačná politika komunistického režimu.

4. Vzťah slovenskej majority k židovskej menšine po komunizme

Na šírenie nami sledovaných aspektov – nacionalizmu a antisemitizmu na Slovensku – nadviazali politici aj po r. 1990. V prístupe k Židom sa, krátko po páde komunizmu, začalo aktivizovať viacero skupín pravicových radikálov (tie mali prepojenie na medzinárodnú sieť extrémistických hnutí). Charakterizoval ich negacionizmus, revizionizmus, osvienčimská lož a ďalšie javy, namierené proti Židom či spochybňujúce zločiny holokaustu.

Nežná revolúcia otvorila nielen *branicu*; s pádom berlínskeho múru sa skončilo delenie sveta na východný a západný blok a tzv. Nežná revolúcia priniesla Slovákom odstránenie komunistického režimu tzv. ‘nekrvavým spôsobom’. Bola to revolúcia, ktorá po páde komunizmu otvorila aj *politický priestor*, ktorý umožnil vzniku viacerých neoľudáckych strán. S nimi ožila aj obhajoba fašizmu, čo možno vidieť pri pohľade na výroky zo zakázaného samizdatu – predovšetkým vysvetľovanie fašizmu ako obrannej ideológie pred ovládaním a rozpínavosťou židovstva. Ak sa chcelo Slovensko ubrániť pred touto hrozbou, malo sa (podľa ‘demokratických fašistov’) uchýliť k nacionalizmu (Hlas Slovenska, 1988, 1991 a ďalšie).

Etablovanie pravicových radikálnych hnutí v slovenskej spoločnosti bolo podľa Hradskej založené na požiadavke rasovej čistoty. Dodnes v nich podľa autorky ide o cieleňú podporu neznášanlivosti a otvorený antisemitizmus, ktorý označuje judaizmus za *kacírsky hebrejizmus* a Židov za *antikristov a klamárov*. Židom sú zároveň prisudzované snahy o svetovú nadvládu a ciele svetového miešania rás či zničenia pravého kresťanstva (Hradská, 2007).

G. Fatranová (2000) sa v kontexte po komunistického diania rozhodla skúmať štyri hlavné antisemitské javy, ktoré boli medzi Slovákami v skrytosti vždy prítomné, ale nanovo ožili najmä po páde komunistického režimu. Zaujímalo ju, do akej miery antisemitské javy čerpajú z minulosti, čo medzi Slovákami ovplyvňuje ich efektívnosť a či dochádza aj k ich odumieraniu. Podľa autorky sa krátkodobo a marginálne ukazovala nenávisť voči Židom v dôsledku:

- a) presvedčenia Slovákov o svetovládnych úmysloch Židov,
- b) názoru, že Židia Slovákov zdierajú a okrádajú,
- c) obvinení Židov z účasti na maďarizácii Slovákov.

Podľa Fatranovej iba jeden jav pretrváva do súčasnosti – opäť ide o rovnaký jav – slovenský nacionalizmus (ktorý sa naplno rozvinul vďaka politickému klerikalizmu počas druhej svetovej vojny a ktorý, zdá sa, pretrváva) (Fatranová, 2000).

Výskum Fatranovej potvrdil, že *kauza Tiso* stále vzbudzuje staronové emócie, nakoľko sa stala nielen obľúbeným výkrikom antisemitov, ale o. i. aj dozvukom úsilia o uznanie existencie slovenskej štátnosti. Širšie to objasňuje aj František Mikloško, disident za čias komunizmu a aktivista vtedajšej tzv. *Tajnej cirkvi*. Podľa Mikloška je Tisova poprava po vojne stále slovenskou traumou. “Bol to kňaz a obesť kňaza je potupná smrť, ktorá sa ľuďmi hlboko dotýka.” To z neho urobilo mučeníka a tak sa “na jeho poprave ďalej šírila myšlienka slovenskej štátnosti” (Vagovič, 2012).

Aj v súčasnosti je postoj Slovákov k židovskej menšine špecifický. Vago hovorí o. i. o tzv. *očisťovaní histórie*, t. j. v prekrúcaní minulosti alebo v udržiavaní presvedčenia, že osud Židov sa počas vojnového Slovenska nijako *nelíšil* od osudu obyčajných Slovákov alebo iných menšín. Ďalším negatívnym javom postkomunistickej doby je podľa autora systematický útok na historickú pamäť holokaustu s cieľom *relativizovať holokaust*. Vago pripomína aj dôsledky nárokov Židov na reštitúcie a odškodnenie, keď hovorí o spôsoboch, ako sa tieto nároky prezentujú verejnosti. Argumentácia je postavená tak, aby bolo verejnosti jasné, že ide o “židovský pokus vytĺkať peniaze od postkomunistických štátov” (Vago, 2000). Daný spôsob chápu Slováci ako “vykorisťovanie”, čo sa prejavuje ako veľká ‘nevôľa’ majority voči židovskej komunite ako celku.

Vago a ďalší, vyššie predstavení autori, predstavujú nenávisť voči Židom a antisemitizmus ako dôsledok generačného vplyvu, ktorý sa naplno prejavil práve po komunizme. Ako sme naznačili vyššie v texte, podľa Vaga sa však postkomunistické zmeny hlboko dotkli najmä rodinných spoločenstiev. V obyčajných slovenských rodinách nabral totiž antisemitizmus jeden zo svojich najsilnejších argumentov – vďaka rodine a v rodine vznikol stereotyp o “večnom prefíkanom Židovi, ktorý riadi krajinu” (Vago, 2000).

Častý a obľúbený *nový antisemitský slovník* nikdy neopomína ani pojem *globalizácia*. Práve naopak, globalizáciu spája so záujmami súčasného tzv. svetového židovstva. Moderný antisemitizmus identifikuje Židov, slovami Vaga, ako prvotných šíriteľov globalizácie aj ako jej *hlavných užívateľov*. Vďaka globalizácii

naberá stereotypný obraz Žida v očiach nežidov ďalšie nelichotivé charakteristiky – ide o toho istého, večne prefičaného a mazaného Žida, ktorý nemá korene a slúži svojim záujmom rozprestretým po celom svete” (Vago, 2000).

Krátke zhrnutie: Možno povedať, že aj v období po páde komunistického režimu dva nami sledované aspekty – slovenský nacionalizmus a židovský antisemitizmus – neustávajú. Na myšlienky *politického klerikalizmu* nadviazali politici aj po r. 1990. Ich prejavom navyše sekundovali pravicoví radikáli, ktorí s využitím médií a nových médií prehlasovali myšlienky negacionizmu, revizionizmu, osvienčimskú lož a ďalšie javy, namierené proti Židom. Výnimkou neboli ani útoky na židovské kultúrne dedičstvo alebo spochybňovanie zločinov holokaustu. Nedávne výskumy potvrdili, že *kauza Tiso*, resp. slovenský nacionalizmus stále vzbudzuje emócie, ktoré vedú k netolerancii. Ide o jeden zo spoločenských ‘motivátorov’, ktoré robia postoj Slovákov k židovskej menšine aj dnes špecifickým. Za charakteristické prejavy majority voči Židom po páde komunizmu možno považovať: *tzv. očisťovanie histórie; prekrúcanie minulosti, pokusy o rehabilitáciu a legitimizáciu odsúdených fašistických lídrov; útoky na historickú pamäť a kultúrne dedičstvo, pokusy o relativizáciu holokaustu či úsilie extrémistov interpretovať právoplatné reštitúcie a odškodnenie Židov ako ich úsilie okradnúť a zničiť slovenskú väčšinu*. Slovenský nacionalizmus a stále živý antisemitizmus sa predovšetkým po páde komunizmu javí ako dôsledok generačného vplyvu. V obyčajných slovenských rodinách vzniká a naberá na sile jeden z najsilnejších argumentov proti Židom: *Žid je večne prefičaný a robí všetko preto, aby riadil a ovládal túto krajinu*. V 21. storočí sa v prístupe k Židom v slovenských podmienkach aktivizuje viacero skupín pravicových radikálov. Tí označujú Židov ako prvotných šíriteľov globalizácie aj ako jej *hlavných užívateľov*. Globalizácia je v očiach extrémistov výmysel Židov, ktorí chcú naďalej *hájiť svoje záujmy, rozprestreté po celom svete*.

5. Metodológia kvalitatívneho prieskumu

Prieskum postojov respondentov voči Židom na Slovensku bol uskutočnený formou dvoch skupinových rozhovorov. Tie boli realizované začiatkom roka 2020. Plánovaný prieskum v tretej a štvrtej skupine (v ktorých mala pribudnúť aj výskumná kategória *pohlavie respondentov* a interpretácia zistení na základe pohlavia respondentov) bol odvolaný vzhľadom na nepriaznivú pandemickú situáciu COVID-19.

Prvú skupinu tvorili ôsmi respondenti oboch pohlaví so stredoškolským vzdelaním vo veku 18-40 rokov (1sk). Druhú skupinu tvorili ôsmi respondenti

oboch pohlaví s vysokoškolským vzdelaním vo veku 18-40 rokov. Kriteériálny výber členov oboch výskumných skupín znázorňuje (tabuľka 1).

Cieľom kvalitatívneho prieskumu bolo získanie názorov a postojov respondentov voči Židom, žijúcim na Slovensku. Výskumnou metódou bol *skupinový rozhovor*, ktorý bol realizovaný samostatne v každej výskumnej skupine.

V rámci prieskumu boli stanovené závery. Členovia oboch samostatne posudzovaných výskumných skupín vyjadrili vo vzťahu k zisteniam svoj *súhlas*. Súhlas respondentov so zisteniami a závermi prieskumu boli našim *osobným cieľom*; chceli sme čo najviac eliminovať vlastné zásahy a vlastnú interpretáciu získaných výrokov v rámci oboch výskumných skupín.

6. Zistenia prieskumu a diskusia

Diskusia v každej zo skupín prebiehala v rozsahu dvoch hodín. Spočiatku zaznievali monotematické odpovede a zaznamenávali sme skôr všeobecný kontext vnímania odlišnosti židov v porovnaní s majoritnými Slovákami. Postupne, s prehĺbením vzájomných vzťahov sa medzi respondentmi objavili aj otvorene negatívne názory. S prvkami predsudkov a stereotypov zazneli názory, v ktorých respondenti hodnotili fyziognomické odlišnosti židov. Židom boli ďalej pripisované negatívne vlastnosti, ktoré respondenti spájali s náboženskou praxou. Názory, ktoré môžeme klasifikovať ako predsudky a stereotypy vzišli v diskusii aj v súvislosti s predstavami respondentov o chamtivosti a lakomstve židov či ich úmysloch ovládať svetové dianie (a médiá).

Zaujímavosťou je, že hoci postoj respondentov oboch výskumných skupín sprevádzal väčšinový negativizmus, tento jav ustupoval potom, čo respondenti spomenuli osobnú skúsenosť so stretnutia so židom. Táto skúsenosť bola hodnotená pozitívne a zmienka o “peknom zážitku” mala vplyv aj na úsilie respondentov odvrátiť negatívne postoje.

Z rozhovorov s respondentmi vyplynuli tieto pozorovania (respondenti súhlasili s takouto formuláciou zistení, pozn.):

1. Vôbec prvá, bezprostredná asociácia spojená so slovom “Žid” sa u väčšiny respondentov spája s tým, čo je pre Slováka “cudzie”, “fyziognomicky odlišné” a “iné”. Takéto vnímanie môže byť (ale aj nemusí) dôvodom negatívnych názorov, ale aj postojov a skutkov, ktoré predstavitelia majority na Slovensku vykazujú vo vzťahu k židovskej menšine.
2. V dvoch skupinových rozhovoroch zaznievajú viaceré príklady rozdielnych a nie práve pochopených židovských sviatkov a zvykov, upravujúcich napríklad židovské princípy stravovania. Výraznejšie negatívne postoje

zaznamenávame i v názore respondentov na židovskú kultúru; napr. obriezka malých chlapcov. Výnimkou je pozitívne hodnotenie židovskej hudby.

3. Najviac negatívne bol hodnotený vzhľad Židov. Respondentom prekážajú “copíky”. Sú presvedčení o “zlej hygiene” a Židov hodnotia ako “škaredých” a “nesympatických”.
4. Respondenti v oboch skupinách konštatovali, že je to náboženská odlišnosť Židov (t. j. “výrazné náboženské oblečenie a náboženské zvyky”), ktorá ich robí “sociálne neatraktívnych”. Podľa predsedu Ústredného zväzu Židovských náboženských obcí P. Salnera alebo na základe výskumu T. Gyárfášovej je na Slovensku pritom v súčasnosti už väčšina takých mladých židov, ktorí sú otvorene sekularizovaní a prejavujú záujem skôr o židovskú kultúru a tradície ako o náboženstvo (Gyárfášová, 2008). Slováci sa v súčasnosti stretávajú s rovesníkmi, ktorí židovstvo považujú skôr za kultúrnu záležitosť. Netolerantný pohľad na Židov má, domnievame sa, korene inde, nakoľko sa prípadný negativizmus Slovákov voči Židom nemôže odvolávať na ‘náboženský prvok’.
5. Podľa respondentov je reakcia na verbálne prejavovanú intoleranciu voči Židom na verejnosti (napríklad v školskom prostredí, na vlakovej stanici alebo v hypermarkete) skôr výnimkou. Ak sa niečo také na verejnosti deje podľa jedného z respondentov to “nik nekritizuje a nik to neodsúdi. Antisemitizmus sa v drvivej väčšine prípadov ticho toleruje”.

Záverom, môžeme vidieť, že vzťahy Židov so slovenskou majoritou majú dlhú históriu, poznačenú nejednou smutnou skutočnosťou. O potenciály súčasnej netolerancie majority v kontexte Slovenska svedčí aj náš výskum. Skúmaná problematika nabera na vážnosti najmä ak si uvedomíme, že v oboch výskumných skupinách boli zaznamenané obdobné názory, ktoré charakterizuje výraznejšia negativita respondentov vo vzťahu k Židom na Slovensku; napriek malej osobnej skúsenosti s nimi.

Pozitívnym zistením je výrazný ústup negativizmu v skupine, hneď po priznaní dobrej osobnej skúsenosti jedného z respondentov so židom. V skupine s výraznejšie negatívnym postojom respondentov k Židom (1 sk.) bolo zaznamenané úsilie respondentov hľadať pozitívne znaky kultúrnej a náboženskej odlišnosti.

Záver

V teoretickej časti príspevku sme poukázali na niekoľko vybraných podôb netolerancie, ktoré obsahovali postoje Slovákov voči Židom pred komunizmom, počas neho a po ňom. Sústredili sme sa na dva vybrané aspekty netolerancie voči Židom, ktoré sa tiahnu všetkými sledovanými obdobiami – *špecificky slovenský nacionalizmus* (v kontexte tzv. politického klerikalizmu) a *židovský antisemitizmus*.

Židovský antisemitizmus sa v troch obdobiach – pred komunizmom, počas neho a po komunizme – ukazuje ako univerzálny fenomén, tiahnuci sa naprieč generáciami Slovákov. Netolerancia majority voči židovskej minorite obsahuje aj prvky *nacionalizmu*, ktorý sprevádzajú výčitky majoritného obyvateľstva voči židovskému spoločenskému, historickému aj náboženskému etnocentrizmu, odsudzovanie židovskej emancipácie, predsudky aj stereotypné obvinenia. Zdá sa, že netolerancia Slovákov má v troch sledovaných obdobiach okrem tradične náboženského charakteru i sekulárny, t.j. rasovo a etnicky zameraný ráz.

Vago si preto kladie zaujímavú otázku. Pýta sa, či sa netolerancia a židovský antisemitizmus stratia, keď bude proces postkomunizmu na Slovensku nadobro ukončený. Podľa autora sa to žiaľ neukazuje a antisemitizmus, definovaný ako *najstaršia nenávisť* sa z nášho regiónu nestráca. Dôvodom podľa Vaga je, že rozličné podoby antisemitizmu a extrémizmu sa u nás a rovnako aj v strednej a východnej Európe *uskutočňovali až príliš dlho* (Vago, 2000).

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Prílohy

Tabuľka 1. Charakteristika členov skupinového rozhovoru

Skupina	Počet	Vek	Vzdelanie
1 skupina	8	18-40	stredoškolské
2 skupina	8	18-40	vysokoškolské

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Ethnic problems of the Baltic region

Abstract:

The research is devoted to the ethnic problems of the Baltic region (the territory of 3 former Soviet republics – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). This topic remains relevant, despite the fact that these republics do not have a special global political, economic and cultural influence. The region has almost lost its industrial potential. In the Baltic States, the population is rapidly declining, returning to the figures of more than a century ago. The research shows the reasons why civil society has not developed in the Baltic States. The result is the fragmentation of society. The basis of the research is based on the historical method. Although there is a fairly significant scientific literature on the history of the region, mainly in Russian, this topic is usually reduced to the history of aboriginal peoples, which cannot be considered historically correct. The Baltic republics will gradually fade away, which will only paradoxically spur the struggle for these empty territories. The results of the study will be applicable in the field of ethnological research within the framework of the development of a single European space and the preservation of historical and cultural heritage.

Keywords:

Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ostsee region, Ostsee Germans, ‘Russian-speaking population’, ‘non-citizens’, emigration, diasporas.

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Этническая проблематика Прибалтийского региона

Аннотация:

Исследование посвящено этническим проблемам Прибалтийского региона (территория трёх бывших советских республик – Эстонии, Латвии, Литвы). Данная тема сохраняет свою актуальность, несмотря на то что эти республики не имеют особого глобального политического, экономического и культурного влияния. Регион, практически утратил свой промышленный потенциал. В Прибалтике стремительно сокращается численность населения, возвратившись на показатели более чем столетней давности. В статье указаны причины, по которым в Прибалтике так и не сложилось гражданское общество.

Результатом становится фрагментация общества. В основу исследования положен исторический метод. Хотя по истории региона существует довольно значительная научная литература, преимущественно на русском языке, данная тема обычно сводится к истории аборигенных народов, что не может считаться исторически корректным. Прибалтийские республики ждёт постепенное угасание, что только парадоксальным образом подхлестнёт борьбу за эти пустеющие территории. Результаты исследования будут применимы в области этнологических исследований в рамках развития единого европейского пространства и сохранения историко-культурного наследия.

Ключевые слова:

Прибалтика, Эстония, Латвия, Литва, Остзейский край, остзейские немцы, «русскоязычное население», «неграждане», эмиграция, диаспоры.

Introduction

Of the regions of historical Russia, the Baltic States occupy a special place. Speaking of the Baltic States, it is necessary to distinguish the Baltic States in several meanings.

First, in the narrowest sense of the word, the Baltic States are the territory of the former Livonia, which later make up three Russian provinces – Estland, Courland and Livonia. These provinces formed a separate general government of the Russian Empire – the Baltic Region. The German name for the Baltic Sea – Ostsee, this region was even called Ostsee in the Russian press. (Now – the territory of Estonia and Latvia).

Secondly, the Baltic States in the broader and most traditional sense refers to the historical and cultural region that included the three republics (with the addition of Lithuania) that emerged during the collapse of the Russian Empire and existed in 1918-1940, then became Soviet republics, and finally joined the European Union.

And, finally, third, the Baltic States are considered as a special region of historical Russia, including, along with the three former republics of the Soviet Baltic States, the Kaliningrad region.

Thus, the study aimed to consider the ethnic problem of the Baltic region through the prism of all three meanings. Consequently, the following research objectives were:

- analyze the historical and geographical aspects of the territorial formation of ethnic groups;
- identify the main features of the policy of segregation in the modern society of the Baltic states;

- present the prospects for the development of the Baltic peoples in the 2020s, based on the study results.

The research used the works of leading experts in this field such as D.V. Zhitin, A.A. Ivanova, V.M. Kabuzan, P.M. Koryavtsev, M.N. Rutkevich and others.

1. Historical and geographical aspects of the territorial formation of ethnic groups

Geographically, the Baltic States are of crucial importance for Russia's foreign policy relations. It is located on the direct route from the central regions of Russia to Europe. Estonia covers 45,227 sq. km, Latvia – 64,589 sq. km, Lithuania – 65,300 sq. km, and Kaliningrad Region – 15,125 sq. km. The total area of the region is 190,300 sq. km. However, it is also necessary to add 233,54 sq. km of East Prussia lands, ceded to Poland in 1945.

By European standards, the former republics of the Soviet Baltic States are not so small. Even tiny Estonia is huger than its former metropolis Denmark. And Lithuania and Latvia, each separately, are twice the size of Belgium. The Kaliningrad region, the smallest in Russia, is still almost one and a half times larger than Cyprus.

In Estonia, the average population density: 29 people per square km, in Latvia – the 30 persons per sq. km in Lithuania, 44 people/sq. The decline in the population of the Baltic States causes a reduction in the average population density of the region. According to scientists, “in socio-demographic terms, there is a ‘desertification’ of most of the territory of the Baltic States. Rare cities in the ‘anthropo-desert’ are relevant a forecast for the near future not so much for Russia as for the Baltic states.” (Zhitin & Ivanov, 2017)

The following ethnic groups inhabit the Baltic States: Estonians (925,000), Latvians (1.3 million), and Lithuanians (2.3 million). The now officially non-existent Latgalians of Latvia (in 1934 they were declared Latvians, and since then they have been counted as Latvians by statistics, although in religion, language and culture they are seriously different from the Latvians themselves) can be attributed to the Baltic ethnic groups. Russians are a large ethnic group of the Baltic States. There are one million Russians in the Kaliningrad region, 342 thousand in Estonia, 560 thousand in Latvia, 180 thousand in Lithuania. However, as it will be presented later, the real Russians, as the so-called ‘Russians’, were more. There are significantly more ‘Russian-speaking’ people in the Baltic States. The proportion of all persons whose native language is Russian was 35% in Estonia, 42% in Latvia,

and 12% in Lithuania. Russian speakers also included a certain number of representatives of local ethnic groups-0.3% of Estonians, 2.5% of Latvians and 1% of Lithuanians, respectively, who indicated Russian as their native language. Also, Poles live in the Baltic States (250 thousand in Lithuania, 50 thousand in Latvia. From 1945 to 1950, half of the Polish population left Lithuania (or rather, was expelled). For seven centuries, a huge role in the Baltic States was played by the Germans, who were both a specific ethnic group of Baltic Germans (Deutsch Balten), and the entire ruling class of the Ostsee region to a significant extent.

Historically, the Jews, who almost completely disappeared during the Second World War, played a significant role. During the Second World War, the largest number of Jews were killed in Lithuania (260 thousand people), i.e., almost the entire Jewish population of the republic. There were 86 thousand people in Latvia and 9 thousand people in Estonia by killed. In the same years, Estonian Swedes almost completely left their homeland.

As a result of assimilation processes, the Finnish people of Livonia, which gave the name of Livonia and Governorate of Livonia, completely disappeared. Once a very huge nation, numbering up to 50 thousand people in the middle of the 13th century, almost completely Latvized in ancient times. In the middle of the 19th century, there were only 2,324 Livs. Already the All-Russian census of 1897 did not take into account the Livs. In 2011, 167 residents of Latvia called themselves Livs, because they had a share of Livian blood. But none of them knew the language of their ancestors. The last native speaker of the Lebanese language died in Canada in 2013. Nowadays, the Latvian language enjoys state patronage in Latvia. A unique case in world law: a completely extinct language has official status. And this is in Latvia where the Russian language, native to half of the inhabitants and understandable to almost everyone, does not have such a status.

Thus, the Second World War also affected the Baltic peoples not only by the disappearance of Germans, Jews and the decline in the number of Poles but also by a general demographic catastrophe. As a result of emigration, deportations, genocide, and military losses, the decline in 1939-45 was about 1.7 million people, which accounted for 28% of the three Baltic republics' population (6 million people in 1939) (Kabuzan, 2009).

2. Features of the policy of segregation in the modern society of the Baltic States

After the restoration of independence in 1991, the entire population of the Baltic States is divided in two categories at the official level – ‘titular’, i.e., native

people, and ‘migrants’, i.e., ‘Russian-speaking’. According to the official history, the titular ones are the original and permanent residents of the Baltic countries, and the Russians are only the newly arrived ‘migrants’. Immediately after the declaration of independence, the authorities of the new Baltic countries introduced the concept of ‘non-citizens’ (in fact, restricting the rights of all migrants).

On February 6, 1992, the Supreme Council of Estonia issued a Decree restoring the Estonian Citizenship Act of 1938. Following the Decree, only persons who had citizenship on June 16, 1940, and their direct descendants were automatically considered citizens. As a result, only about 120 thousand of the almost 470 thousand Russians were able to become Estonian citizens automatically.

The Law on Latvian Citizenship was passed on July 22, 1994. According to it, the original citizens are persons, who were citizens of Latvia before June 17, 1940, and, also, their descendants who were registered. As a result of the application of this Law, only about 280 thousand of the almost 900 thousand Russians received citizenship.

‘Non-citizens’ are discriminated against at all levels, e.g., in Latvia, there are 70 differences in the rights of citizens and non-citizens: restrictions on holding positions in various sectors (in the public, private and public sectors) – 19, 8 and 11 differences, respectively; restrictions on the right to property – 9 differences; restrictions on private entrepreneurship – 6 differences; social rights – 3 differences; other rights – 14 differences. And after Latvia acceded to the EU, some classes (13 in total), still inaccessible to non-citizens of Latvia, became available to EU citizens. Particularly, this applies to the right to stand as a candidate and vote in local elections allowed the EU citizens with six months of residence experience in Latvia. However, it has still forbidden to non-citizens, most of whom are local natives, and most of the rest have lived in the country for more than 30 years. All this apartheid-like process is not discussed by human rights activists and European democracies.

At the same time, although the official mass media of Estonia and Latvia states that Russians are discriminated against only because they came to the republics after 1940, this is not true. So, in 2013, the Latvian Seimas adopted a law, according to which the right to dual citizenship of Latvia is provided only for ethnic Latvians. In other words, the descendants of Latvian emigrants from the Russian Empire who left long before 1918, who never lived in free Latvia during the first independence, who do not speak the Latvian language at all, can count on

obtaining Latvian citizenship without problems. And this is in contrast to the Russians who were born, have worked all their lives in Latvia, and remain ‘non-citizens’.

In Lithuania, there is no such apartheid-like regulation at the official level. But it is so hard to call Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians ‘titular’ nations. Titularity has always assumed independence, and the Baltic peoples were only completely subordinate for most of their existence. The truly titular peoples in the Baltic States are the Russians, also, the vanished Ostsee Germans and, to some extent, the Poles of Lithuania.

Historically, many Russians in the Baltic Republics are natives of the Baltic States, and Lithuanians, for example, in their capital, Vilnius, are post-war migrants. As always, it is difficult with Jews, among whom there are many natives and migrants.

As the modern author P.M. Koriavtsev notes, “clearly, which is characteristic of a large part of the representatives of the titular nation in the Baltic republics hostility (often turning into hatred) to Russia and ‘Russian-speaking’ is not caused by any wrongful actions of the object of dislike (as manifested long before any repressive measures, in almost all cases, the Russian side which bore a return character), and is entirely rational and is a specific feature of their world. Further, it is necessary to take into account that the ‘Russian-speaking’ population of the Baltic states is, in fact, no less ‘indigenous’ than the representatives of the titular nations or the same Ostsee Germans, and therefore the Baltic rhetoric about the ‘occupiers’ that has become familiar has a frankly speculative, Nazi character. In general, the anti-Russian policy of the Baltic states is caused by reasons of a completely unconstructive nature, and one should not count on its sanity and the prospects for a reasonable correction with an arbitrarily loyal attitude of Russia to them.” (Koriavtsev, 2005)

As always is the case in regions with mixed populations, inter-ethnic marriages in the Baltic States were very common in all historical periods. Latvia alone in the Soviet era had one of the highest rates of ethnically mixed marriages in the USSR, exceeding a quarter of all marriages performed in the republic (275 ethnically mixed families for every thousand). In general, by the end of the Soviet era, about 50% of Latvians, about the same number of Estonians, and about 40% of Lithuanians were in ethnically mixed marriages (Rutkevich, 1992). In general, it is difficult to find a ‘native’ Baltic who does not have at least 1/8 of Russian blood.

Finally, due to the political situation, a voluntary change of nationality was not uncommon. So, many Lithuanians got drunk, there were a lot of ‘juniper

Germans' (as they ironically called the voluntarily numbered Estonians), and in the Latvian lands, there was the concept of 'shameful Latvians', to refer to Latvians posing as Germans. Many Latvians and Estonians, who had converted to Orthodoxy, did not speak Russian. During the period of both the first and second independence, there were opposite cases when people of very different ethnic origins tried to join the 'titular' nations of the Baltic States. So, even in Latvia between 1930 and 1935, the entire population of the country increased by 50 thousand people, but the number of Latvians in the country increased by 77.6 thousand. In the 1930s, the government of the Latvian Dictator K. Ulmanis pursued a policy of 'Latvishization' (latviskošana). In the course of this policy, many people of various nationalities, who may have had Latvian blood in their veins, as well as children whose parents were Latvian, were automatically counted by statistics as representatives of the titular nation. A completely similar policy was carried out in 1920-40 in Estonia. Thus, between 1922 and 1934, the population growth was 19,354, but the number of Estonians increased by 22,544.

Something similar was happening under the new independence. In Soviet Latvia, between 1970 and 1979, the number of Latvians increased by 2 thousand people. However, over the next decade, between 1979 and 1989, the number of Latvians suddenly increased by 44 thousand people. The reason is clear: in the context of the rise of the nationalism of 'indigenous' nationalities, many people born from mixed marriages preferred (or so their parents preferred) to turn into Latvians. However, many migrants, due to careerist considerations, also turned into ardent 'titular' adherents of nationalism.

At the second independence, the mixing continues. Russian Russian mothers in Latvia out of almost 5 thousand children born to Russian mothers, only 60% had a Russian father. In 26% of cases, the father of the child of the Russian mother was a Latvian (Suschiy, 2018). In 2015, out of 5,27 thousand Latvian children born to Russian mothers from Latvian fathers, 1,16 thousand were registered as Latvians. No less significant is the fact that only 159 out of 14,1 thousand children born to Russian fathers by Latvians were written in Russians (Suschiy, 2018).

To assimilate the local Russians, the Baltic authorities impose on them a change of names and surnames in a local way. Between July 1, 2010, and July 1, 2014, 195 surnames were changed to Estonian by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, and in 129 cases, the person, who wanted to change their surname, was Russian by nationality. As reported by the web site rus.err.ee, in 2010, 12 surnames were Estonized, 38 in 2011, 59 in 2012, 60 in 2013, and 26 in 2014. During the

research, it was established that many new Estonians consciously decided to assimilate with the aboriginal population.

According to anthropological characteristics, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians belong to a large Caucasian race, mainly to its northern branch. Among them, there are several anthropological types. Thus, Western and southern Latvians, northwestern Lithuanians, Western Estonians and Livs belong to the Western Baltic type of the Atlantic-Baltic minor race. It is characterized by very light skin, light hair, blue or grey eyes, tall stature, the large size of the head and face. Along with this, the indigenous peoples of the South-Eastern Baltic States also include representatives of other anthropological types of northern Caucasians. Most Russians and Poles living in the region are also Northern Europeans.

Historically, the inhabitants of the Baltic States were the peoples belonging to the Baltic or Letto-Lithuanian branch of the Indo-European family (the ancestors of the Latvians, Lithuanians and now extinct Prussians), and the Finnish ethnic groups of the Ural family (Estonians and Livs). However, these ethnic groups themselves appeared somewhat later.

The Baltic States have always been among the regions of Europe sparsely populated, although the population density in the Baltic States is higher than the average in Russia. As the modern American historian of Latvian origin A. Plakans notes, “if we operate with demographic criteria, since the 13th century, the lands of the Baltic coast have never experienced a demographic boom, but constant internal migration has always provided population growth at the end of each century.” (Plakans, 2016) Indeed, overall population growth in the region has always been low, and migration has had a large impact on the absolute and relative population size. The German conquerors who ruled the Baltic States for seven centuries, being an absolute minority of the regional population, tried to prevent a high increase in the indigenous population. Some demographic growth occurred only in the 19th century and the first decade and a half of the 20th century. But even then, the total natural increase in the Baltic States was significantly lower than the national level. In Estonia and Latvia, the total growth rate in 1851-1860. It was equal to 7.9% against 12.0% in Russia as a whole, in 1911-1916 this indicator decreased to 2.9% against 13.2% in Russia. In 1914, 7,046,1 thousand people lived in the territories of the three future Baltic republics (according to other sources, 6.5 million inhabitants) (Russia 1913, 1995).

However, it was during the periods of independence that the Baltic States died out. In 1920-40, the population increased slightly. The population of Estonia,

according to the 1922 census, was 1,107.1 thousand people, which was by 149 thousand people more than in 1897. However, it should note that the population of Estonia was significantly expanded due to the inclusion of Russian territories in its composition, according to the Treaty of Yuriev in 1920 (Pechora region and the lands to the east of the Narova River with Ivangorod), where 64 thousand people lived. Between 1913 and 1939. The increase in the population of Estonia was slightly less than 100 thousand people, and mainly due to the re-emigration of 38 thousand Estonians from St Petersburg. But if we take the natural increase, then between 1922 and 1939, the population of Estonia increased from 1,108,000 to 1,134,000 inhabitants (Zetterberg, 2013), or by 15.4 thousand people within the modern borders of Estonia (Manakov, 2017). According to the terms of the Treaty of St George in 1920, as already mentioned, the Pechora district of Pskov Region became part of Estonia. 22% of the inhabitants of this area were Setu-Orthodox Finno-Ugric people. And all the Setu were declared Estonians and were counted as such by the official statistics. At the same time, Russians, who then made up 8.2% of the total population of Estonia, provided about half of the total natural population growth of the republic (Pumpyansky, 1931). In Lithuania, the population increased by only 52 thousand people. Half of the increase was due to the re-emigration of Lithuanians. However, the number of residents of Latvia has decreased by more than 600 thousand people (Karlov, 2010). So, in 1913, on the territory of modern Latvia lived 2,493 thousand inhabitants, in 1935 – 1,905 thousand. In Estonia, the Russian-language newspaper *Daily Vesti* in no. 2 for 1937, concerning the official authorities, predicted that (unless something extraordinary happens) the entire population of Estonia will be 860 thousand in 2000. An extraordinary event happened: the annexation of the USSR and the Second World War. And in 1989, the population of the Estonian Republic was 1,565 thousand people (including Estonians – 963 thousand).

A new demographic rise, caused by a large-scale mechanical increase, occurred during the Soviet period of the region's history. In 1950-1989, the population of Latvia grew by 42%, Lithuania by 44%, and Estonia by 54%. The entire population of the three Baltic Republics in 1989 reached the hugest number in its history, reaching 7,929 thousand people. At that time, 1,573 thousand people lived in Estonia, 2,666 thousand in Latvia, and 3,690 thousand in Lithuania. In the Kaliningrad region in 1989, there were 871 thousand inhabitants. In total, 8,800 thousand inhabitants lived in the Baltic States.

As of 1989, the three autochthonous ethnic groups of the Baltic States accounted for 1.9% of the USSR population, and together with the non-ethnic

(primarily Russian) one of the region – 2.8%. There were 3,068 million Lithuanians (of which 2,92 million lived in Lithuania, i.e., 95% of the ethnic group).

The number of Latvians was 1,459 thousand, of which 95.1% of the ethnic group lived in Latvia. In general, from 1959 to 1989, the indigenous population of Latvia grew by only 90 thousand people (to 1387.8 thousand people), slightly falling short of the level of 1930 and much inferior to 1935, which reflected the results of the ‘Latvization’ of the population. In the 1980s, from 35 to 42 thousand people were born in Latvia every year. The maximum was reached in 1987 when 42 thousand children were born. Another thing is that the birth rate of Russians exceeded the birth rate of Latvians.

The number of Estonians in 1989 was 1.027 million (963 thousand, or 93.8%, lived directly in Estonia).

A particularly severe demographic crisis erupted during the ‘second independence’ since 1991. The Baltic States set a kind of world record for the loss of population in peacetime as a result of depopulation and emigration. Between 1990 and 2020. The Baltic States lost 2 million inhabitants. The reason for the large-scale decline in the Baltic population was a combination of three factors – low birth rate, high mortality and mass emigration. Already in the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, the three Baltic republics had fewer inhabitants than a century ago (in 1914 – 6,536 thousand, in 2016-6,174 thousand). At the beginning of 2020, the Lithuanian population was 2,668 thousand inhabitants, Latvia – 1,865 thousand, Estonia – 1,292 thousand. In total-5 825 thousand inhabitants. It is no accident that the Baltic lands were called ‘temporarily inhabited territories’.

At the same time, the decline in the total population was explained not only by the outflow of the Russian population but also by the extinction of the ‘titular’ nations. It is significant that there were 1,318,000 Latvians in Latvia in 1897, 1,467,000 in 1935, 1,298,000 in 1959, 1,387,000 in 1989, 1,284,000 in 2011, and 1,263,000 as of January 1, 2019! However, after all, many people of mixed origin have declared themselves Latvians, so there are even fewer ‘real’ Latvians, i.e., when analyzing data on the native language of Latvian residents, according to the 2011 census, you can find a lot of interesting data. The total number of residents for whom the native language was Latvian in 2000 was 1,383 thousand, and according to 2011 data – 1,165 thousand people. There was a 15.8% decrease, which was even slightly more than the decrease in the total population (13.0%).

Estonians have similar problems. There were 790,000 Estonians on the lands of modern Estonia in 1881, 867.8 thousand in 1897, 1,052 thousand in 1913 (the

largest number in history), 969 thousand in 1922, 893 thousand in 1959, already 963 thousand people in 1989, and 905.8 thousand in 2016. As the study showed, the increase of almost 135 years was insignificant.

The situation of the Lithuanians, whose number doubled in the 20th century, is somewhat better. At the end of the 19th century, there were 1,620,000 Lithuanians within modern Lithuania, 2,150,000 in 1959, and 2,992,000 in 1989! The population of Lithuania grew by 28 thousand people a year for 40 years! At the same time, the share of migrants from other union republics was 6-8 thousand people per year. But after 1992, the Lithuanians became the world record holders for extinction and taking into account emigration, the population is reduced by almost 50 thousand people a year. 26% of all households in Lithuania have only one parent. As of the beginning of 2019, there were 1.3 times fewer children in Lithuania than older people. In Lithuania, as of January 1, 2020, under 15 years of age accounted for 13.8% of the total population, and those over 64 years of age – 16.5%. However, many young people actually live abroad and often were born there. So, a large part of the Lithuanians in the category “... under 15 years” is actually a cut-off slice for the nation. But pensioners mostly live out their lives at home.

Latvia has similar problems, too. In 2020, 17,483 newborns were registered in Latvia. It was an anti-record – the lowest birth rate in a century! (recall that in Soviet times, 40 thousand babies were born in Latvia every year). The results are clear: if in 2009 the share of young people aged 18-24 was 11% of the country's population (238 thousand people), then young people made up only 6.4% of the Latvian one (122 thousand) a decade later.

It should take into account that in the first and second decades of the 21st century, children were born by representatives of the older generation, who were born in the 1980s when the birth rate was quite high. In other words, when the small generations born in the 21st century begin to have their children, the birth rate will decrease even more. However, even now in Latvia in the age group from 18 to 24 years, 48 children are born per 1000 women, i.e., three times less than in the 1980s.

Ageing of the population has become one of the most important problems of the Baltic States. In Lithuania, the ageing of society looks particularly impressive, given that in 1990, the median age (average age) was 33 years, and Lithuanians were one of the six youngest ethnic groups in Europe. Now the Lithuanian society is ageing twice as fast as the average in the European Union (EU).

As the modern Russian researcher, A. Nosovich writes, “... the Baltic states will not turn into poorhouses. The almshouses, in any case, have service personnel. They will turn into Mount Obasute from Japanese fairy tales, to which the Japanese attributed their old men and women to die of hunger and cold.” (Nosovich, 2019)

Thus, the Baltic countries exported abroad, perhaps already a critical part of their breeding population, but did not acquire the economic capacity that would ensure them the status of countries attractive for the re-emigration of their citizens. These States may quickly face a natural collapse, as they will have a much larger population in need of age-related care than the means to provide that care.

3. Perspectives for the development of the Baltic peoples in the 2020s

However, for all its difficulties, the Baltic States can be very attractive for guest workers from the post-Soviet space. After the Maidan of 2014 and the beginning of the civil war in Ukraine, a huge number of Ukrainian labour migrants rushed to the Baltic States. Thanks to Ukrainian immigrants, the decline in the population in the region has slowed down.

As of January 1, 2020, 2 million 794.3 thousand people lived in Lithuania – this is 145 (one hundred and forty-five) souls more than a year earlier, the Statistics Department under the Ministry of Finance happily reported. But the entire increase came from immigrants who arrived. In 2019, 19.7 thousand foreigners immigrated to Lithuania – this is 7.3 thousand more than a year earlier, which indicates a fairly high, by Lithuanian standards, growth rate. Today, migrants from third countries make up about half of all immigrants. The first place is occupied by Ukrainians (8,9 thousand), the second – by Belarusians (6,4 thousand), the third – by Russians (1 thousand) (Ivanov, 2020). The Lithuanians themselves continue to emigrate and die out.

The same year 2019 in Estonia was also marked by an influx of labour from Ukraine. According to the Police and Border Guard Department, 25,000 Ukrainian citizens received work permits in Estonia out of the total number of foreigners in 2019. But Estonian politicians, fervently supporting the Russophobic Kyiv regime, nevertheless saw that Ukrainians were not going to become Estonians. Moreover, once away from the hysterical Bandera people, the Ukrainians in the Baltic States began to rapidly re-Russify, forgetting the Ukrainian *movă*. Prominent Estonian politician Mart Helme said that Ukrainians are more likely to integrate into the Russian-speaking community, and “for us, this is a cultural and demographic problem.” (Vital, 2020)

In 2020, due to quarantine measures caused by the COVID-19 virus pandemic, Estonia could not obtain seasonal workers from Ukraine for agricultural work. As a result, there was a real threat of death in the fields of the entire crop, especially strawberries. Former Finance Minister Jurgen Ligi was indignant: “It is clear that the Estonians no longer harvest the crop. Indeed, nobody milks cows. This time, even the seedlings could not be planted according to the plan and weeded them. A reliable labour force is waiting in Ukraine, but unlike other European countries, they will not be allowed here for the season.”

The mass emigration is just killing these countries. A critical mass of citizens of childbearing age has already left the Baltic States. Significantly, 20.8% of the population left Lithuania by 2018, and 25.3% of the population left Latvia. It should note that even in Bosnia, where the war raged in the 1990s, fewer residents left (19.9% of the total population). However, according to indirect indicators (water consumption in cities, the volume of purchases of food and fuel, the size of cargo transportation, the voltage of the power grid), the population of the three countries is less than the official figures. According to the 2011 census, it turned out that 20% of the total housing stock in Latvia was empty. Also, the ability to fill out electronic census questionnaires along with a vote on the Internet leads to the fact that the ‘exact’ numbers of residents living in the Baltic States are not accurate.

Since all three republics have been members of the European Union since 2004, the Balts who moved to any other EU country are taken into account especially so the real scale of emigration is difficult to determine, i.e., if a Lithuanian family lives in Britain and has children, they fall into the ‘natural growth’ of Lithuania, although they also receive British citizenship by birthright. In 2011, the Lithuanian authorities added another 16% of those born abroad (mainly in the UK) to the number of those born in the republic itself, which is called, in one fell swoop.

The reasons for the cunning of the Baltic statistics are clear because many Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians hide their stay abroad in order not to pay taxes on their earnings there. Some of them are registered as unemployed, so, on the contrary, expats from the Baltic States can receive a small allowance. Emigrants often do not declare their departure. They pay medical fees to be eligible for treatment in the Baltic States, which is much cheaper than in their places of permanent residence in Western Europe (high and quality affordable medicine is one of the legacies of the Soviet time). As long as the family or individual citizens who have left the country retain the citizenship of Latvia,

Lithuania or Estonia, they are included in the statistics of their countries. The authorities are also inclined to ‘improve’ statistics, since up to 20% of the budget revenue of the Baltic republics is made up of EU subsidies, and they are calculated based on the total population. Finally, there is a psychological and propaganda reason to hide the size of the Balts exodus because it turns out that the whole struggle for the freedom of the Baltic was conducted to leave it.

Emigration from the Baltic States differs in one significant indicator. Contrary to the hopes of the nationalist part of the citizens that the Russians would leave, and they would live in an ethnically ‘clean’ country, it turned out the opposite. By definition, more Estonians and Latvians went abroad than Russian ‘non-citizens’ of Estonia and Latvia respectively. The reason is clear because the ‘titular’ had the citizenship of a member state of the European Union and could more easily get a job than the ‘non-Europeans’. Non-citizens (this is the overwhelming majority, Russians) did not have the opportunity to get a job abroad legally. So, they were forced to stay at home in Estonia and Latvia.

Emigrants from the Baltic States quite often marry natives of the country of residence. A life partner with non-Latvian citizenship in 55% of women and 29% of the men, who left Latvia. 27% of single women live abroad with children, and only 9% of men are single fathers (Khazan, 2020). This is how the process of the gradual dissolution of the Baltic nations outside the Homeland looks clearly.

Mass emigration from the Baltic States has another feature: it almost does not give any significant re-emigration. The vast majority of leaving Balts consciously plan to stay in their new country of residence forever and integrate into the local society.

The most characteristic feature of the Baltic diasporas is the rapid voluntary assimilation. Most of the descendants of emigrants of the 19th and 20th centuries were almost completely assimilated into the countries of residence. Thus, there are more than 1.3 million ethnic Lithuanians in the United States, but only 300 thousand identified themselves in the 2015 census as Lithuanians, and most of them are recent emigrants. (By the way, in 1959, there were 450,000 American Lithuanians). There are 48,000 Latvians in the United States. It is no less significant than in the United States for the decade 1990-2000. The Estonian diaspora even decreased from 27 thousand to 25 thousand people, and by 2015 it had already decreased to 21 thousand, although the 90s were a time of mass emigration of Estonians overseas (Tammaru et al., 2010). The large Lithuanian ethnic communities in Latin America, numbering hundreds of thousands of

people, have almost completely disappeared – the Lithuanians have disappeared among the residents.

This is because the Balts have always been ideal emigrants. Literate, hardworking, law-abiding (it is significant that nowhere in the world did the Baltic ethnic mafia arise), they always sought to integrate into the local society. After a few years of living in a new country, the Balts tend to become ‘their own’ for residents, often names and surnames are changed locally.

Thus, in the modern world, the influence of the Baltic countries is a value that tends to zero. The American magazine U.S. News makes an annual list of the most influential countries (based on such criteria as GDP, population, GDP per capita, appearance in the news headlines, participation in the formation of global economic models). In 2019, the Baltic states took the last place in terms of influence in the world (Ranking of the most powerful countries, 2019).

Conclusion

Thus, the study has analyzed the ethnic state of the three Baltic countries based on the three meanings of the name of the region itself. The analysis showed that the indigenous population of the republics is rapidly decreasing due to the change in the political configuration of Europe which they have become a member. Open borders and unambiguous subordination to the EU have led to change towards the predominance of the part of the population in the states’ ethnic composition, i.e., people considered ‘non-citizens’ or has limited rights.

The decline in the population is due to the possibility of labour migration within the EU. The mechanism of covering up the actual outflow due to double statistics no longer helps to keep the population growth within the framework of positive results. One leads to additional political tension within the Baltic States.

The reduction in the ‘citizens’ number leads to a reduction in the labour market which simultaneously decreases due to the natural decline of industry (in Estonia and Latvia). Political preferences harm changes in the structure of the economy of countries. Some enterprises are closed due to retaliatory sanctions from the Russian Federation, others cannot compete with European manufacturers. The artificially created specialization structure of the EU member states also has a specific impact.

At the same time, the understanding of hidden nationalism remains stable. This is evident in the constitutional provisions of Estonia and Latvia, which clearly and unambiguously prescribe the division of the population into ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’. These apartheid-like social factors deepen not only the split in

society, which is supposed to be gradually levelled by the extinction of generations of the Soviet past until the 2030s but also the real ratio of ‘aborigines’ and ‘non-aborigines’ in their ethnic composition.

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Transformation of the Social Space of an Ethnos in Historical Retrospect: Bulgarian Communities in Russia

Abstract:

The social space is constantly changing, which creates difficulties in interpreting this category. There are no ethnic groups that have lived in one place for the entire period of their history. The colonists from the Balkans had a single status, but they were not a single entity at all. A. Skalkovsky (1848) and Nikolai Derzhavin (1914) wrote about Bulgarian settlements. The formation of independent Bulgaria was promoted by the activity of national enlightenment figures in Bulgaria (V.E. Aprilov, M. Drinov, T. Minkov) and the role of the Bulgarian diaspora in Russia. Military conflicts led to the fact that the Bulgarian settlements were on different sides of the borders. After the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia temporarily (until 1878) lost a small part of southern Bessarabia. This territory was ceded to the Principality of Moldavia, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. The upheavals of the 20th century had a heavy impact on Bulgarians. Most of the Russian Bulgarians who lived in the province of Bessarabia were under the rule of the Romanian invaders for 22 years, until 1940. Historical and comparative methods of material analysis were used. In the course of the study, the position of the Bulgarians in the internal Russian conflicts was analyzed. The results of the research published in the article will be useful for specialists in the field of ethnology, ethnography and world history.

Keywords:

Bulgarian diaspora, Ottoman Empire, Bessarabia province, Azov region, colonization, Nikolai Derzhavin, Aprilov, Marin Drinov, T. N. Minkov, S. N. Vankov.

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Трансформация социального пространства этноса в исторической ретроспективе: болгарские общины в России

Аннотация:

Социальное пространство находится в постоянном изменении, что порождает трудности в интерпретации этой категории. Нет этносов, которые проживали бы на одном месте весь период своей истории. Колонисты с Балкан имели единый статус, но вообще не представляли собой единого целого. О болгарских поселениях писали А. Скальковский (1848), Николай Державин (1914). Становлению независимой Болгарии способствовали активность деятелей национального просвещения в Болгарии (В.Е. Априлов, М. Дринов, Т. Минков) и роль болгарской диаспоры в России. Военные конфликты приводили к тому, что болгарские поселения оказывались по разные стороны границ. После поражения в Крымской войне Россия на время (до 1878 года) утратила небольшую часть южной Бессарабии. Эта территория отошла к Молдавскому княжеству, вассальному государству Османской империи. Потрясения XX века тяжело отразились на болгарях. Большинство российских болгар, живших в Бессарабской губернии, оказались на 22 года, вплоть до 1940 года, под властью румынских оккупантов. Были использованы исторический и сравнительные методы анализа материалов. В ходе исследования была проанализирована позиция болгар во внутрироссийских конфликтах. Результаты исследования, опубликованные в статье, будут полезны специалистам в области этнологии, этнографии и мировой истории.

Ключевые слова:

болгарская диаспора, Османская империя, Бессарабская губерния, Приазовье, колонизация, Николай Державин, Априлов, Марин Дринов, Т.Н. Минков, С.Н. Ванков.

Introduction

The categories ‘social space’ and ‘social time’ characterize both sustainability and change. Time and space as philosophical categories describe both the state of the elements and the processes that arise between them. Indeed, society is in constant change. There is not a single society and nation without changes. Culture and economy are changing.

Russia has traditionally been a country that welcomes refugees from among the co-religionists and half-blood Slavs. Bulgarians make up a diaspora in Russia, a very significant number, quite educated, but almost invisible in political life. The reason is simple: Russian Bulgarians were distinguished by their absolute loyalty to Russia, never making any specific demands in the interests of the Diaspora. There were no revolutionaries, no dissidents, no ethnic mafia among the Russian Bulgarians.

The Bulgarian diaspora in Russia also played a huge role in the cultural, economic, and political development of Bulgaria, not only during the period of the Turkish yoke but also during the formation of the independent Bulgarian state. At the same time, scientists were somehow little interested in the fate of the

Bulgarians, who became subjects of Russia, gradually becoming one of the ethnic groups of Russia.

Bulgarians in Russia is the general designation of the descendants of Bulgarian immigrants to the Russian Empire in the late 18th and 19th centuries. The first Bulgarians moved to Russia in the 10th century. After the Baptism of Russia, Byzantine monks, teachers, doctors, and icon painters arrived in Russia, among whom there were many southern Slavs, including Bulgarians. Probably, the Bulgarian was Metropolitan Cyprian of Moscow (1389-1406), one of the most prominent Russian church leaders.

The study aimed to analyze the transformation of the social space of Bulgarian communities in Russia in historical retrospect. Based on the goal, the following tasks were:

- give a historical description of the process of the Bulgarian re-sitting;
- analyze the peculiarities of the resettlement of Bulgarians to certain territories;
- analyze the features of the settlement of Russian Bulgarians;
- problems of the division of the Bulgarian colonies and settlements at the current geopolitical stage.

In the formation of the analytical material, the scientific works of such famous ethnologists in the space of Bulgarian issue as P.N. Batyushkov, L.M. Berg, N.S. Derzhavin, A. Klaus, B.M. Lyapunov, O.V. Medvedeva, and A. Skalkovsky were used.

1. Historical description of the process of the Bulgarian re-sitting

However, the real large-scale immigration of Bulgarians to the Russian Empire began during the Russo-Turkish wars in the reign of Catherine the Great. Together with the Bulgarians, numerous Christians from the Balkans of various nationalities were resettled, who in Russia were equally called ‘Trans-Danube migrants’. So, the accounting of Bulgarians is very difficult, given that the vast majority of ‘Zadunaians’ were Orthodox, and their living conditions in the Balkans were very similar. Finally, even among the immigrants who came from the Bulgarian lands, a considerable percentage were Turkic-speaking Gagauz.

In 1773, the entire Bulgarian village of Flatar, located near Silistra, numbering 400 families, moved to Russia. The influx from across the Danube increased, and in October 1801, an imperial decree extended certain benefits to ‘Trans-Danube migrants’. By this time, the number of Zadunaians numbered in the tens of

thousands. The ruler of Novorossiia, Duke A. Richelieu, called the Bulgarian settlers ‘incomparable’ for their ability to work on the land in the local climate (Richelieu called the German colonists ‘obnoxious’ for their constant complaints) (Klaus, 1869).

After the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-1812, the flow of migrants from across the Danube became especially large. Since Bessarabia, annexed to Russia as a result of this war, was a very desolate region, especially Budzhak, the southern steppe part of the province, the Russian authorities sent the mainstream of ‘Zadunay’ to Bessarabia. Among the Zadunaians, Bulgarians predominated (among whom at that time there was no special people – the Gagauz), Greeks, and the Cossacks who had once gone to Turkey.

It should note that not only the Bulgarians but also the Moldovans themselves were to a large extent immigrants in Bessarabia, although it was historically part of the Moldavian principality. In general, the southern part of the Bessarabian province for immigrants from across the Danube became about what the Saratov province was for the German colonists by the place of the largest concentration of colonists, who make up a very considerable part of the population.

In the early 19th century, the Bulgarian settlements in the province of Kherson and Crimea – Small and Large Blagoyevo, Ternovka, Russia Balta Chokrak, Crichlow, parks and Kubanka – were created.

The colonists from the Balkans had a single status, but they were not a single entity. Even in a mixed colony, there was home to Greeks, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Moldovan, at the same time, in contrast to the German colonists, the colonists were talking mostly in Russian. The reason is that the Greeks spoke various mutually intelligible dialects, the Gagauz spoke their language, the Bulgarians did not yet have a literary language (in Bulgarian schools, teaching was conducted in Church Slavonic).

The account of the Trans-Danube migrants was kept very approximately. Only those, who served in the Russian army, were taken into account, and ordinary immigrants, especially those, who did not receive the rights of colonists, were not taken into account at all. A full accounting of entry and exit in Russia began only in 1828, but in Novorossiia, there was almost no accounting. Wars with the Turks, pestilence epidemics also had an impact on the number of colonists.

In 1818, there were 27,000 registered Bulgarian immigrants (along with the Gagauz people). After the successful Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, another 25 thousand Bulgarians and Gagauzians moved to Bessarabia (Medvedeva, 2009).

By 1844, Bulgarians made up 3.3 % of the population of Novorossiia (Derzhavin, 1914).

The centre of the Bulgarian colonies was the city of Bolgrad. The settlers also founded the city of Taraclia. There were also 60 Bulgarian villages in the province (but some of them were Gagauz, since the Gagauz people, as natives of Bulgaria, were not separated in official censuses from the Bulgarians themselves). Finally, quite a few Bulgarians settled in the cities of Izmail, Kilia, Reni, Akkerman (Belgorod-Dniester). They formed a significant part of the population there (Derzhavin, 1914).

Thus, during the 19th century, Bulgarians actively moved to new areas for themselves. This movement can be described as a historical remigration, if we take into account the settlement of the Slavic peoples in the first centuries of the new era. However, the second settlement was of an accentuated nature and concerned only certain regions of the south of the Russian Empire.

2. The peculiarities of the resettlement of Bulgarians to certain territories

The well-known Russian figure A. Skalkovsky in 1848 published a statistical work on the Bulgarian settlements in Bessarabia, in which he stated many features of life and everyday life of Bulgarians. Bulgarians lived in large families, 3-4 generations under one roof, the age of 80 years was common in their colonies. They possessed the art of finding water, which also helped to survive in the arid Bujak steppes. They sowed mainly wheat and corn. They were engaged in gardening with a special love. From Bulgaria, the settlers brought and began to grow cabbage, cucumbers, beans and other vegetables. They were engaged in gardening, wine-making, sericulture, and tobacco cultivation. The Bulgarians built the first sugar factory in the province. On the arid lands of Budjak, the Bulgarians began to use a specific plough, known as the 'Bessarabian'. By 1847, schools had been established in almost all the Bulgarian colonies. Quite quickly, the Bulgarian colonists achieved prosperity. It was the well-to-do Bulgarians in Russia who became the organizers of education in their homeland.

It is significant that during the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-29, the rich Odessa merchant Vasily Yevstafyevich Aprilov (1789-1847) armed and equipped a volunteer Bulgarian regiment that fought with the Turks at his own expense. In Odessa, he was a trustee of the Greek school. In 1835, in Gabrovo, at his expense, the first secular Bulgarian school was opened. Children of all classes were accepted to study there, and education was free. In the future, in other cities of Bulgaria, educational institutions were also opened on the Gabrov school model with the

help of Aprilov. The textbooks for these schools, under the monk Neofit Rilski authorship, mostly printed and distributed in Bulgaria at the expense of the Aprilov. Aprilov also played a major role to introduce the Russian public to the history and culture of the Bulgarians. He wrote several translations of ancient Slavic letters and writings on the need to develop education among his people.

With the Crimean War of 1853-1856, a new migration of Bulgarians is associated. As in the previous Russian-Turkish wars, they participated in it on the side of Russia. However, the unsuccessful course of hostilities and the retreat of the Russian army from Bulgaria led to the relocation of all residents of 29 villages from the vicinity of the city of Silistria in the amount of 6,600 people (about 900 families).

Thus, despite the new immigration of Bulgarians to Russia, in Bessarabia itself, the number has decreased.

After the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia temporarily (until 1878) lost a small part of southern Bessarabia. This territory was ceded to the Principality of Moldavia, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. Almost half of the Bulgarian colonies were located in this territory. In 1868, there were 46 Bulgarian colonies in the Bessarabian province. 57 thousand people lived there. However, the high natural growth rapidly increased both the absolute and the relative number of Bessarabian Bulgarians.

The Moldavian rulers immediately deprived the Bulgarian colonists of all privileges, imposed taxes and began to forcibly take the Bulgarians into their army. In response to the actions of the Bulgarians, the authorities of the principality introduced their troops into the colonies, establishing a real military occupation regime. The consequence was the mass departure of Bulgarians to Russia, which took on a particularly massive character in 1861-63 (Batyushkov, 1892). It was during these years that the Russian government began the agricultural colonization of the Azov steppes, in the Berdyansk and Melitopol counties of the Tauride province. Previously, the Nogais roamed these steppes, but in the early 1860s, the Nogais, along with some of the Crimean Tatars, left for Turkey. The authorities of the province considered that the Bulgarians, who had a good reputation as farmers and gardeners, would be able to turn the steppes into a granary. That is why the Azov Sea region was proposed to make a region of Bulgarian colonization. The government allocated 214 thousand dessiatines of land to former Russian citizens of Bulgarian origin who left the Moldavian principality. However, the Moldovan government-imposed all sorts of obstacles on the Bulgarian emigrants. Therefore, the first settlers were forced to cross the border

illegally, and only in October 1861, they were issued passports. In the Northern Azov region, Bulgarians from Bessarabia founded 34 colonies. In meantime, in addition to the 'old' Russian Bulgarians from southern Bessarabia, Bulgarians from Bulgaria also arrived on the coast of the Sea of Azov. By the end of 1863, there were already 5,500 Bulgarian families in Berdyansk and Melitopol counties. Each family received a loan for the acquisition of 125 rubles, the supply of bread for each family member until the first harvest, and most importantly-50 acres of land.

The Slavic scholar Nikolai Derzhavin, in his work *Bulgarian Colonies in Russia*, published in 1914, singled out the Azov colonies as the most preserved national traditions and customs. He attributed this to the location of the Bulgarian settlements in proximity to each other and isolation. At the same time, the proximity of the Bulgarian colonies to German and Ukrainian settlements influenced the style of clothing and housing construction.

The centre of the Bulgarian settlements in Bessarabia is the city of Bolgrad Ismail County, located at the lake Yalpuh. In 1827, there were 2,279 inhabitants, of whom 2,270 were Bulgarians (Skalkovsky, 1848). The 1897 census counted 12,300 villages in Belgrade, of which 8,478 were Bulgarians, 1,199 Jews, 612 Moldovans, 117 Gagauzians, 40 Greeks, 63 Germans, 94 Poles, and about 1,700 Russians (Great Russians and Little Russians). According to the data of 1907, there were 111,624 Bulgarians in the rural population of the Bessarabian province (Berg, 1923).

Among the Bulgarians, who moved to Russia after the Crimean War, Marin Drinov (1838-1906) was particularly famous. At the age of 20, he emigrated to Russia, studied at the Kyiv Theological Seminary and Moscow University at the Faculty of History and Philology. His interest in Slavic history and philology led him to the then centre of the relevant sciences – in Prague. In 1865-71, the young scientist travelled to Europe, carefully studying the archives. In 1869, Drinov published the works *The History of the Bulgarian Church* and *On the Origin of the Bulgarian People*, which were highly appreciated by the academic world. On the pages of the Bulgarian newspapers that appeared at this time, Drinov also placed articles on historical topics, which in the conditions of the Turkish yoke sounded very revolutionary, encouraging Bulgarians not only to remember their great past but also to fight for the future. In 1869, in the Romanian city of Braila, Drinov, together with several Bulgarian scientists, created the *Bulgarian Book Friendship*, or, for short, the BLA (Bulgarian Literary Association), which later grew out of the framework of a literary organization and turned into the Academy of Sciences of Bulgaria. Drinov became the first chairman of the society and the editor of its

body *Periodic Edition of the BCD*. However, Drinov did not stop his scientific activity in his new Homeland – in Russia. In 1873, at Moscow University, he defended his master's thesis *The Settlement of the Balkan Peninsula by the Slavs*. Three years later, Drinov defended his doctoral dissertation *The Southern Slavs and Byzantium in the 10th Century*. There he introduced into scientific circulation a lot of historical information that he received while researching ancient chronicles. His scientific achievements received a well-deserved assessment. Since 1876, Drinov has been a professor of Slavic studies at the Kharkiv University. After the liberation of Bulgaria in 1878, Drinov came to his homeland and became (as part of the provisional Russian administration of the country) Minister of Public Education and Spiritual Affairs, and vice-governor of Sofia. He was one of the founding fathers of the Bulgarian state, co-author of the first Bulgarian constitution, and it was at his suggestion that Sofia became the capital of the recreated Bulgarian state. In addition to playing a huge role in the creation of the state, Drinov was engaged in the development of the Bulgarian alphabet, since by 1878 there were several variants of the Bulgarian grammar. Drinov introduced the 32-letter civil alphabet used in Bulgaria before 1945 (with the small letters yat and yus, as well as the mute 'ѣ' and 'ѥ' at the end of words). Minister Drinov created the National Library, built several hundred new schools, founded some secondary educational institutions, and prepared to establish a university (which was opened only in 1888, when Drinov was no longer a minister). However, the young principality of Bulgaria immediately after birth became a place of internal conflicts and a place of confrontation between the great powers, which resulted in several coups that brought pro-German forces to power. In April 1881, Prince Alexander Battenberg of Bulgaria carried out a coup by revoking the constitution, offering Drinov the chairman position of the State Council (something like prime minister). However, Drinov refused to get involved in intra-Balkan squabbles. In such circumstances, in 1881, Drinov returned to Russia, Kharkiv, which became his native city, and continued working there until the end of his life. In 1898, Drinov became a Corresponding Member of the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences (Lyapunov, 1905).

Another enlightenment figure was Fyodor Minkov (Todor Nikolov Minkov) – (1830-1906), born in Ruschuk (now – Ruse) in the family of a well-to-do Bulgarian merchant. Thanks to the help of a rich uncle, he managed to get an education at the classical gymnasium in Vienna and the Dresden Polytechnic Institute. In Europe, Minkov met Russian students and learned Russian. During the Crimean War, without finishing his education in Dresden, he volunteered for

the Russian army. He participated in several battles, and the defence of Sevastopol was wounded. After the war, he completed his education in Dresden, receiving a degree in engineering. In 1861, he finally moved to Russia. In 1862, with the active participation of Minkov, a South Slavic boarding school for immigrants from the South Slavic lands was founded in the city of Mykolaiv. In 1867, Minkov took charge of his private boarding school, which he managed for 25 years. The boarding house was a notoriously unprofitable enterprise, but Minkov was not interested in profit, it served the Slavic idea. In total, up to 800 people, mostly Bulgarians graduated from the Minkov Boarding School. Many students of the South Slavic boarding school later became prominent figures of the Bulgarian national liberation movement, became famous Bulgarian politicians, military men, writers and musicians. Along with teaching, Minkov was actively engaged in political journalism, defending the idea of Slavic unity. During the Eastern crisis of 1875-76, Minkov organized fundraising and the volunteers transfer to Bulgaria. In independent Bulgaria, Minkov could have held important positions but he could not leave the boarding school. In 1886, Minkov received the grade of full state councillor (civil grade of the 4th class).

Thus, in 1897, there were 170 thousand Bulgarians in the Novorossiysk provinces, of which 103 thousand Bulgarians lived in Bessarabia, which was 5.3% of the province population. There were 5,840 Bulgarians in Crimea. The Crimean Peninsula experienced next ethnic annexation. This created a more complex ethnic conglomerate on the peninsula. Fyodor Minkov and Marin Drinov made a special contribution to the assimilation of ethnic Bulgarians in the new territories. On their example, it is necessary to note the liberal policy of the Russian Empire in relation to the Bulgarian diaspora, in contrast to the policy of the Ottoman Empire.

3. The features of the settlement of Russian Bulgarians

The Russian Bulgarians played a certain role in the events of the First World War and the Revolution. Thus, the Bulgarian General Radko Dimitriev (1859-1918), who held command positions in the army of Bulgaria, after Bulgaria entered the war on Germany's side, immediately went to Russia, where he commanded Russian corps. But during the Civil War, he was shot by the Bolsheviks.

The fate of the Russian officer of Bulgarian origin Semyon Nikolaevich Vankov (25.01.1858-21.06.1937) was happier. He was born in the Bulgarian city of Svishtov in the family of teacher Nikola Vankov, a committed Russophile. His father gave him his primary education. In 1867, Simeon's parents sent him to

continue his education in Russia. He studied at the South Slavic Boarding School in Mykolaiv, then entered the Konstantinovsky Artillery School in St Petersburg. In the meantime, as a free listener, the young Bulgarian attended classes at the Mining Institute, gaining solid knowledge in the field of minerals, which later largely determined his scientific activity. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78. Vankov fought in the ranks of the Russian army for the liberation of his native country. In independent Bulgaria, Vankov served in the national army. He distinguished himself in the short Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885. Russophile Vankov was dissatisfied with the pro-German activities of Prince Alexander Battenberg and participated in a military coup. As a result of this, the prince was overthrown. However, a new coup soon followed, bringing the anti-Russian forces back to power. Vankov was arrested but managed to escape from prison and make his way to Russia. Since 1887, half a century Simeon (now Semyon) Wank served as Russia. He held several high military positions in the Russian artillery. In the meantime, he was not only a combatant officer but also, thanks to his organizational skills, became a major organizer of military production. During the First World War, Vankov was the organizer of the production of field artillery in Russia having converted several civilian enterprises to the production of shells. In total, there were more than 500 enterprises under Vankov's rule. As a result of Vankov's activity in 1916, the 'shell famine', which had so severely affected the results of the campaign a year earlier, was eliminated. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks attracted many 'bourgeois specialists', and Semyon Nikolaevich was among them. He was entrusted to head the artillery-armour and mine-electrical part of the metal department of the VSNH, the scientific and Technical Council of VSNH Glavmetall, the Scientific and Technical Council of VSNH coloured metals. In the meantime, he was a member of the board of many councils and committees of the Supreme Economic Council. He was elected Professor of Metal Technology of the Moscow Institute of National Economy, head of the Department of General Metal Technology of the Moscow Engineering and Pedagogical Institute. In those positions, he played a major role in the restoration and development of coloured metallurgy plants in Russia, in the design of the Dnipro Aluminum Plant, too. He was the organizer of the first Soviet congresses of scientific and technical workers in the space of metallurgy. He wrote numerous scientific papers on metallurgy. Vankov is rightly considered a pioneer of non-ferrous metallurgy in Russia, in particular, the light-alloy industry, which found its embodiment in aircraft construction, space technology and instrument making, one of the first propagandists of the widespread introduction of

refrigeration technology and much more. Semyon Nikolayevich Vankov died on June 21, 1937, from heart disease in the eightieth year of life. He was buried at the Vvedenskoye Cemetery in Moscow (Semion Nikolaevich Vankov, 2012).

The upheavals of the twentieth century had a heavy impact on Bulgarians. Most of the Russian Bulgarians, who lived in the province of Bessarabia, was under the rule of the Romanian invaders for 22 years, until 1940. During the Romanian occupation, the Bessarabian Bulgarians were subjected to harassment, as relations between Romania and Bulgaria were very tense, and the Bessarabian Bulgarians were also considered pro-Russian. In 1930, according to the Romanian census, there were 163.7 thousand Bulgarians in Bessarabia, which was 5.7% of the population of Bessarabia. In 1940, there were about 180,000 Bulgarians.

Thus, as a result of Bulgarian immigrants' activity in Russian Army before, together with most of the Bessarabians, the Bulgarians enthusiastically welcomed the Red Army in 1940. The war, the 1946 famine, and the mass deportations of 'bourgeois elements' (there were many among the well-to-do Bulgarians) in the late 1940s seriously undermined the ethnocultural community of the Bessarabian Bulgarians. In the Moldavian Soviet Republic, the share of Bulgarians gradually decreased relative to the total population accounting for 2% of the republic's inhabitants (88 thousand people).

4. Problems of the division of the Bulgarian colonies and settlements at the current geopolitical stage

Although it was ignored until 1991, the most important problem was that the Bulgarians were divided by administrative borders. The majority of Bulgarians were residents of the Odessa region of Ukraine, about a third-residents of Moldova. The collapse of the USSR has led to the fact that now Bulgarians have become residents of two post-Soviet states. At the same time, the village of Parkany was in the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Republic. Almost half of the Moldavian Bulgarians were residents of the Gagauz Autonomy.

The total number of Bulgarians is decreasing. So, in 1989, 88.5 thousand Bulgarians lived in Moldova and 233 thousand in Ukraine. Depopulation, assimilation and emigration reduce the number of ethnic groups. At the beginning of the 21st century, about 140 thousand Bessarabian Bulgarians lived in Ukraine, 65 thousand in Moldova, 28 thousand of which were Gagauzia. Bulgarians dominated in the capital city of Bolhrad. According to statistics, the Bolgradsky district of the Odessa region was inhabited by Bulgarians in 61%, Gagauz in 19%, Russians in 8%, Ukrainians in 7%, Albanians in 2%, and Moldovans in 1.5%.

Thus, the Bessarabian Bulgarians retain a certain 'hearth', thanks to which they have a significant chance to survive as a unique ethnic group.

Bulgarians of Moldova with Bulgarian mother tongue made up 81% of the population, 13.9% of Bulgarians indicated Russian as their native language (Moldova. Modern trends of development, 2004).

The Bulgarians of Azov experienced all the vicissitudes of Soviet and post-Soviet history. Many Bulgarians, especially those who moved to the fast-growing cities of the Donbass, quickly became Russified. In 2001, in the Zaporizhzhia region, which includes most Bulgarian villages on the coast of the Sea of Azov, there were 27 thousand Bulgarians. Another 5 thousand Bulgarians lived in the Donetsk region. In total, there were 204 thousand Bulgarians in Ukraine. In the Russian Federation, there are 32 thousand Bulgarians, but most of them came from Bulgaria to study or work.

Thus, it should note that the Bulgarians of Crimea actively participated in the movement for the reunification of the peninsula with Russia. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 1994-95 was Sergey Tsekov. Significantly, Tsekov himself was the leader of the Russian Movement of Ukraine party. Similarly, the Bulgarians of the Donbass, without creating any separate Bulgarian parties and organizations, generally take pro-Russian positions.

Conclusion

Thus, the social space describes the elements of society, which are different social groups: small and large, cultural and national, as well as the structures that arise between them. Social and describes the dynamics of the relationships that occur between them. In each locus and region, both in the past and in modern times, different historical variants of the social space (pre-industrial, post-industrial) coexist. The transformation of social space is asynchronous, varies in pace and scale, and generates a multiple and complex structure of the region.

The Bulgarian diaspora in Russia played an outstanding role in the development of Bulgaria but also gave Russia many outstanding figures in response. In the meantime, the Bulgarians, being very modest people, are not inclined to advertise their services to Russia, and even more so to complain about modern difficulties. It is therefore fair to recall the Bulgarian contribution to the history of Russia.

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