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
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
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## Political drift of society as a category of political life

*Abstract:* The author considers four hypostases of the term political drift, political time passionarity and political time, with the help of which it is possible to analyse the vector of political development of modern Russian society. The study's subject is the political processes, which characterise political crises. The study's purpose is to analyse the political drift of society as a category of political life. To achieve the purpose and solve the tasks set by the author, Soviet, Russian, and foreign sources of information, including the works of the great philosopher Lev N. Gumilyov, were used. The author comes to an understanding of political drift as a category of political science, since it reflects the most significant natural connections and relations of real political life. Political drift is inherent in any society. Therefore, it is methodologically important to understand that the political drift of society cannot be considered in isolation from historical time. Based on the analysis, it follows that the category of "political drift of society" has an ambiguous interpretation: on the one hand, this indicates the complexity of the political phenomenon itself and the inability to use only one approach for its comprehensive characterization, on the other – the lack of elaboration of this phenomenon.

*Keywords:* political drift, passionarity, political time, political crisis.

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## Политический дрейф общества как категория политической жизни

*Аннотация:* В статье рассматриваются четыре ипостаси термина политический дрейф, политическое время пассионарность и политическое время, с помощью которых можно анализировать вектор политического развития современного российского общества. Предметом исследования являются политические процессы, характеризующие политические кризисы. Целью исследования является анализ политического дрейфа общества как категории политической жизни. Для достижения цели и решения поставленных задач автором были использованы советские, российские и зарубежные источники информации, в том числе труды великого философа Л.Н. Гумилева. Автор приходит к пониманию политического дрейфа как категории политической науки, поскольку оно отражает наиболее существенные закономерные связи и отношения реальной политической жизни. Политический дрейф присущ любому обществу. Поэтому методологически важно понимать, что политический дрейф общества нельзя рассматривать в отрыве от исторического времени. Исходя из анализа следует, что категория «политический дрейф общества» имеет неоднозначное толкование: с одной стороны, это свидетельствует о сложности самого политического феномена и невозможности использовать только один подход для его всесторонней характеристики, с другой – о недостаточной разработанности этого феномена.

*Ключевые слова:* политический дрейф, страсть, политическое время, политический кризис.

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## Introduction

A political crisis cannot only be a catalyst for rebellions, revolutions, uprisings, and riots, but also act as an independent political process affecting the drift of society. A political crisis can develop on the basis of economic, financial, governmental, and other crises, forming and developing in various spheres of society, or it can itself stimulate these types of social crises.

The political crisis has a different time duration. Political time is one of its parameters, it can be short-term, calculated in several days, or it can be long-term, lasting for years.

A political crisis may have an objective basis, e.g., a financial crisis that leads to a government crisis, a change of government, early parliamentary elections. Another option is when a political crisis is caused by the actions of conflicting political forces, political leaders, it causes significant damage to society as a whole and can trigger crises in other public spheres.

The consequence of the political crisis may be a different degree of change in the political life of society. The most profound changes are associated with a change in the political system, socio-economic structure. Such results of political crises are called revolutions.

The study's subject is the political processes, which characterise political crises.

The study's purpose is to analyse the political drift of society as a category of political life.

Based on the study's purpose, the following tasks were set:

- analyse the concepts of political drift;
- consider the society's drift from the viewpoint of the third hypostasis of this political category;
- determine the passionarity place in the political drift of society.

In the course of the study, historical, comparative, and deductive methods were applied.

To achieve the purpose and solve the tasks set, the author used Soviet, Russian and foreign sources of information, including the works of the great philosopher L.N. Gumilev.

## Result of study

First, it is necessary to consider the very concept of drift in relation only to political processes. The word "drift" itself has several meanings. I should turn to the Modern Dictionary of Foreign Words, in which drift is:

- 1) the demolition of a moving vessel from its course line under the influence of wind and currents; the angle (magnitude) of drift, i.e., the angle formed by the direction of the keel and the direction of the actual movement of the vessel; to drift is about a sailing vessel;
- 2) movement of something (ship, ice) carried by the current;
- 3) slow directional movement of charged particles superimposed on their faster random (thermal motion);
- 4) geological drift of continents, i.e., slow movement of continents in the horizontal direction

So, there are four hypostases of the term of drift. Now it should consider them from the viewpoint of social development. According to the first meaning, a society moving along a certain political course changes the direction of its movement under the influence of certain

factors, e.g., only at the beginning of the 21st century, in Russia, the electoral legislation was repeatedly changed, and, consequently, the electoral process. The electability of the heads of the Russian Federation constituent entities was then canceled, then returned again. Elections to representative and legislative authorities were held personally for candidates, then according to party lists, according to a mixed system, then in a number of subjects of the Russian Federation in single-mandate districts. The legislation and practice of elections to local self-government bodies were changing. Today, the threshold for voter turnout in municipal-level elections has been removed altogether. Another example of a change in the political course in modern Russia can be its foreign policy activities. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state authorities took a course to integrate into the world economic and political system, putting the country in dependence on the United States. Since the early 21st century, the vector of Russian politics has begun to shift to that part of the “political spectrum” that can be characterized as gaining foreign policy independence.

The second hypostasis presupposes the movement of society carried by the course of history. It is legitimate to consider the latter as a general trend in the economy, politics, and culture. The global economic crises as an objective component of the market economy leaves its imprint not only on the economic, but also on the political drift of society. If you look at the consequences of the economic crises of the 20th century, it is not difficult to notice that the way out of them, as a rule, shifted countries towards totalitarian regimes. A classic example is Italy (1922-1943) and Germany (1933-1945). An acute economic crisis arose here after the defeat of these countries in the First World War. The consequences of the economic crisis (mass unemployment, impoverishment of the broad masses of the people) stimulated the rampant revanchism and the establishment of fascist ideology.

If we consider the drift of society from the viewpoint of the third hypostasis of this political category, then it should focus on the internal movements of this society, in a certain sense abstracting from numerous external factors. With this approach, the field of research will include the slow movement (within a given society) of social strata, communities, groups, the expression and defense of their interests, which, depending on the political regime of a particular society, can take various forms. The movement of these elements of society constitutes its internal drift, which can change the entire political “landscape”.

The internal drift of society can occur slowly, its movement can be likened to a reciprocating movement. Or it may have a discontinuous character. This leap in political science is usually expressed in terms of revolution, political crisis, insurrection, rebellion. Since these definitions are used in relation to the same political events, we will give them our interpretation (*Hacker et al., 2015*).

Revolution, regardless of the political time, can be considered by such a political process, during which the state system and socio-economic formation change. The catalyst for revolutions, as a rule, is a political crisis. In the history of 20th-century Russia, the results of political crises were four revolutions: 1905-1907, February 1917, October 1917, 1991-1993. The result of the first political crisis was the formation of the Parliament (State Duma), legal political parties. Russia as a whole began to “drift” towards a limited monarchy. The result of the second political crisis was the abolition of the monarchy and the preparation of the Constituent Assembly, supposed to solve the issue of the political structure of Russia. The third political

crisis brought a new political force, the Bolsheviks, to power and changed the social and economic structure of Russian society. As a result of the fourth political crisis, the Soviet period of Russia ended, and the social and economic system changed.

A political crisis cannot only be a catalyst for rebellions, revolutions, uprisings, and riots, but also act as an independent political process affecting the drift of society.

It follows from the above analysis that the category of “political drift of society” has an ambiguous interpretation (*Arrighi, 2010*). On the one hand, it indicates the complexity of the political phenomenon itself and the impossibility of using only one approach for its comprehensive characterisation, on the other hand, it does the lack of elaboration of this phenomenon. It also determined the author’s position not to try to integrate the various hypostases of the “political drift of society”, but use them when considering various types of social movements.

A political crisis can develop based on economic, financial, governmental, and other crises, forming and developing in various spheres of society, or it can itself stimulate these types of social crises.

More often than not, political crises do not end with such profound changes in the state’s political and economic system. Thus, in the states, which are parliamentary republics in the form of government, political crises often transform into governmental ones, occur quite often, but do not affect the basic economic and political foundations of society. A typical example is Italy, where political negotiations of the political parties’ leaders take place almost after every parliamentary election to form a majority-government coalition. The political consensus achieved in this case is temporary, since the ideology and basic values of political parties are often very different. In such cases, the political crisis can last for quite a long period of time, since the mechanism of its reproduction is triggered several times: the impossibility to create a parliamentary coalition, forming a government on its basis, the dissolution of parliament, new parliamentary elections, the search for consensus.

In the assessment of certain political events of a violent nature, such a concept as an uprising, a riot, a mutiny is used. However, there are certain differences between them there. An uprising is understood as an open armed action of social groups or classes against the existing political power (*Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1983*). The uprising is planned in advance, it has a leader, certain resources for conducting an armed struggle. If the uprising wins, then its leaders become the political power, and its ideology becomes the dominant one. Otherwise, when an uprising is suppressed by the current government, it is declared a riot or a putsch, its leaders and participants are repressed.

A riot is defined as a spontaneous disorganized mass action without a clearly realized goal (*Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1983*). The classical Russian literature of the 21st century (A. S. Pushkin) gives the definition of the Russian revolt as “senseless and merciless”.

The coup is associated with the performance of officer groups to establish a military dictatorship (*Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1983*). Putschists often use the army or other state power structures as direct perpetrators. They may be backed by other social groups with significant resources, primarily financial. The result of the coup, if it is realised, is not a change in the state system or a change in the social and economic formation. During the coup, one ruling group changes to another.

Insurrection, rebellion, mutiny, putsch unites action outside the legal field, legislation is replaced by expediency. All these political forms of protest significantly change the vector of society's development. The consequence of these violent forms of manifestation of population's social and political activity, as a rule, becomes a civil war.

Any civil war leads to a split of society and has its own impact on its drift. At the same time, this kind of split can exist for quite a long time and take place on different grounds: ethnic, religious, social, geographical, cultural, and ideological. Thus, the Civil War in Russia (1918-1920) split Russian society on ideological and social grounds. This split was mostly overcome during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) based on the consolidation of Soviet society in the struggle against Nazi Germany. At a new historical turn after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the split of Russian society manifested itself again. But now it has manifested itself in relation to the revolution, property, events and personalities of that time.

The drift of society can be realised not so radically. Changing the society's structure also leads to drift. The increase in the specific weight of some social groups and strata, and most importantly their real influence, significantly changes the qualitative composition of political elites, which, in turn, change the internal and foreign policy of the state (*Galvin et al., 2020*).

The fourth hypostasis of the concept of drift implies global tectonic shifts in the movement of peoples over long distances. These global processes are associated with assimilation, interpenetration of cultures, formation and disintegration of empires (*Orlov, 2016*).

If we turn only to the 20th century, we will see how Germany, the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, British, and Ottoman Empires collapsed. This disintegration had, among other things, long-term consequences. Thus, independent states were formed on the fragments of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Hungary, Czechoslovakia (later split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Romania, Yugoslavia (later split into Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia). The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was accompanied by the formation of new sovereign states within new borders, which were the result of political bargaining and compromise. At the same time, there was a compactly living ethnic minority in other States. This happened in Hungary, Romania, and almost all the former republics of Yugoslavia. This situation inevitably leads to constant political tension and periodic explosions on ethnic grounds. The colonial wars of the 17-19th centuries and the collapse of the colonial system in the 20th century fit into this context.

Considering this side of a drifting society, one cannot ignore Lev N. Gumilev's theory of passionarity (*Gumilyov, 1994*). If we consider political time in relation to large historical periods, then we will find the same patterns there. The political time of the same ethnic group within the framework of its ethnogenesis proceeds in different ways. In Russian science, the sociobiological understanding of the ethnos and the phases of its development is represented by the concept of passionarity by Lev Gumilev. For him, ethnicity is a phenomenon inextricably linked with the "feeding and accommodating landscape". An ethnos, according to Lev Gumilyov, cannot be a social group, since it is not directly connected with the productive forces, although its culture acts as a social phenomenon.

In turn, ethnogenesis is a four-stage process of the birth, rise, decline, and death of an ethnos. The biological potential of a person plays an exceptional role in this process.

Accumulating in ethnic groups, this potential leads to the appearance of excess energy – passionarity (*Gumilyov, 1990a*).

Obviously, the political timing of each stage of this process will be different. For example, at the birth and rise of Byzantium as a state, the emerging ethnos had a much greater passionarity than during the decline and death. The Byzantine ethnos passionarity as a whole allowed in the first two phases to reflect numerous attempts by other ethnic groups to reject its territory, to establish themselves as a hegemon in geopolitical terms. However, with the appearance of new strong players on the political map – Kievan Rus, the Ottoman Empire, the Christian states of Europe, – the Byzantine ethnos entered the stage of decline and dying, while its passionarity significantly decreased. Political time during these periods, no matter what political events it was characterised by, did not lead to a change in the phases of ethnogenesis, the Byzantine Empire ceased to exist.

Passionarity, according to Lev Gumilyov, is possessed by individual groups of people who involve the entire newly formed ethnic group in active intra-ethnic and international activities within certain geographical and historical limits. Having reached its apogee, the ethnos gradually comes to naught and dissolves into other ethnoses, appeared in comparison with the disappearing one in the passionate phase. The historical framework covering the period from the passion push to the death of the ethnos is one and a half thousand years. According to Gumilyov's concept of passionarity, a group of ethnic groups in one region is quite capable of creating a super ethnos based on the passion charge of geographically close peoples. Thus, having received a passionate impetus in the first century AD, the Byzantine super ethnos consisted of Greeks, Egyptians, Syrians, Georgians, Armenians, Slavs and existed until the 15th century.

Having reached its apogee, accompanied by internal rivalry and mutual destruction, the ethnogenesis of the super ethnos is inhibited. The passion charge in it is significantly reduced. There comes a phase of fracture and a huge dissipation of energy. For some time, the ethnos still functions by inertia. A new development only occurs if a new passionate population arises. However, it will be a completely different ethnic group (*Gumilyov, 1994*).

The analysis of political time based on the concept of passionarity has its limitations. Firstly, the emphasis on the close connection of the ethnos with the natural environment and, above all, with the landscape, removes from the scope of consideration many social and economic factors, which undoubtedly affect the political time. Secondly, the idea of one's own rhythms of ethnos development, which cannot be changed by people's consciousness, makes all four temporary stages of ethnogenesis purely closed social systems. In this case, political time is doomed to develop in the “cocoon” of these phases of ethnogenesis (*Gumilev, 1990b*).

At the same time, the theory of passionarity once again confirms that political time is an integral component and at the same time an indicator determining the content of the political life of super ethnoses.

Political time affects such qualitative aspects of political life as political regime, political leadership, political behaviour, political culture (*Orlov, 2016*). Within the framework of a specific political time, all political processes take place, all political institutions function. In turn, all these phenomena of political life affect political time, changing its pace, speeding up or slowing down its course. Thus, the presence of an active civic culture in society can create prerequisites for the

emergence of political institutions and mechanisms of control by the society of power, and, consequently, accelerate the course of political time, and, conversely, low political culture of citizens leads to a slowdown in political time (*Orlov, 2013*).

## Conclusion

Thus, we come to an understanding of political drift as a category of political science, since it reflects the most significant natural connections and relations of real political life. Political drift is inherent in any society. Therefore, it is methodologically important to understand that the political drift of society cannot be considered in isolation from historical time. The analysis of the political drift of society within a given political time should be realised comprehensively, considering various social, economic, natural and, cosmic factors.

From the point of view of the drift of modern Russian society, the above-mentioned phenomenon generates a mosaic picture, where along with linear motion we observe all others – pendulum, circular, return (*Orlov, 2016*).

It follows from the above analysis that the category of “political drift of society” has an ambiguous interpretation. On the one hand, this indicates the complexity of the political phenomenon itself and the impossibility to use only one approach for its comprehensive characterisation, on the other hand, it does the lack of elaboration of this phenomenon. This also determined the author’s position not to try to integrate the various hypostases of the “political drift of society”, but to use them when considering various types of social movements.



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## Citizen's propositions towards the future form of government in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1789-1790

*Abstract:* The Sejm, which had been meeting in Warsaw since the autumn of 1788, 7 September 1789 appointed a deputation whose task was to draw up a new state constitution. The resolution called on the nobility to submit their own proposals in this area. The aim of article is to specify and subsequently examine the texts containing these proposals for the reform of the Polish-Lithuanian political system. The texts are very diverse in content and scope. The proposals were divided into those relating to axiology, the sejm, the king, the king's council and the ruling commission, the administration and the social order. Generally speaking, they represented a republican vision of a state in which the nobility occupies a privileged position. The legislative body of the nobility is the sejm, which consists of the deputies elected in the nobility assemblies. Executive power is exercised by the king, the king's council, and ruling commissions. The king's council and commissions are subordinate to the parliament. The King is, as they said at the time, "the father of the fatherland". There were no reports on the judiciary, as they were not dealt with by the Deputation. The social order relates essentially to two texts, which call for limited reforms in this area. Ideas contained in the texts are specific for mercantilism and physiocracy and for free market economy. The summary indicates which of these proposals were taken into account in the draft form of government prepared and submitted to the Sejm in 1790.

*Keywords:* constitution, form of government, reform, king, sejm, The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Deputation for Form of Government, Project for Form of Government, remarks, thoughts.

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## Obywatelskie propozycje względem przyszłego ustroju politycznego Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów z lat 1789-1790

*Adnotacja:* Sejm, który rozpoczął się w Warszawie jesienią 1788 roku uchwałą z 7 września 1789 roku wyznaczył deputację, której zadaniem było opracowanie nowej konstytucji państwa. Uchwała wzywała szlachtę do nadsyłania do Deputacji propozycji wskazujących, co należałoby zmienić w dotychczasowym ustroju i jak powinien on wyglądać w przyszłości. Celem artykułu jest wskazanie przekazanych Deputacji opracowań oraz analiza ich zawartości. Są one zróżnicowane, tak pod względem zawartości, jak i obszerności. Zawarte w nich propozycje dzielą się na dotyczące aksjologii, sejmu, króla, rady króla, komisji rządowych, administracji, ustroju społecznego. Przedstawiały wizję państwa utrzymaną w duchu republikańskim, w którym szlachta zajmuje uprzywilejowaną pozycję. Władza prawodawcza jest sprawowana przez szlacheckiego sejm składający się z posłów wybieranych przez sejmiki szlacheckie. Władzę wykonawczą sprawuje król, rada króla i komisje rządzące. Rada i komisje są podporządkowane parlamentowi. Król jest, jak ówcześnie mówiono, „ojcem ojczyzny”. Propozycji nie zgłaszano w obszarze sądownictwa, bowiem nie było to przedmiotem prac Deputacji. Kwestie związane z ustrojem społecznym poruszane zostały przez dwóch autorów, których proponują ograniczone reformy w tym obszarze. Idee, które są zawarte w tekstuach, odzwierciedlają założenia doktryn merkantystycznej i fizjokratycznej, a także wolnego rynku. W podsumowaniu wskazano, które z propozycji zostały uwzględnione w „Projekcie do Formy Rządu” przedstawionym sejmowi w 1790 roku.

*Słowa kluczowe:* konstytucja, forma rządu, reforma, król, sejm, Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów, Deputacja do Formy Rządów, Projekt do Formy Rządu, uwagi, myśli.

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### Wyniki badań

Do 1789 roku ustrój polsko-litewskiego państwa, zwany ówcześnie „formą rządów” określony był w głównej mierze przez akta prawne z lat 1768-1776. Były to przede wszystkim prawa kardynalne (od łac. cardo, -inis – zawias) obejmujące najważniejsze zasady działania państwa i jego instytucji oraz ustawy określające organizację i funkcjonowanie organu władzy wykonawczej - Rady Nieustającej i podporządkowanych jej departamentów. Pozostałe instytucje i procedury były uregulowane w innych przepisach prawnych pochodzących nierzadko sprzed wielu dziesięcioleci. Sejm, który rozpoczął obradowanie w 1788 roku, podjął decyzję o zniesieniu rozwiązań ustrojowych wprowadzonych przez tzw. sejmy delegacyjne – zwane repninowskim i Ponińskiego. Decyzja ta była wynikiem programu politycznego zwycięskiego obozu politycznego, który można uznać za antyrosyjski i antymonarchiczny. Zdawano sobie jednak sprawę, że sejm nie będzie trwał wiecznie. Dlatego tak król, jak i sejm dążyli do uchwalenia nowego aktu, który by określał ramy działania państwa, prawa i obowiązki poszczególnych stanów. Już od dłuższego czasu na ten temat wypowiadało się wielu przedstawicieli ówczesnej opinii publicznej, zarówno poważni pisarze polityczni, jak i drobnijsi publicyści. Rozwiązań, z których można było czerpać, było więc wiele ([Czaja, 1988:268-307](#)).

Jeden z wybitnych znawców epoki oświecenia pisał tak: „Czyż można pomijać związki pomiędzy państwem a myślą? Myśl Oświecenia, często wynikająca z rozważań politycznych, nieuchronnie wraca do państwa i oddziałuje na tych, którzy decydują o jego losie. Rzut oka na te sprawy zachęca, aby za pozorami dojrzeć wielkie artykulacje przestrzeni. W centrum, na osi środkowej, pewna wzorcowa forma państwa ewoluje nieznacznie, jeżeli ma za sobą rewolucję; dookoła, na skrajach, prawdziwe państwo Oświecenia, państwo w zmaganiach z rzeczywistością, którą usiłuje opanować: państwo, które namiętnie chce nadrobić opóźnienia” ([Chaunu, 1989:134](#)). Taka była Rzeczpospolita w okresie, o jakim mowa.

Ustanawiając 7 września 1789 roku Deputację do Formy Rządu sejm postanowił, że każdy ma prawo nadsyłać do niej własne „myśl” w sprawach będących przedmiotem jej prac ([Wyznaczenie osób do ułożenia projektów do formy rządu, 1889:107-108](#)). Tego rodzaju działania miały już miejsce wcześniej, chociażby w przypadku zakończonych fiaskiem prac nad *Zbiorem Praw Sądowych* Andrzeja Zamoyskiego w latach 1776-1780, czy później także nad *Kodeksem Stanisława Augusta*. Celem takich działań było przede wszystkim wzbudzenie zainteresowania prowadzonymi działaniami, a przez to zwiększenie poparcia dla nich. Za najlepsze „projekty” nie rzadko przysługiwały nagrody: nie wiadomo, czy w przypadku Deputacji do Formy Rządu też tak było ([Szafranowski, 2007:168-169; Borkowska-Bagieńska, 1986:54](#)).

Owe „myśli” w rzeczywistości przybierały bardzo różne formy: myśli, uwagi, rozważań w różnych kwestiach, nierzadko bardzo luźno związanego z pracami gremium, czasem zdarzały się projekty ujęte w formie aktu prawnego. Rzadko kiedy jednak nadsyłane „myśli” miały wysoki poziom merytoryczny. Te poniżej wskazane są bardzo różnorodne, tak pod względem objętości, jak i zawartości. Trudno określić ich autorstwo, jeśli nie jest to napisane wprost. Są to najczęściej rękopisy.

Do Deputacji do Formy Rządu nadeslano następujące teksty [1]:

- 1) „Do Deputacyi Rządowej o rządzie.”, dalej jako „Do Deputacj...” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:98:329-335*);
- 2) „Kopia listu JW. Czackiego kawalera orderu orła białego do JW. Krasińskiego bpa kamienieckiego 22 Sept. 89 z Paryża do W-wy pisanego”, dalej jako „Kopia listu...” (*Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich, 913:53-56*);
- 3) „List od Marcelego U. Niemcewicza Do Deputacyi z 17 lutego 1790 roku” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:98:349-353*);
- 4) „Myśli do obszernych projektów”, dalej jako „Myśli do obszernych projektów” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:197:155-161*);
- 5) „Myśli do poprawy formy rządu”, dalej jako „Myśli do poprawy...” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:98:167*);
- 6) „Projekt do formy rządu narodu polskiego”, dalej jako „Projekt do...” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:98:183*);
- 7) „Prospekt do ulepszenia formy rządu”, dalej jako „Prospekt...” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:98:171*);
- 8) „Uwagi polityczne krótko zebrane względem reformy rządu polskiego roku 1789”, dalej jako „Uwagi polityczne...” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:197:22-96*);
- 9) „Uwagi z okoliczności rysu rządu publicznego”, dalej jako „Uwagi z okoliczności...” (*Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich, 912*);
- 10) „Widok ku poprawie formy rządowej”, dalej jako „Widok...” (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, APP:97:177*).

Większa część wyżej wskazanych pism prezentuje tradycjonalistyczny światopogląd na to, jak ma zostać ukształtowany ustrój polityczny i społeczny. Niepozbawione są one jednak elementów mających na celu pewną zmianę i naprawę tego, co zostało zakwalifikowane przez autorów owych pism jako złe. Owa „pewna zmiana” to nic innego jak naprawa egzorbitancji, mechanizm, który od dziesięcioleci znany był polskiemu sejmowi. Warto też zauważyć, iż wiele postulatów zgłoszonych w owych pismach ma na celu nie tyle wprowadzenie zmian, ile przypomnienie dotychczasowych zasad, zwyczajów, uzusów w funkcjonowaniu państwa i jego instytucji.

Potwierdzeniu ulega konstatacja Anny Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, według której publicystyka doby Sejmu Czteroletniego charakteryzuje się tym, że zawiera mało rozważań teoretycznych, a skupia się na szczegółowych kwestiach funkcjonowania państwa i jego instytucji (*Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, 2018:21*). Pierre Chaunu pisał natomiast w ten sposób: „Myśl polityczna Oświecenia jest o tyle skuteczna, o ile akceptuje stan faktyczny, o ile jej reformizm jest umiarkowany i empiryczny; wychodzi ona, nawet gdy nie chce się do tego przyznać, od wzorca zrodzonego z racjonalnej obserwacji pewnej złożonej rzeczywistości politycznej i społecznej” (*Chaunu, 1989:150-151*) [2].

Uwypuklane w nadesłanych do Deputacji pismach wartości to przede wszystkim religia rzymskokatolicka („Uwagi z okoliczności rysu...”), ojczyzna, swobody i prerogatywy (szlacheckie) – „Kopia listu....”. Zmiany prawa (*lex*) nie powinny następować często, tym bardziej jego tłumaczenie, w czym dostrzega się zagrożenie dla ładu i porządku („Prospekt...”). Dawne prawa normujące stosunki króla z sejmem powinny zostać zrealizowane („Uwagi

polityczne...”). Stosunek do oświecenia jest krytyczny, podkreśla się konieczność poprawy obyczajów, krytykuje pieniężno-ważenie w sądach. Podatki powinny być stale i sprawiedliwe, opłaty sądowe niskie, by biedniejsi mogli korzystać z wymiaru sprawiedliwości („Myśli do obszernych projektów...”, podobnie w „Uwagach politycznych...”). W świetle jednego z projektów („Projekt do formy...”) wyjazdy za granicę byłyby możliwe tylko za zgodą króla i rady (wynika to z niechęci do współczesnej „salonowej” Europy), obowiązywałby zakaz wyprowadzania majątków, zakaz nakładania lichwy, majątki uległyby zrównaniu, przewidziano dopłaty do edukacji, rejestrację długów, możliwość wprowadzenia zakazu zadłużania.

Zestaw wartości, które zostały uwypuklone w niektórych pismach, jest tradycjonalistyczny, nastawiony na obronę swobód szlacheckich, patriotyzm, niezmienność praw, sprawiedliwość oraz mercantylizm i egalitaryzm jeśli chodzi o stosunki ekonomiczne. Krytykuje się oświecenie, a więc epokę współczesną piszącym za negatywne zjawiska, które spowodowało. Skutkiem krytyki tej epoki jest szereg zakazów i ograniczeń w zakresie relacji z zagranicą czy z obcokrajowcami w Polsce.

W wymienionych wyżej pismach nadesłanych do Deputacji stosunek do uchwalonych przez sejm „Zasad do poprawy formy rządu” jest negatywny. Dokument ten jest zbyt ogólnikowy i stanowi zagrożenie dla tradycyjnych instytucji państwa szlacheckiego („Uwagi z okoliczności...”). Największym mankamentem jest brak ograniczeń w stosunku do władzy wykonawczej i regulacji działania sądu sejmowego, który ma być sądem na urzędników („Uwagi z okoliczności...”). Reforma ustroju powinna być stopniowa („Do Deputacji...”) [3]. Autor „Widoku...” zwrócił uwagę, iż przy układaniu formy rządów konieczne byłoby rozwiązanie także bardzo wielu spraw związanych z organizacją i funkcjonowaniem państwa. Można więc wywnioskować, że zdawano sobie sprawę z tego, że reforma ustroju nie jest tak prostym przedsięwzięciem i że nie będzie szybka, jak pierwotnie się wydawało sejmującym [4].

Bezkrólewia zostały poddane ostrej krytyce (list Niemcewicza..., „Myśli do obszernych projektów...”). Tron królewski miałby być sukcesyjny przez związek z familią europejską („Prospekt...”, „Uwagi polityczne...”). Elekcja władcy następowałaaby „przez familie” (list Niemcewicza). W jednym z pism występuje także elekcja *vivente rege* (za życia króla) z uprzywilejowaniem syna króla, a także dotychczasowy model wolnej elekcji („Projekt do formy...”). Król byłby głową narodu troszczącą się o wspólne dobro całego społeczeństwa („Uwagi polityczne...”), „ojcem dla dzieci” („Projekt do formy...”). Musiałby być rzymskim katolikiem („Uwagi polityczne...”, „Projekt do formy...”). Na sejmie elekcyjnym składalby przysięgę na pakta konwenta („Projekt do formy...”). Podczas elekcji zakazane byłoby tworzenie stronnictw popierających kandydatów. Kandydatów na tron wybierałyby sejmiki, króla zaś sejm większością głosów („Projekt do formy...”). Dobra stolowe, które dotychczas stanowiły źródło utrzymania władcy, zostałyby przeznaczone na skarb państwa, a król otrzymywałby pensję („Uwagi polityczne...”, „Projekt do formy...”). W czasie małoletniości władcy rządy sprawowałby prymas („Uwagi polityczne...”). Przy powoływaniu senatorów i ministrów król byłby ograniczony kandydatami przedstawionymi przez sejm („Uwagi polityczne...”). Na króla włożone zostałyby ograniczenia w zakresie wyjazdów za granicę, zatrudniania na dworze obcokrajowców, pisania listów do obywateli, urzędników i za granicę bez zgody sejmu. Jego żona miałaby zakaz wtrącania się w sprawy rządzenia („Projekt do formy...”).

Wydaje się więc, że podstawowym celem było zniesienie instytucji bezkrólewia i ustanowienie takiego trybu wybierania króla (przy utrzymaniu wolnej elekcji modyfikacja procedury wyborczej), aby państwo ponosiło jak najmniejsze koszty *interregnum* i zamieszania związanego z elekcją. Autorzy pism podkreślali jednoczący, zwierzchni charakter urzędu królewskiego. Jednocześnie jednak król byłby bardzo mocno ograniczony w swych uprawnieniach przez prawo, poddany nadzorowi sejmu. Z jednego z pism emanuje chęć zapewnienia jak największej „polski” dworu i możliwie największego ograniczenia kontaktów z „obcymi” (Kowecki i in., 1972) [5]. Jest to odzwierciedlenie jednego z nurtów w ówczesnej myśli politycznej.

We wszystkich tekstach za „naród” uważana jest cała społeczność szlachecka zgromadzona na sejmikach, a sejm to tylko ich reprezentacja („Myśli do poprawy...”, „Myśli do obszernych projektów...”, „Uwagi z okoliczności rysu...”, „Widok...”, „Uwagi polityczne...”, „Projekt do Formy...”). Poprawie uległy sposób przeprowadzania elekcji na sejmikach („Widok...”). Celem tego działania byłoby ograniczenie wpływu intryg na obsadę urzędów poprzez wprowadzenie czynnika losowego („Uwagi polityczne...”). Udział w sejmikach byłby dobrowolny („Uwagi polityczne...”). Autor jednego z pism bardzo silnie podkreślił konieczność rozwoju i swobody handlu, usprawnienia sądownictwa w obszarze handlowości, zatrzymania w kraju surowców i produktów (zwłaszcza tych których brakuje), rozwój manufaktur i rzemiosł, oszczędność („Uwagi polityczne...”). O tych sprawach pisał tam, gdzie wspominał o sejmikach, tudzież miastach, co wskazywałoby, że te społeczności lokalne miałyby się tym zajmować nimi w pierwszej kolejności. Byłby to więc dowód na obecność elementów idei pomocniczości u tego autora. Nadzór na handlem sprawowałyby komisje cywilno-wojskowe, w miastach komisje *boni ordinis*, komisja skarbową i specjalna magistratura szlachecko-miejska wybierana przez sejm („Uwagi polityczne...”). Lokalne urzędy byłyby obsadzane przez sejmiki, centralne przez sejm. Kompetencje sejmu we wszystkich pismach są takie same jak dotychczas, ewentualne modyfikacje służyłyby wzmacnieniu izby poselskiej pozycji względem senatu, egzekutywy i władcy.

Akceptacja dla „rządów sejmikowych” jest powszechna (Pawiński, 1978) [6]. Można dostrzec wyraźną obawę przed zbyt rozrośniętymi uprawnieniami władzy wykonawczej – czy to króla, czy ministrów, a także senatu będącego w opinii szlacheckiej ośrodkiem wpływu monarszego. Jeśli idzie o sejmiki – u autorów istnieje oczekiwanie pewnej zmiany w ich funkcjonowaniu i przeprowadzaniu określonych procedur, co miałoby usprawnić ich działanie.

Sejm byłby „zawsze czuwający”, jednak musiałby być ograniczony prawem. Stany sejmujące powinny być wobec siebie równe, a król stanowiłby jeden ze stanów sejmujących („Uwagi polityczne...”, „Myśl do poprawy...”), kadencja sejmu wynosiłaby dwa lata (także „Projekt do Formy...”), liczba posłów ulegałaby podwojeniu („Uwagi polityczne...”), do sejmu wchodzili by też przedstawiciele miast („Uwagi polityczne...”, „Projekt do Formy...”). Sejm gotowy byłby zwolnywany przez władcę („Myśli do poprawy...”). W opinii innego autora („Uwagi z okoliczności rysu...”) sejm gotowy stanowi zagrożenie, w związku z czym nie należy go ustanawiać, a zachować dotychczasowe sejmy nadzwyczajne i konwokacyjne. Autor „Projektu do formy...” wspomniał tylko o sejmach nadzwyczajnych w sprawach wojny i pokoju zwolnywanych przez króla z radą.

Senat posiadalby jedynie doradczą rolę względem izby poselskiej (w „Uwagach politycznych...” połowa izby ma głos stanowczy połowa doradczy). Pogląd ten odzwierciedla powszechnie wówczas dążenie do emancypacji posłów i zmniejszenia roli senatorów postrzeganych jako stronicy władcy („Myśli do poprawy...”). Senat byłby złożony z doświadczonych urzędników, cieszących się uszanowaniem, wybieranych na sejmikach. Senatorowie skłaliby przysięgę, ponosiliby odpowiedzialność przed sejmem. Mogliby być odwołani, ale też mogliby się zrzec funkcji. Senator byłby raczej doradcą i „mądrą głową” niż politykiem („Projekt do Formy...”). Krytyce poddano konfederacje („Prospekt...”).

Mimo podkreślania roli sejmu w szlacheckiej Rzeczypospolitej, niektórzy autorzy zaznaczali, iż sejm nieograniczony żadnymi obostrzeniami również może stanowić zagrożenie. Do sejmu przypuszczeni zostaliby przedstawiciele miast. Sejm gotowy jako nieznane *novum* stanowił w opinii wielu zagrożenie. Mimo przywiązania do utrwalonych rozwiązań ustrojowych krytyce poddane zostały konfederacje, ponieważ powodują zaburzenie porządku i ładu. Senat stalby się izbą, w której zasiadają doświadczeni politycy mający służyć radą i pomocą.

Posłowie wybrani na sejm byłby odpowiedzialni przed sejmikami, można byłoby ich odwołać („Uwagi polityczne...”). W sejmie byłby czytane paktu konwenta, posłowie mieliby prawo odniesienia się do nich zabierając głos. Sejm sprawowałby kontrolę nad polityką zagraniczną i fiskalną („Uwagi z okoliczności rysu...”, „Uwagi polityczne...”), wojskiem poprzez komisję wojskową oraz hetmana („Uwagi polityczne...”). Byłby gwarantem suwerenności (w obawie przed królem, który w opinii wielu w latach 1773-1775 obrócił się przeciwko własnym obywatelom („Projekt do Formy...”). Wojsko mogliby być używane tylko do celów defensywnych i nie mogliby zostać zmniejszone („Projekt do Formy...”). Pojawił się postulat wprowadzenia przysiąg poselskich, w tym na niebranie pieniędzy („Kopia listu...”, „Uwagi z okoliczności rysu...”). Zwraca uwagę fakt, iż przysięgi nadal postrzegane są pozytywnie mimo ich nieskuteczności, co w owym czasie już zauważano. Propozycja określenia kompletu w sejmie (minimalnej liczby posłów wymaganej do tego, by uchwały były prawomocne) stanowiła niewątpliwie pokłosie sejmów delegacyjnych („Uwagi z okoliczności...”) [7]. W jednym z pism krytyce poddane zostały instrukcje poselskie („Kopia listu...”), według innych autorów nadal mają istnieć („Myśli do poprawy...”, „Projekt do Formy...”). Stwierdzono, iż dominacja jednego stanu nad drugim w sejmie powoduje iluzoryczność trójstanowości parlamentu („Prospekt...”). Krytykowano okoliczność, iż sejm załatwia sprawy prywatne („Uwagi z okoliczności rysu...”), zbyt długie procedury, zwłaszcza wyborcze, oraz wymóg uzyskiwania jednomysłności – powszechnie powinny być wprowadzone głosowanie większościowe z wyjątkami („Prospekt...”, „Myśli do obszernych projektów...”, list Niemcewicza, „Uwagi polityczne...”).

Sejm zachowuje ścisły nadzór i kontrolę nad poszczególnymi obszarami działania państwa, w tym zwłaszcza nad wojskiem i dyplamacją. Stosunek do instrukcji poselskich jest różny, przysięgi postrzega się jako remedium na zjawisko brania przez posłów pieniędzy od przedstawicieli obcych państw. Krytyce poddawany jest brak równości między stanami sejmującymi, przewlekłe procedury parlamentarne, prywata w sejmie – w związku z tym oczekuje się reform. Obawa przed działaniami władcy jak i przed zagarnięciem władzy przez garstkę posłów wynika z wydarzeń, które miały miejsce na przełomie lat 60. i 70. XVIII wieku.

Wielu autorów pism pozostaje nieufnych w stosunku straży, która byłaby organem powołanym w miejsce zniesionej Rady Nieustającej („Myśli do poprawy...”, „Uwagi z okoliczności...”, „Widok...”, „Projekt do Formy...”). W jednym z pism („Projekt do formy...”) przewiduje się, iż straż byłaby wybierana przez sejm z osób, które ułożą formę rządów – miałoby to na celu sprawne wdrożenie w życie nowej konstytucji („Projekt do Formy...”). Straż miałaby posiadać przede wszystkim władzę typu „dozorczego”: przygotowywać projekty, przyjmować skargi, kontrolować urzędy, inicjować określone działania, zbierać informacje, koordynować pracę komisji, prowadzić korespondencję, doradzać królowi i jednocześnie nadzorować jego poczynania („Myśli do poprawy...”, „Widok...”, „Projekt do Formy...” – tu dodatkowo upominać urzędy i urzędników, udzielać pomocy uciśnionym, pilnować bezpieczeństwa). Ponosiłaby odpowiedzialność przed sejmem. Ministrowie musieliby być obecni w straży (obowiązywałby ich zakaz wyjazdu z miejsca, gdzie odbywałaby się sesja), swe zadania wypełnialiły do wyboru nowej rady, cołułyby zachowaniu ciągłości działania „ciała międzysejmowego” („Projekt do Formy...”). Właściwymi organami egzekucyjnymi byłyby komisje rządzące podległe sejmowi i odpowiedzialne przed nim. Przewodniczącymi tych komisji byłby ministrowie („Myśli do poprawy...”, „Widok...”, „Uwagi polityczne...”). Straż miałaby zakaz dokonywania wykładni prawa („Myśli do poprawy...”). Komisje miałyby być rozdzielone („Widok...”), jednak autor innego pisma dopuszczał ich połączenie. Liczba tak komisarzy, jak i oficjalistów została zmniejszona, co miałołuły służyć usprawnieniu i zmniejszeniu kosztów („Uwagi polityczne...”). Autor jednego z pism przewidywał, iż zamiast straży istniałby („Uwagi polityczne...”) „nieustanny sejm” i organ o nazwie *senatus consultum*, co niewątpliwie nawiązywało do dawnej instytucji istniejącej do momentu ustanowienia Rady Nieustającej.

Można stwierdzić, iż zniesienie Rady Nieustającej nie sprawiło, że zaufanie do nowego gabinetu byłoby większe, a poczucie zagrożenia z jego strony dla „wolności” zmniejszyło się. Nowy organ podlegalny sejmowi i byłby odpowiedzialny przed nim, jego zadania ograniczałyby się do dozoru magistratur, koordynacji ich pracy, doradzania władcy i nadzorowania jego działań. Rządzić i administrować miałyby komisje jako kolejne ciała również podległe sejmowi, którymi kierowałby ministrowie.

Kwestie dotyczące administracji zostały uwzględnione jedynie w kilku pismach, tych najobszerniejszych i prezentujących najwyższy poziom. Przede wszystkim podkreśleniu uległo znaczenie urzędników i administracji dla sprawności rządu („Widok...”). Urzędy niższego stopnia miałyby być zorganizowane na wzór urzędów wyższego stopnia. Okres, przez jaki dana osoba pełniłaby urząd, byłby określony – wówczas mogłyby być zespolone, albo też nie – wówczas miałyby być rozdzielone („Widok...”). Przy obejmowaniu stanowisk i awansach istniałby wymóg posiadania określonego doświadczenia („Widok...”, „Projekt do Formy...”). Poziom województwa stanowiłby podstawowy stopień, w oparciu o który zorganizowana została administracja. W każdym województwie działałyby odpowiedzialne przed sejmikami komisje złożone z asesorów, którymi byłby miejscowi kasztelani i chorążowie, na ich czele stałby prezes. Zauważalne jest również dążenie do powiązania władz lokalnych ze strukturami administracyjnymi, które zajmowałyby się lokalnymi sprawami i przyjmowały skargi obywateli.

W świetle „Projektu do Formy...” w województwach działałyby rady wojewódzkie wybierane na dwa lata przez sejmiki. Zajmowałyby się administrowaniem, pilnowaniem

porządku, rozpatrywaniem apelacji od wyroków sądów i wszelkimi innymi kwestiami lokalnymi, ponadto nadawaniem urzędnikom patentów. W radach prezydowaliby wojewodowie. Obok szlachty zasiadaliby w nich też przedstawiciele miast. Członkowie rad ponosiliby odpowiedzialność przed sejmikami. Urzędnicy ministerialni byliby wybierani na sejmie, a urzędnicy lokalni na sejmikach. Urzędy, które nie pełnili swej pierwotnej roli, takiej, jaka była wskazana w chwili ustanowienia, zwane nieczynnymi, miałyby zostać zniesione, a pozostałe uregulowane. Urzędnicy byliby odpowiedzialni przed sejmem. Przewidzianych zostało kilka cenzusów jako wymóg objęcia urzędów (wieku, posiadłości w województwie, umiejętności i doświadczenia). Urzędnik musiałby złożyć przysięgę, otrzymywałby „instrument”, ponadto miałby zakaz łączenia funkcji urzędniczej z funkcją posła/deputata. Ponadto dla usprawnienia administracji przewidziano określenie i ujednolicenie liczby powiatów w województwach.

Struktury urzędnicze powinny być więc zorganizowane jako spójny system, w miarę jednolity. Kandydatów na urzędy obowiązywałyby cenzusy, w tym doświadczenie. Zarząd lokalny sprawowałyby rady, które byłyby odpowiedzialne przed sejmikami. W ten sposób chciano także zapewnić szlachcie monopol nadzoru nad tymi ciałami, w których zasiadali mieszkańców. Zakaz łączenia funkcji urzędnika z funkcją poselską/deputacką służyłby rozdzieleniu władzy wykonawczej od prawodawczej.

Na temat ustroju społecznego wypowiadały się autorzy nielicznych pism. Należy podkreślić, iż utrzymaniu uległyby podział na stany, a każdy stan podlegałby własnym regulacjom prawnym („Do Deputacji...”, „Projekt do Formy...”). W jednym z pism mowa jest również o obowiązku przynależności stanowej („Projekt do Formy...”). Szlachta posiadałaby prawa polityczne (wolność polityczną – prawo do sprawowania władzy w państwie), byłaby stanem uprzywilejowanym, lecz musiałaby mieć świadomość, iż stanowi część ogółu społeczeństwa („Do Deputacji...”). Posiadałaby prawo do posiadania własności, pierwszeństwo do urzędów („Projekt do Formy...”). Wolności cywilne objęłyby także mieszkańców, a nawet chłopów („Do Deputacji...”). Szlachcic mógłby zostać aresztowany, ale areszt miałby zapobiegać ucieczce, nie stanowilby dodatkowej kary. Od poddanych szlachcic mógłby wymagać tylko tyle, ile wskazywałby inwentarz („Projekt do Formy...”).

Autor „Projektu do Formy...” podkreślał, iż stan miejski jest potrzebny i musi być poważany. Magistraty w miastach byłyby wybierane przez mieszkańców i podlegałyby radom wojewódzkim. Mieszczanie poprzez swych przedstawicieli brali by udział w elekcji króla, w radach wojewódzkich, w magistratach, mogliby pełnić urzędy. Mogliby też służyć w wojsku, gdzie posiadałiby prawo do awansu, a nawet nobilitacji za zasługi.

Chłopi byli postrzegani jako „ciemni”, konieczne byłoby ich oświecenie i przystosowanie do życia w warunkach wolności, w sytuacji, w której byłyby pozbawieni nadzoru szlacheckiego. Szlachta jest wobec nich nieufna („Myśli do poprawy...”). Wielu autorów wskazywało, iż konieczna byłaby poprawa ich losu, mając na względzie idee równości i sprawiedliwości, a także humanitaryzmu. Szlachta powinna na to przyzwolić czy to z побudek ideologicznych czy to ze względu na własny interes. Chłopom należy się też wsparcie w sytuacji klęsk żywiołowych, jak głód. Jeden z autorów zaproponował ustanowienie urzędników, którzy wspieraliby chłopów w sądach („Widok...”). Autor „Projektu do Formy...” podkreślał istotną rolę, jaką chłop spełnia w państwie, zwłaszcza w rolnictwie. Miałoby to odzwierciedlenie w konkretnych rozwiązaniach, jak ulgi podatkowe czy określenie zobowiązań wobec panów w inwentarzach ustalanych w

drodze urzędowej (w miejsce pańszczyzny). Przewidział ponadto szereg postanowień mających na celu objęcie chłopstwa opieką państwa. Miałby prawo do pomocy w sądzie. Za zabór należącego do niego mienia, za okrucieństwo ze strony pana, przekroczenie norm inwentarzowych chłop mógłby zwrócić się do sądu o sprawiedliwość. Miał też prawo do służby w wojsku i możliwość awansowania. Na wsiach zorganizowane zostałyby szkoły, które kształciliby ich mieszkańców. Chłop w razie nadużycia władzy przez pana otrzymywałby pomoc od lokalnej rady, miałby prawo wychodźstwa ze wsi. Szlachta zostałaby pozbawiona władzy życia i śmierci nad chłopem.

Szlachta zachowałaby więc swą dotychczasową uprzywilejowaną pozycję, jako jedyny stan miałaby prawo sprawować władzę polityczną. Mieszczanie i chłopi byliby do niej przypuszczeni jedynie w pewnym zakresie. Władza szlachcica nad podanym byłaby ograniczona prawem i inwentarzem. Miasta podległyby nadzorowi państwa, a w zasadzie stanu uprzywilejowanego – szlachty. Podkreślane, że mieszczańcy są potrzebni dla kraju i powinni być szanowani. Mogliby się starać o służbę w wojsku, awans, nobilitację. Chłopi jako warstwa społeczna była postrzegana jako stanowiąca zagrożenie dla szlachty. Ponieważ żyli dotąd w ograniczonej wolności, należałoby ich do tej wolności przyzyczyć. Mimo tego proponowano różne zmiany, mające na celu poprawić dolę chłopską, jak na przykład regulacja wymiaru obowiązków przez inwentarze, pomoc w sądzie, możliwość służby w wojsku i awansu, utworzenie szkół wiejskich. Podobnie, jak w przypadku mieszkańców, podkreślane duże znaczenie chłopów dla kraju, dla rolnictwa i wsi.

Warto zadać pytanie, które z propozycji zawartych w przedstawionych Deputacji pismach znalazły się następnie w opracowanym „Projektie do Formy Rządów” (*Archivum Główne Akt Dawnych, ASCz XVI:381-538v*), który został przedstawiony sejmowi w sierpniu 1790 roku.

Zakładał on, iż religią panującą w Rzeczypospolitej będzie wyznanie rzymskokatolickie, a odstępstwo od niego będzie karane. Tego wyznania musieli być król i jego żona. Jeśli małżonka byłaby innej religii, warunkiem jej koronacji byłaby konwersja na katolicyzm.

„Projekt do Formy Rządu” stał na straży wartości, które były wymieniane w pismach kierowanych do Deputacji: wolności, swobód i prerogatyw szlacheckich, własności, sprawiedliwości, religii panującej, ojczyzny. Świadczy o tym treść przedmowy do tego „Projektu do formy rządu” czy też zadania poszczególnych instytucji państwowych. Idea sprawiedliwości jest dostrzegalna w zadaniach komisji policji, mercantylizmu – komisji skarbowej. Są też obecne w nim wartości związane z rodzącym się kapitalizmem i wolnym rynkiem, czego pisma nie zawierają. Ponadto po uchwaleniu konstytucji król, urzędy, stany miałyby złożyć przysięgę na jej dochowanie. Do idei dawności prawa nawiązywano tam, gdzie wskazywano, iż pewne sprawy będą regulowane przez dawne prawa i zwyczaje. Straż miałaby zakaz dokonywania wykładni prawa.

W przedmowie do „Projektu do Formy Rządu” wskazano, iż praca Deputacji to jedynie poprawa, nie zaś zmiana ustroju. W ten sposób chciano uspokoić obawy tradycjonalistycznie nastawionej szlachty. Stalości prawa miała też służyć zasada jednomyślności – wielokrotnie wspominano o niej wskazując, iż przy podejmowaniu decyzji w pierwszej kolejności należy dążyć do uzyskania jednomyślności. Autorzy „Projektu do formy rządu” nie byli jednak pozbawieni poczucia realizmu wskazując, iż niektóre decyzje powinny być podejmowane odpowiednimi większościami kwalifikowanymi, inne prostą większością głosów.

Projekt wprowadzał mechanizm, zgodnie z którym po śmierci Stanisława Augusta sejm miałby wybrać dynastię panującą na tronie polskim a dziedziczność tronu następowałaby w obrębie tej dynastii; w razie jej wygaśnięcia sejm wybierałby kolejną.

Sejmiki, obok sejmu, byłyby częścią władzy prawodawczej. Zastrzeżono jednak, że sejmiki nie posiadają władzy prawodawczej, by nie podważały decyzji sejmu. Celem reformy ustroju było bowiem, między innymi, wzmacnienie suwerenności wewnętrznej państwa. Jak stwierdzał Projekt: „samowładność Rzeczypospolitej jest w sejmie”. Instrukcje miałyby charakter wiążący w kwestiach stanowienia prawa. Udział w sejmikach byłby dobrowolny. Zadania w zakresie handlu, rozwoju przemysłu i rzemiosła, towarów należałyby do komisji policji i skarbowej oraz komisji wojewódzkich na poziomie lokalnym. Komisje *boni ordinis* uległyby likwidacji.

Wszelkie procedury w sejmie i sejmikach zostały opisane bardzo szczegółowo. Wierzono, że to zapobiegnie nadużyciom. W stosunku do dawnego systemu, byłyby nie tyle skrócone, co usystematyzowane i uporządkowane. Powszechnie stosowane byłyby przysięgi, które wymagano by od wybranych na różne urzędy.

Sejmy odbywałyby się co dwa lata, król byłby jednym ze stanów sejmujących. Rozstrzygnięcie kwestii zasiadania w nim przedstawicieli miast przekazano sejmowi. Król zwolniałby sejmy gotowe w określonych przypadkach. Posel mógł zostać na sejmiku po sejmie odwołany lub jego mandat mógłby ulec przedłużeniu. W sejmie czytano by paktu konwenta. Sejm sprawowałby kontrolę nad polityką zagraniczną, fiskalną, nad wojskiem powołując radę wojenną.

Senat brałby udział w stanowieniu prawa i podatków, wyborze i kontroli straży praw, komisji i urzędów, lecz byłby osobnym organem. Tworzyliby go wybierani dożywotnio na sejmikach senatorowie. Byłaby ich polowa liczby posłów. W senacie zasiadałyby też ministrowie na czele z królem. Konfederacje zostałyby zniesione.

Król w świetle „Projektu do formy rządu” sprawowałby „najwyższą rządową opiekę”, nadzorował realizację prawa - w imię „jednostajności” Rzeczypospolitej. Władca po objęciu na tron składałby przysięge na paktu konwenta. Projekt nie mówił nic na temat dóbr stołowych, ale przewidywał, iż król będzie otrzymywać pensję ze skarbu państwa. Przy powoływaniu senatorów i ministrów władca byłby ograniczony kandydatami wskazanymi przez sejm. Wyjazd króla za granicę byłby uzależniony od zgody sejmu. Nie zakazano zatrudniania obcokrajowców na dworze. Nie zakazano królowi prowadzenia korespondencji z obywatelami, urzędami, z zagranicą bez zgody sejmu. Na temat roli żony w polityce dokument również nic nie mówił.

„Projekt do formy rządu” przewidywał istnienie złożonej z 12 członków straży praw, która byłaby odpowiedzialna przed sejmem. Przewodniczyłby jej król. Straży podległe byłyby komisje rządzące (policji, skarbowej, wojskowej, edukacyjnej), a także kancelarie. Sejm miałby prawo wydawać wobec straży zalecenia, upomnienia, wstrzymywać jej decyzje. Podobne prawo miałaby straż wobec komisji. Kompetencje straży byłyby bardzo zbliżone do tych, o których była mowa w pismach nadesłanych do Deputacji. Komisje rządzące byłyby rozdzielone, jednak mogłyby prowadzić wymianę korespondencji i organizować wspólne posiedzenia, także z udziałem straży. Projekt nie przewidywał redukcji liczby urzędników lub komisarzy, ale zwiększenie obsady kancelarii komisji uzależniało od zgody sejmu.

W zakresie zarządu lokalnego ustanowione zostałyby komisje wojewódzkie (sejm osobną decyzją wcześniej powołał identyczne komisje), które sprawowałyby zarząd lokalny w

województwach, powiatach, ziemiach. Komisja złożona byłaby z 16 komisarzy wybieranych co dwa lata przez sejmik i byłaby przed nim odpowiedzialna. Sejmiki powoływałyby lokalnych urzędników.

Cały odrębny rozdział został poświęcony strukturze urzędów i administracji państwa, w tym sądów i trybunałów oraz uniwersytetów. Wielokrotnie przewiduje się w nim cenzusy względem kandydatów do różnych funkcji, w tym census posiadania własności nieruchomości i wykształcenia. Wiele przepisów tego rozdziału miałoby obowiązywać poczawszy od momentu, w którym upłynęłyby kilka lat od wejścia w życie całej formy rządów. Urzędy nieczynne zostałyby zniesione. Urzędnicy byliby odpowiedzialni przed sejmem lub sejmikami, nie mogliby łączyć funkcji z pełnieniem mandatu posła lub deputata. Podział terytorialny kraju zostałby ujednolicony, liczba powiatów w województwach byłaby taka sama.

Spoleczeństwo byłoby trójstanowe. Nie zostałby nałożony obowiązek przynależności stanowej – kontrolę nad tzw. ludźmi luźnymi, bez zawodu i źródła utrzymania, sprawowała komisja policji. W przedmowie projekt mówi o „obywatelach”, a więc szlachcie, i „mieszkańcach”, a więc pozostałych ludziach. Szlachta byłaby więc częścią ogółu społeczeństwa zamieszkującego Rzeczpospolitą. Stanem uprzywilejowanym posiadającym władzę polityczną byłaby szlachta posiadająca własność. Szlachcie zapewniono wolność wyboru miejsca zamieszkania w kraju lub za granicą. Nie wprowadzono zakazów w zakresie przemieszczania, wyjazdów, wyprowadzania majątku. „Projekt do Formy Rządu” nie obejmował też rozwiązań o wyraźnie egalitarystycznym zabarwieniu. Szlachcic w sądzie miałby prawo do obrony, świadków, porozumiewania się z obrońcą, jawnego przesłuchania i informacji o wyroku. Nie wskazywał, jakie powinny być opłaty sądowe czy podatki.

W miastach jurysdykcję sprawowałyby magistraty podległe nadzorowi komisji policji. Prawa polityczne miałyby mieszkańców posiadający własność. Miałyby prawo pełnienia urzędów w stanie duchownym, żołnierskim, awansowania, ubiegania się o nobilitację. Komisja policji miałaby prawo wydawania dla ludności instrukcji i wskazówek w sprawach zdrowia, rolnictwa, handlu celem „oświecenia” mniej wyedukowanych.

Chłopom przyznany zostałby ograniczony katalog praw, co było odbiciem koncepcji stopniowego przyznawania praw i wolności stanom nieuprzywilejowanym. Wprowadzony zostałby obowiązek zawierania przez dziedziców z chłopami umów określających wymiar świadczeń. Chłopom przyznano prawo opuszczenia wsi z rodziną w razie działania pana na szkodę zdrowia, życia chłopa lub jego rodziny. Prawo własności dóbr przyznane zostało tylko „mieszkańcom” dóbr królewskich. W sytuacjach zagrożenia niedoborem żywności przewidywano, iż komisja wojewódzka informowałaby komisje policji, by ta podjęła stosowne działania. Chłopi w takich sytuacjach nie uzyskiwałiby jednak bezpośredniego wsparcia. Sądy przy komisjach wojewódzkich byłyby bezpłatne, „zawsze gotowe”, co miałoby ułatwić chłopom dochodzenie sprawiedliwości. Poprawie położenia ludności służyłyby też wprowadzenie obowiązku przeprowadzania spisów ludności i lustracji majątków w kraju.

Podsumowując należy stwierdzić, iż „Projekt do Formy Rządu” zawierał większość postulatów, jakie zostały zapisane w nadesłanych do Deputacji pismach. Był z nimi zgodny przede wszystkim w warstwie aksjologicznej. Różnice są dostrzegalne w zakresie szczegółów

związanych z działaniem poszczególnych instytucji, przede wszystkim władzy wykonawczej: straży, komisji, administracji. Pisma cechują się w tym zakresie ogólnikowością, ich autorzy zazwyczaj nie znają tych zagadnień. Tymczasem w „Projekcie do Formy Rządu” sprawy te zostały szczegółowo opisane i usystematyzowane w jeden spójny system.

### Źródła informacji:

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### Uwagi

- [1] Uwzględniono tylko te teksty, które w jakikolwiek sposób odnoszą się do prac Deputacji do Formy Rządu lub do „Zasad do poprawy Formy Rządu” w związku z ogłoszonym wezwaniem do przesyłania tekstów, bądź też tytuł albo treść wskazuje na to, iż tekst był skierowany do Deputacji. Pominięto tu pozostałe teksty z tego okresu dotyczące prac nad reformą ustroju, a których jest wiele, także w postaci rękopiśmiennej. Niewykluczone jednak, iż powstały w związku z tą akcją, ale tego nie da się ustalić, a wyciąganie wniosku z milczenia źródeł byłoby w tym wypadku błędem. Wszystkie teksty pochodzą z dwóch jednostek w Archiwum Publicznym Potockich [APP] w Archiwum Głównym Akt Dawnych [AGAD] (nr 98 – skany dostępne pod adresem: <http://agadd2.home.net.pl/metrykalia/335/sygn.%2098/indeks.htm> i 197 – której skany jeszcze nie są dostępne) zatytułowanych w identyczny sposób: „Rękopisma statystyczno-polityczne w Czasie Sejmu Czteroletniego ku polepszeniu Rządu i Mienia Rzeczypospolitej wydane”. Tytuł jednostki 912 w Bibliotece Czartoryskich [BCz]: „Miscellanea historyczne z w. XVIII zebrane przez Tadeusza Czackiego”. Niestety nie można stwierdzić, ile Deputacja otrzymała „myśli” w ogóle z uwagi na nie zachowanie się spuścizny po pracach nad reformą ustrojową w całości.
- [2] Chaunu, P. Cywilizacja..., s. 150. Także na s. 151 pisze o tym, iż filozofia wieku światel jest nastawiona na bezpośrednie zastosowanie w praktyce.

- [3] Pogląd ten odpowiada koncepcji łagodnej rewolucji.
- [4] Świadczą o tym powtarzające się kilkukrotnie prorogacje obrad sejmu, który się rozpoczął 6 października 1788 roku, pierwsza z nich Volumina Legum..., s. 52. Sejm ten pierwotnie miał się zakończyć po sześciu niedzielach.
- [5] Na temat niechęci do tego, co obce, francuskie i „salonowe” zob. J. Michalski, „Warszawa”, czyli o antyspołecznych nastrojach w czasach Stanisława Augusta, w: Warszawa XVIII wieku, z. 1, Warszawa 1972.
- [6] Wyrażenie „rządy sejmikowe” nawiązuje do tytułu książki A. Pawińskiego „Rządy sejmikowe w Polsce 1572-1795 na tle stosunków województw kujawskich”, oprac. H. Olszewski, Warszawa 1978.
- [7] Terminem „sejm delegacyjny” określa się tzw. sejm repnинowski z 1767-1768 roku oraz tzw. sejm Poniatowskiego z lat 1773-1775, kiedy zadanie opracowania aktów prawnych i ich przedyskutowania przekazano kilkudziesięcioosobowym gremium, posiadającym nadzwyczajne uprawnienia.
- [8] „Projekt do Formy Rządu” w formie drukowanej, z niewielkimi poprawkami, który został przedstawiony Marszałkowi Sejmowemu, znajduje się w AGAD, ASCz, t. XVI, k. 381-538v. Skany tej jednostki dostępne są pod adresem: <http://agad.gov.pl/ASCz/16/indeks.htm>

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## Features of the historical and political development of the Baltic countries in the 1910s

*Abstract:* On August 1, 1914, the First World War broke out, and everything changed decisively for the Baltic States, and for Russia, and for the whole world as a whole. At the same time, no one could foresee all the consequences of the war. And at the same time, the Baltic peoples were among the most affected in the 1914-20 wars. The author presents the results of a study of the historical and political development of the Baltic countries in the 1910s. The study analysed the political state of Lithuania at the beginning of the 20th century, identified the features of the period of occupation of Lithuanian lands in 1915-1917, presented statistical data on the emigration process that swept the Baltic States during the period under study, and also determined the contribution of the Latvian and Estonian military to the political transformations of the Russian army and territory of the Russian Empire Historical, comparative, logical, and deductive research methods were used. In the course of scientific research, numerous historical and statistical sources published in Russia and the Baltic countries, as well as the works of famous researchers, were used.

*Keywords:* Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, World War I, State Duma, Austria-Hungary, Courland.



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## Особенности историко-политического развития стран Прибалтики в 1910-х годах

*Аннотация:* 1 августа 1914 года разразилась Первая мировая война, и все решительно изменилось и для Прибалтики, и для России, и для всего мира в целом. При этом никто не мог предвидеть всех последствий войны. И при этом прибалтийские народы оказались в числе наиболее пострадавших в войнах 1914-20 гг. Автор представляет результаты исследования историко-политического развития стран Прибалтики в 1910-х годах. В ходе исследования проанализировано политическое состояние Литвы в начале 20 века, определены особенности периода оккупации литовских земель в 1915-1917 годах, представлены статистические данные эмиграционного процесса, охватившего Прибалтику в исследуемый период, а также определён вклад латышских и эстонских военных в политические трансформации российской армии и территории Российской Империи. Были использованы исторический, сравнительный, логический и дедуктивный методы исследования. В ходе научного исследования использовались многочисленные исторические и статистические источники, опубликованные в России и странах Прибалтики, а также труды известных исследователей.

*Ключевые слова:* Прибалтика, Литва, Латвия, Эстония, Первая мировая война, Государственная Дума, Австро-Венгрия, Курляндия.



## Introduction

On August 1, 1914, the First World War broke out, and everything changed decisively for the Baltic States, Russia, and the whole world as a whole. At the same time, no one could foresee all the consequences of the war. Two revolutions will take place in Russia at once, the country will fall apart, then another one will break out, now a civil war. Among the collapse of several empires and an attempt to create a fundamentally new society, quite unexpectedly (one might even say, by accident) three small Baltic republics appeared. And at the same time, the Baltic peoples were among the most affected in the wars of 1914-20. In addition to those who fell on the battlefields, as well as those who died in the rear from the hardships of military life, the population of the Baltic states has significantly decreased as a result of the evacuation and flight of civilians to the rear, far from the Baltic coast. The ethnographic and demographic consequences of these bloody events are still felt today.

The study's purpose was to research the features of the historical and political development of the Baltic countries in the 1910s.

Based on the purpose, the following study's tasks were developed:

- analyse the political state of Lithuania at the beginning of the 20th century;
- determine the features of the period of Lithuanian lands occupation in 1915-1917;
- provide statistical data on the emigration process that has engulfed the Baltics;
- determine the contribution of the Latvian and Estonian military to the political transformation of the Russian army and the Russian Empire territory.

To solve the tasks set, historical, comparative, logical and deductive research methods were used.

In the course of scientific research, numerous historical, and statistical sources, as well as the famous researchers' works published in Russia and the Baltic countries were used.

### The Baltic States went to war together with Russia

In total, 178,387,800 people lived in the Russian Empire at the beginning of 1914, including 570,200 (250.2 thousand men, 257 thousand women) in the Estonian province, 1,744,000 (861.3 men, 882.7 women) in the Livland province, 798, 3 thousand (388.5 men, 409, 8 women) in Courland, 1857 thousand (914 thousand men, and 943 thousand women) in the Kovno province (Russia ..., 1995: 18-22). According to the Military Statistical Yearbook for 1912, there were 979,557 Russians, 104,079 Poles, 23,790 Lithuanians and Latvians, 18,874 Germans, 50,237 Jews, 26,621 Caucasians, 9,551 Finns, Mordvins, Cheremis, Chuvashs, 38,679 Tatars, Meshcheryaks, and Bashkirs, and Teptyars in the army ([Military Statistical Yearbook..., 1914:372-375](#)).

The Baltics became a battlefield literally from the first hours of the war. Thus, the war was officially declared by Germany to Russia at 18:00 on August 1, 1914. The Russian port of Libava was shelled by German warships on August 2. And at the same time, hostilities began on the lands of ethnic Lithuania and in East Prussia.

When the war broke out, the local population demonstrated loyalty to a single state in the Baltic provinces of Russia. Moreover, the struggle against the eternal enemies – the Germans – led to a certain enthusiasm and patriotic upsurge. All politicians of the Baltic region declared

their loyalty to Russia. Thus, deputy J. Goldmanis declared from the rostrum of the IV State Duma: “Among the Latvians and Estonians there is not a single person who would not be aware that everything that they have achieved in terms of well-being has been achieved under the protection of the Russian Eagle and that everything that Latvians and Estonians must still achieve, perhaps only when the Baltic region will continue to be an indivisible part of Great Russia. Therefore, we can now see such an upsurge in our spirits, such enthusiasm to stand up for our dear Fatherland, that in order to paint a correct picture of this, the brightest colours would be completely pale. These great days prove that neither nationality, nor language, nor religion prevents us, Latvians and Estonians, from being ardent patriots of Russia and defending our Fatherland, standing shoulder to shoulder with the great Russian people against the daring enemy” ([Zorin, 2009:166](#)). Lithuanian Martin Ichas, a deputy of the State Duma from the Cadets, declared support for Russia’s military efforts: “At this crucial historical moment, I must declare on behalf of all Lithuanians, without distinction of parties, that the fate of our people has always been connected with the fate of the Slavs. The Lithuanian people, on whose land the first shots fell, who are forced to fight in the forefront, go to this war as if it were a sacred one. He forgets all his grievances, hoping to see Russia free and happy after this war, and Lithuanians torn in half united under one Russian flag” ([Zheleznov et al., 1928:712](#)).

In the autumn of 1914, the Lithuanian political elite wrote the so-called *Amber Declaration*, a political proposal to the government. Russia was called “the liberator of peoples” in it, and it was said that the friendship between the Lithuanian and Russian people “is not overshadowed by anything” ([Laurinavičius & Rowell, 2009:50](#)). In this declaration, it was stated that in return for the full support of the Lithuanians for all Russian military efforts, Lithuania also hopes for the restoration of historical truth and it will be allowed to reunite with the Prussian part of Lithuania. It was understood that the united region would become an autonomy within Russia.

Jaan Raamot, an Estonian State Duma deputy, speaking in the Duma in early 1915, said that the entire Estonian people supported the government’s military efforts. He believes that Russia’s military victory will mark the beginning of the prosperity of the state and mark the success of Estonia, which “in these great historical days tied its fate with her both with blood and love” ([Zetterberg, 2013:43](#)).

Newspapers in local languages wrote enthusiastic articles, urging, e.g., Latvians from a shepherd people to become a people of warriors ([Bleyere et al., 2005:71](#)). At the same time, the publication of newspapers in German was prohibited.

However, of course, it was not the official speeches of politicians that testified to the real attitude towards the outbreak of war, but the behavior of those who had to go into the trenches. On the second day of the war, 3,000 Latvians voluntarily signed up for the Russian army. The mobilisation carried out in the Baltic provinces showed a remarkable result – 96% of those called up arrived in the barracks. By the way, do not think that 4% evaded the draft. Just in the midst of field work, some peasants on farms did not immediately learn about the war and mobilisation, and besides, many Balts were in St. Petersburg and other areas far from the Baltic provinces. Many conscripts, unable to get to their recruiting center, simply went to the nearest parts of the Russian troops in the hope of being enlisted in the regiments. “Reverse dodgers” were noted – some exempted from military service for health reasons tried to bribe doctors in order to be recognised as fit.

It is difficult to calculate how many Balts in total wore Russian military uniforms between August 1914 and March 1918 (the time of the conclusion of the *Brest Peace Treaty*) due to the poor preservation of documentation in the chaos of the subsequent events of the revolution. In total, in 1914, 17,600 reservists, 3,500 recruits, and about 14,500 Estonian origin volunteers were called up in the Estonian lands, which amounted to at least 7% of the male population of Estonia and the Estonian counties of the Livonian province. In the future, new mobilisations were carried out. A total of 100,000 Estonians joined the ranks, and 2,000 of them received officer ranks. Seven senior officers commanded regiments, 17 commanded battalions, 13 had an academic military education, 12 had the rank of colonel, 28 were lieutenant colonels, and three served as division chiefs of staff during the war. About 600 Estonians fought at the front in the rank of company or battalion commander. During the First World War, 333 Estonian officers were awarded orders for bravery and skillful leadership of hostilities, including 47 by orders of St. George. At least 120 Estonian officers died or went missing in the battles of the First World War ([Tannberg, 2010:100-111](#)). In total, they fell about 10 thousand Estonians under the Russian banners in the battles of 1914-17.

According to the results of the mobilisation of 1914-1915. from the Latvian districts of Livonia, 91,700 people were called up for service ([Kraslyn, 1972:52](#)). In total, about 140 thousand people were called up from the Latvian lands. Some researchers point out that during the World War, 55% of the total number of men aged 18 to 43 were mobilised ([Tannberg, 2014:98-113](#)).

About 70 thousand Lithuanians fought in the ranks of the Russian army (with a total population of about 1.7 million people). Approximately 11 thousand Lithuanians died in battles under the Russian banner. It is difficult to count how many Lithuanians became officers and generals of the Russian army in that war, since many of the natives of the Lithuanian lands belonged to the gentry class, and on this basis were considered Poles. So, Major General Sylvester Zhukovsky was considered a Pole, but after the collapse of the Russian Empire and the declaration of Lithuania's independence, he served in the Lithuanian army. Probably, Russian military officers considered themselves (or began to consider themselves) Lithuanians, who went to serve in the newly created army of Lithuania after the collapse of the Russian Empire. Among them were: a military general (S. Zhukovsky), four persons who were in general positions, 12 colonels, 46 lieutenant colonels and captains, more than 150 junior officers in ranks from ensigns to staff captains, several hundred non-commissioned officers.

In total, in proportion to the total population, the Baltic peoples gave Russia the largest number of soldiers in that war. With their blood, the Balts proved their loyalty to a single country.

The First World War inflicted a severe wound on the Ostsee. After the outbreak of the war in the Livonia and Courland provinces, there were numerous cases of manifestations of an open negative attitude of the indigenous population towards the local Germans. Many of them were deported by the tsarist authorities deep into Russia, some of them fled to the German troops. However, the bulk of the Ostze people remained loyal to Russia right up to the *Treaty of Brest-Litovsk*. As one Baltic writer put it, "the oath was higher than popular feeling". In other words, for all their sympathy for Germany, the Ostze people remained loyal to Russia. Russian military leaders from the Baltic Germans P.K. Rennekampf, I.K. Baggovut, R.R. Bisnek, A.F. Brinken, A.P. Budberg, N.F. Krusenstern, N.A. Korf, I.N. Maydel, F.V. Sievers, and many others

probably did not show themselves as outstanding commanders, but none of them changed their oath and did not work for Germany. When the revolution broke out, the Ostsees suddenly found themselves abandoned by their Fatherland – Russia.

During the war, the authorities of the Russian Empire tried to abolish the special privileges of landowners and liquidate the manor police. In the interests of local peasants, in 1915, the Duma adopted the law “On the abolition of special land rights of the owners of noble estates in the Baltic provinces”, which came into force the following year and expanded the opportunities for trade and entrepreneurship of the indigenous population (*Karjaharm, 1987:176-177*). The development of the zemstvo reform, which would finally transfer power in the regions to the ethnic majority, was postponed until the end of the war.

The very first defeats of the Russian army in East Prussia, as well as the retreat in Poland, led, in particular, to heavy losses among soldiers and officers of Baltic origin, many of whom went to war as volunteers and adhered to Russophile views. Only in the almost completely destroyed 20th Corps of the 1st Army (where almost all the reservists from Livonia and Courland were sent), in early February 1915, in the battles in the swamps of the Augustow province, the number of dead, wounded and captured by the Germans Latvians was about 20 thousand people, according to some estimates (*Butulis & Zunda, 2010:69*).

From the very first days of the war, in August 1914, Lithuania found itself in a war zone. After the defeat of the 2nd Army under the command of General Samsonov, the Russian troops retreated to the Lithuanian territory, but already on September 28, 1914, the German troops were driven out of it. However, during the German troops' offensive, which began in February 1915, they again entered Lithuania. In the spring, the Germans took Shavli (Shauliai). After 10 days, the Russians managed to return Shavli back, but the Germans retained the initiative of actions and positions in Lithuania. In the summer of the same year, a new German offensive followed, which led to a serious defeat of the Russians and the abandonment of the entire territory of ethnic Lithuania, and half of the Latvian lands. In August, the Kovno fortress was taken by the Germans. Although the fortress garrison bravely fought for 10 days, the commandant, General V.N. Grigoriev ordered the fortress to be handed over to the enemy, although the possibilities of defense were far from being exhausted, the stocks of weapons and food were sufficient. The surrender of Kovna shocked Russian society, becoming one of the reasons for the spread of panic rumors about the betrayal of the tops of the empire. After the capture of Kovna, German troops moved between the Neman and Viliya, approaching Vilna. Vilna was surrendered on September 3 (16).

In the spring of 1915, hostilities also unfolded on the Courland territory: at the end of April, Libava (Liepaja) fell almost without a fight. On August 1, the provincial city of Mitava (Jelgava) was captured by the Germans. The front approached Riga. The fighting was already going on 20-30 kilometers from the city center. A mass evacuation of the population began. Convoys with refugees from Courland passed through the city. By order of the military command, the Riga wine warehouse was destroyed. As the newspapers wrote, not a single sober cab driver was seen in Riga for two days. The city authorities knew that the Germans needed copper, so it was decided to evacuate the bells of the Cathedral of the Nativity of Christ, the monuments to Peter the Great, Barclay de Tolly. But the city stood. For two years, near Riga there were fierce battles with varying success, but the front remained motionless.

Nevertheless, the panic of the authorities in the rear led to the evacuation of enterprises and valuables, even from territories far from the front line. When the German zeppelins fired on several cities in Estonia, the famous Waldhof pulp mill near Pernov was blown up in fear of the expected German landing.

In October 1915, the Germans reached the approaches to Dvinsk (Daugavpils). In November, the German troops were forced to stop the offensive and switched to a long positional war. As a result of the 1915 campaign, the Kaiser's troops occupied all of Lithuania and almost half of the territories inhabited by Latvians, most of which they controlled for four long years.

The fighting was extremely fierce. Many settlements repeatedly passed from hand to hand. Entire cities were wiped to the ground by artillery. Kalvaria, Shavli (Shauliai), Taurongen (Taurage), Kelme and other cities and towns were almost completely destroyed. At the same time, both sides often carried out destruction that was not at all caused by military circumstances. German troops burned the city of Taurongen (Taurage) under the pretext of revenge for the destruction of Memel by Russian troops. Retreating, Russian troops also destroyed infrastructure, blowing up bridges, damaging roads, burning food supplies, and taking industrial enterprises to the rear to make it difficult for the Germans to use the occupied territories. In general, the large-scale destruction of material assets was the only success of the Russian imperial army in the 1915 campaign.

### **Occupied lands in 1915-17**

The Baltic States annexation was one of the main motives for Germany to start the World War. The Ostsee provinces were automatically considered German territories, which should "return" to Germany. For the territories of the Russian western provinces, inhabited by Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Little Russians, the German plans provided to create pseudo-independent states under German control. Moreover, work in this direction began immediately. So, already on August 1, 1914, in the Prussian Landtag, Wilhelm Gaygalat (in modern Lithuania he was declared Vilius Gaygalaitis), parliamentarian from Memel, announced his hopes for joining Greater Lithuania to Germany "on behalf of the Lithuanians". In just 4 years, this Gaigalatis became the initiator of the so-called Tilsit Act on the accession of the Memel Territory to Lithuania. As already mentioned, during the 1915 campaign, all Lithuanian and half of the Latvian lands were occupied by German troops. The German occupation authorities established their own administration on this territory – "Oberost" (occupied regions in the East), headed by P. von Hindenburg, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Eastern Front, and E. Ludendorff, the chief of front staff. The Germans considered Lithuania as a promising colony due to its proximity to the main territory of the Reich. Literally immediately after the occupation, German circles began to implement the "Hindenburg Plan", i.e., colonisation measures. The occupiers confiscated 1,200 estates with a total area of 650 thousand hectares of land, planned to be transferred into the hands of German landowners who wanted to become colonisers and "Germanisers" of the region. The new landowners required not only an impeccable German noble origin, but also experience to manage strong farms in the east. Particular preference was given to persons with experience in colonial activities in Africa.

While the war continued, the Germans organised a large-scale robbery of Lithuania, requisitioning everything that could be taken away. For the Lithuanians themselves, the invaders introduced food rations of 250 grams of bread (or 160 grams of flour) and 40 grams of potato flour per person per day. 130,000 Lithuanians were taken into “worker battalions”, which built roads and military facilities for the occupiers. The population movement from county to county without special passes was prohibited. Only one weekly newspaper in Lithuanian and one daily newspaper in Polish were allowed, subsidised by the German government. Famine, epidemics, and reprisals by the invaders claimed the lives of about half a million people.

The occupying authorities sought to attract influential figures from the local population to their side in the region. However, initially the invaders did not have any support. Archbishop Franciszek Karevich of Zhmud, now called Pranciscus Karevičius (1861-1945), who was in the occupied territory, refused to swear allegiance to the German Kaiser, saying that he had already sworn allegiance to the Russian Tsar. However, with the help of the Baltic baron Friedrich von der Ropp, who had defected to the other side of the front, the German occupation authorities drafted an appeal from the “oppressed peoples of Russia” to the American President Wilson and an appeal to the entire “civilized world” in the spring of 1916. In April 1916, under the auspices of Gisbert von Romberg, the German ambassador to Switzerland, the *League of non-Russian Peoples of Russia*, which, of course, demanded the destruction of Russia in the name of the “freedom” of non-Russian peoples, arose. These demands were contained in the *Appeal of the Oppressed Peoples of Russia*, sent to US President Woodrow Wilson in May 1916. Then the *Congress of the Union of Peoples* (June 27-29, 1916) was organised in neutral Switzerland, in Lausanne. It was attended by 400 delegates from 23 nationalities. Among the deputies was a journalist, the future dictator of Lithuania Antanas Smetona. Of course, this “Union” was led by the German services and all the “decisions” of this event were reduced to the “liberation” of the oppressed peoples of Russia in the form of their subjugation to Germany.

The German authorities took the first steps in relation to the Polish lands, given the long-standing Russophobia of the Polish society. In August 1914, the formation of the Polish Legion, the “commandant” (commander) of which was Józef Klemens Pilsudski, began in Austria-Hungary. In August 1915, after the occupation of the Poland’s territory by German and Austrian troops, in order to develop pro-German sentiments among the Poles, the occupying authorities introduced teaching in Polish in schools and announced the creation of a national higher school. On November 5, 1916, Germany and Austria-Hungary signed an act on the creation of a constitutional monarchy in the territory of the Kingdom of the Polish of the Russian Empire, closely associated with the two founding states ([Tymanovsky et al., 2004:388-390](#)).

However, as always, the Polish leaders immediately began to put forward claims to all the lands of the former Commonwealth. The German authorities did not promise anything concrete, simultaneously playing out conflicts between Poles and Lithuanians. At the same time, the Germans began to take advantage of the Belarusian movement. In the Belarusian territories occupied by the Germans, the Central Union of Belarusian National Public Organisations, headed by the Belarusian People’s Committee (BPC) in Vilna, was created. Under his leadership in 1916-1917, a significant network of Belarusian schools emerged. The publication of textbooks, full of topics about the suffering of Belarusians under the tsarism yoke and about the “freedom” that came under the German occupation, began. The newspaper *Gaumont* also

began to be published. Polish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian figures constantly argued with each other for the right to become the main favorite of Germany.

Initially, the Germans sympathised with the Poles in the Lithuanian lands. The representative of Bekerat, the German General Staff in Vilna, reported in 1917 that "... the importance of the Poles in Lithuania is incomparably stronger than expected, moreover, the Poles there are the only element with good political and creative qualifications. If, in time of war, it is still possible to rule without them, then in time of peace, ruling against them is not only difficult, but even dangerous, since other nationalities in Lithuania are not able to provide a single serious and permanent point of support" (*Silvanovich, 2014*). However, the German command soon considered that the claims of the Poles were excessive. In addition, the Entente countries also sought to attract the Poles to their side. Thus, the *Declaration of the Provisional Government of Russia* dated March 29, 1917, recognising Poland's right to restore statehood, had some success among the Polish population, Polish military units were soon formed in the Russian army, including a whole corps. Because of this, German politicians decided not to trust the Poles. The bet was made on the support of small peoples.

Most Lithuanians remained loyal to Russia. In the occupied Lithuanian territory, the partisan movement of the *Forest Brothers* began (the pro-Russian-minded Lithuanian partisans in 1915-18). The Germans had to throw regular units against the partisans. So, in June 1916, at the height of the Brusilov breakthrough, the kreishauptman (county chief) Raseiniai, where the "forest brothers" were especially active, reported to his superiors that "the situation threatens to paralyse the entire administration ..." (*Tautavičius, 1978:284*). However, the partisan movement, which in was a rare phenomenon during the First World War, did not develop widely in Lithuania because Nicholas the Second and his generals were afraid of any popular initiative, including in the fight against an external enemy. In addition, a significant part of adult men from among the Lithuanians either already fought in the Russian army, or were evacuated to the inner Russian provinces. So, old men and teenagers fought in the "forest brothers".

The occupied Latvian territories were also thoroughly plundered. In 1915-1917, wheat, oats, flax, hay, livestock, building materials and non-ferrous metals, valued at more than 20 million marks, were exported from Courland to Germany. In occupied Courland, the German military administration failed to win over even the German population. The astonishing loyalty of the Ostsees to the Russian monarchy was preserved even under the occupation of the German "brothers". The *February Revolution* and the abdication of Nicholas the Second, who released his recent subjects from the oath of allegiance, changed everything.

After the fall of the Russian monarchy, the sentiments of the Baltic Sea began to change. In March 1917, the Courland Landtag turned to Wilhelm the Second with a request to annex the region to Germany. However, there was no quorum at this meeting, the majority of deputies deliberately ignored the meeting. The Livonian Landtag, which continued to operate in the Livonian province, unequivocally occupied an all-Russian patriotic position.

### **The Baltics outside the Baltics**

The war moved not only the soldiers. Hundreds of thousands of refugees rushed deep into Russia. The wave of immigrants covered 25 provinces, their number reached 3-4 million already in 1915. According to official data as of December 20, 1915, presented by the governors and

published by the *Tatiyanin Committee*, 2,706.3 thousand refugees were registered on the territory of the empire, with the exception of Transcaucasia ... As of February 1, 1917, the *All-Russian Central Labor Bureau* registered 3,200.5 thousand refugees... Among all registered refugees, Russians accounted for 54%, Poles – 16.3%, Latvians – 8.8%, Jews – 6.2%, Armenians – 3.8%, Lithuanians – 2.7%, “other”, among which were predominantly German deportees – 6%, undistributed – 2.2% ([Petrov, 2014:233](#)). Data on the ethnic composition of the refugees, not collected from all counties, were presented to Petrograd in January 1916. According to these incomplete data, there were 17,050 (53%) refugees of Russian nationality in the province, 9,470 Poles (29.4%), Latvians – 3,305 (10.3%), Jews – 1,327 (4.1%), Lithuanians – 126 (0.4%), German colonists – 631 (2%), other nationalities – 269 (0.8%) ([Belova, 2011](#)).

The exact number of refugees is unlikely to ever become known to historians. A mass of people spontaneously moved away from the border areas already in the first days of the war. The Russian authorities began organised evacuation only during the retreat of 1915. However, even so, the number of those who left on their own without notifying the authorities exceeded the number of legally evacuated. Many who had relatives and acquaintances in the inner provinces of Russia never got registered as refugees. Workers of the evacuated enterprises, like as students and teachers of the evacuated universities, were not registered as refugees. In addition, following the Russian army retreating from Galicia in 1915, hundreds of thousands of Galician Rusyns, supporters of Russia, poured in. In general, approximately 10% of the Rusyns left their native lands along with the retreating Russian army. Major statistician G.Z. Volkov determined the total number of refugees and evacuees at 7,421 thousand souls ([Volkov, 1930:72](#)). Most researchers estimate the total number of refugees in the deep provinces of Russia at 5 million people.

At the same time, in fact, there was no central management of all refugees. In Vilna, e.g., several independent committees for helping victims of the war functioned in parallel – Polish, Jewish, Lithuanian, Belarusian, and even the Old Believers ([Buldakov, 2010:106-109](#)). The most effective were 260 Latvian refugee organisations, led by the Central Committee of Latvian Refugees in Petrograd. The Committee published the newspaper *Echo of the Motherland* (Dzimtenes Atballs), organised a network of schools for refugee children. In Moscow, the created Latvian theater played only plays by Latvian authors ([Bartele, 2002:68](#)).

In addition to refugees and evacuees, deported representatives of various nationalities – Germans, like as citizens of enemy countries – were in the depth of Russia against their will.

The Baltic provinces gave a lot of refugees. So, in the summer of 1915, about half of the population of Courland, along with livestock and belongings, went into forced exile to the east. The townspeople also fled. So, more than half of the former inhabitants left Libau (now Liepāja), 90% of the inhabitants lost Tuckum (now Tukums). As a result, at the beginning of 1916, about 149 thousand Latvian refugees were registered in Estonia and Livonia, and about 109 thousand – in the “internal” provinces of Russia. By the middle of the year, the number of officially recorded Latvian refugees reached about 334 thousand people, while their actual number estimated to be twice as large ([Šalda, 2005](#)). According to A. Spreslis, in 1916 there were 492,954 refugees from Latvia in the inner provinces of Russia. Of these, there were 276,378 people in the Baltic States (Latgale and Estonia), 11,748 in Belarus, 66,967 in the northwestern provinces of Russia, 79,259 in the Central Industrial Region, and 31,507 in the south of Russia

(in Ukraine, on the Don, etc.), 7,547 in the Volga region, 12,667 in the Urals, 3,794 in the northern provinces. In Siberia and the Far East there were 3208 Latvian refugees, which accounted for 6.5% of their total number ([Lotkin, 2003:44](#)).

The evacuation of part of the population deep into Russia, and at the same time the arrival of many refugees in the Baltic cities, not yet affected by hostilities, led to dramatic changes in the ethnic composition of the population. The data of the census conducted at the end of July 1917 in Riga, literally on the eve of the fall of the city, are indicative. By this time, 209 thousand inhabitants were counted in the city (2.5 times less than in 1913). The census showed that among the inhabitants of the city, Latvians made up 54.3% (more than ever before), Germans – 14.3%, Jews – 10.4%, Russians – 8.6%. True, in this case, the number of Latvians, of which 113,000 were counted, was noticeably increased by the 49,000 refugees who were in the city from Courland occupied by the German troops ([Krastīņš, 1978:30](#)). Also, the proportion of Jews increased due to those who fled to Riga from the Lithuanian provinces. New waves of refugees poured after the capture of Riga by the Germans in 1917 ([Bartele & Šalda, 2000](#)).

Many Lithuanians fled from their lands at the beginning of the war, a year before the official evacuation, and the evacuation in the summer of 1915 took place in a hurry, almost unorganised, for this reason, Lithuanian refugees can only be counted according to indirect data. According to A. Plakans, 300,000 Lithuanians fled or were evacuated from Lithuanian lands, many of whom found salvation in the east ([Plakans, 2016:296](#)).

The ranks of refugees were mowed down by epidemic diseases (e.g., typhus), domestic disorder, and personal dramas, generated by war and flight, led to an increase in alcoholism, to a large number of suicides. Many of these refugees, having accumulated in large cities, embittered at the “old regime”, became the combustible material of two Russian revolutions and the Civil War.

The Russian military command, along with the evacuation of the civilian population, also began to dismantle and remove industrial enterprises. Only in the lands of modern Latvia during the war years, about 400 enterprises ceased to exist. Up to 90% of the entire machine and power equipment park were removed from Riga. However, many industrial enterprises stopped working due to the cessation of supplies of raw materials and fuel.

### In the Russian army under the Latvian banners

Against the background of the retreat of the Russian army and the loss of half of the ethnic Latvian territory in July 1915, the Latvian deputies of the State Duma appealed to the highest military authorities with a request to organise volunteer Latvian rifle battalions. The military command, highly appreciating the bravery of the Latvian militia units near Mitava in the spring of 1915, agreed with the need to replenish the ranks of the army with highly motivated, literate, and disciplined Latvian soldiers. A special Latvian committee headed by Goldman (Goldmanis) addressed in the summer with an appeal “*Gather under the Latvian Banners*”. This appeal said that “the Latvian regiments will serve to protect Latvia, so that it will continue to bloom as an indivisible part of mighty Russia”. The results were impressive: at once 8 thousand volunteers signed up for the units being formed. Thus, units of the Latvian Riflemen (in Latvian: *Latviešu strēlnieki*) were created as part of 9 regiments, united in two brigades. Soldiers of Latvian nationality, previously drafted into the army, asked to be transferred to their Latvian units. Most

of the shooters were workers, landless peasants, and farm labourers. So, by the beginning of 1916, there were 1,639 riflemen in the 2nd Riga Rifle Battalion. Of these, there were about 42.2% workers, 35.8% landless peasants, 4.7% sailors and fishermen, 2.2% artisans, 8.4% landowners and tenants, 3.4% representatives of urban entrepreneurs. Thus, 81.2% of the shooters of this battalion were representatives of rural and urban middle and poor segments of the population ([Kopylov, 2014](#)). This social composition of the shooters largely contributed to their Bolshevikisation. The only politically significant criterion to select the shooters' ranks was nationality (the Organising Committee of the Latvian battalions was vigilant that there were no Germans or Jews in them) ([Kopylov, 2014](#)). The banners of the Latvian battalions had Latvian national symbols on one side (usually a sword and the sun) and the monogram of Nicholas the Second and the Russian double-headed eagle on the other side ([Latviešu strēlnieku brigāde, 2016](#)). The anthem of the Latvians during the war became “*God Save the Tsar*” in Latvian. In the old orthography of the Latvian language: Deews, şargi Keisaru!/Dod viņam spēhku waldit/ Par šlawu, par šlawu mums! (in modern spelling: *Diers, sargi Keizaru!/Dod viņam spēku/Valdit par slavu,/Par slavu mums!*). In 1916, there were 40 thousand Latvian riflemen (excluding Latvians who continued to serve in the Russian army in other units, like in the navy).

From the very first days at the front, the Latvian riflemen showed excellent fighting qualities. Already in the autumn of 1915, the Latvian Riflemen received a baptism of fire in the vicinity of Riga, fighting the Germans on the Misa River. The command used these shooters in the most difficult front sectors, which was accompanied by huge losses. In 1916, they valiantly fought on the “island of death” – a foothold on the left bank of the Western Dvina, withstood all German attacks, including those using gases. Subsequently, the Latvians took part in the *Christmas Battles*, which began on January 5, 1917, according to the new style (December 23, 1916, according to the old style). During these battles, the shooters suffered huge losses – 43.13% of the personnel. The mediocrity of the high command, the decomposition of the rear, had a painful effect on the shooters. Among them, the slogans of the Bolsheviks began to enjoy particular popularity. After the February Revolution, the Latvian units were quickly propagated by the Bolsheviks.

At the same time, the shooters retained discipline and fighting spirit. If desertion flourished in parts of the Russian army after February 1917, riots, reprisals against officers were common, mass surrenders were observed, orders were not followed, then the shooters had nothing of the kind. This was especially evident during the battles for Riga in the summer of 1917. On August 19 (September 1), 1917, after a powerful artillery preparation using gases, German troops attacked Russian positions near Riga, forcing the Western Dvina. Although the Russian units, including the Siberian units operating jointly and the Latvian riflemen, initially steadfastly repulsed the enemy offensive, the orders to retreat followed from the command. The retreat soon turned into a stampede. Only the Siberians and Latvian Riflemen, who suffered huge losses in the battles, continued to fight and retreated in an organised manner. It is significant that in one Latvian 5th Zemgale regiment, commanded by I. Vatsetis, the future commander-in-chief of the Red Army, 664 soldiers and officers were awarded the St. George Cross for their courage and stamina in battle. This was the largest number of Knights of St. George in one military unit in the history of the Russian army. In these battles, the 5th Zemgale Latvian Rifle Regiment lost

80% of its officers and 67% of privates from its composition, and the 1st and 5th companies of this regiment were completely killed.

Soon the Germans took Riga, the Russian troops left the “island of death”, which they staunchly defended for two years, without a fight. The German offensive lasted only 4 days. Having occupied Riga, the Germans immediately turned the Russian cathedral into a Lutheran church. Russian street names were painted over. In the early days, only one newspaper was published, and it was in German, of course. Its programme article was called *The Liberation of Riga from the Slavic Yoke*. The new owners quickly began to turn Riga into the rear of the German army, where the Kaiser’s soldiers could rest and have fun. So, special army brothels began to open, separate for private ones, for gentlemen-officers – a special luxurious ones on Zamkova Street, in the building of the former Balta Hotel. So that the prostitutes did not get tired too quickly, they were given a double food ration. Exactly one year after the capture of Riga, the German command erected a monument to a German soldier in the city center, officially called the *Iron Soldier*. However, by the way, the monument itself was made of wood, only painted with steel-colored paint, so the Riga inhabitants of called this sculpture *Wooden Fritz*.

For the city of Riga, the consequences of the First World War were sad. No, the city was almost not destroyed, but forever ceased to be that dynamic, advanced world-class scientific and industrial center that it was before the war. For the century that followed, Riga was nothing more than the administrative center of Latvia. Miroslav Mitrofanov, co-chairman of the *Russian Union of Latvia* (RUL) party, member of the *Riga City Council*, said that “If it were not for the influence of the First World War, the pace of development of these provinces remained the same, today Riga would be a world center, a metropolis of skyscrapers, scientific laboratories, and outstanding scientific world discoveries. And so today we are a small peripheral administrative center – well, this is also not bad, but the greatness remained there forever, in June 1914. Latvia fell victim to the ambitions of global players who clashed the interests of different empires in a conflict. It is a pity, but it is forever” ([Melkonov, 2021](#)).

In the fall of Riga, a much greater role than military circumstances was played by the internal political struggle in Russia. The Bolsheviks assured that the Supreme Commander L.E. Kornilov deliberately surrendered Riga to open the way for the Germans to revolutionary Petrograd. Bolshevik influence was really strong in Riga. So, in August, literally on the eve of the capture of the city by the Germans, in the elections to the Riga City Duma, in which 18 parties and blocs competed for 120 seats, the Bolsheviks received 41% of the vote, which gave them 49 seats, other socialist parties – 15% (18 seats).

However, just immediately after the fall of Riga, Kornilov began his campaign against Petrograd (so-called *Kornilov Rebellion*). Be that as it may, the surrender of Riga and the *Kornilov Rebellion* undermined the combat effectiveness of the Russian army and in many respects contributed to the Bolshevikisation of the Soviets and many army units, in particular, the Latvian riflemen and sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

Meanwhile, the disorder reigning in Russia after the *February Revolution* aroused interest not only among Germany, but also among the Entente countries, as it were, allied with Russia. It was the Entente representatives who began to quietly finance various self-proclaimed committees and organisations, hastily assembled from unknown figures proclaimed “autonomy”, and even complete independence of individual regions of Russia.

On the territory of the Latvian lands not occupied by the Germans, Soviets began to emerge, as well as throughout Russia. The Soviets were led by the *Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers', and Landless Deputies of Latvia* (Iskolat). The *Iskolat* was created in Riga on July 29-30, 1917, at the initiative of the Central Committee of the Social Democracy of Latvia at a meeting of the *Council of Workers', Soldiers', and Landless Deputies of Latvia*. Of the 27 members of the Committee, 24 were Bolsheviks, and three were Social Democrats and Internationalists. The Presidium of *Iskolat* had 7 members. Otto Karklin became its chairman. In fact, the *Iskolat* established Soviet power in Livonia and Latgale even before the October uprising in Petrograd. After the *October Revolution* in Petrograd, the *Iskolat* became the body of the Bolshevik government in the Latvia's territory not occupied by the Germans. And the creation of the Iskolat Republic was nothing more than an administrative completion of the process to form and strengthen the Bolsheviks power in Latvia.

Estonian lands had not yet been affected by hostilities. The *February Revolution* contributed that long-standing demands to create a separate Estonian autonomy within Russia, which included ethnic Estonian lands (the Estonian province and the Estonian counties of Livonia) were fulfilled. On March 30 (April 12), 1917, the Provisional Government adopted a resolution *On the Temporary Structure of the Administrative Management and Local Self-Government of the Estland Province*. According to it, the Estlandian autonomy was formed (note, not Estonian) as part of Russia. At the head of this administrative unit was the provincial parliament named the *Zemsky Council* (in Estonian: *Maapäev*). The chairman of the *Zemsky Council* was the mayor of Reval, Jaan (Ivan Ivanovich) Poska, who also acted as commissar of the *Provisional Government* in Estonia. So far, no nationalist slogans have been raised, and Estonian politicians have seen Estonia as a Russian autonomy. During the May Day demonstration of 1917, almost 100 thousand people marched in columns under red banners. Attempts to raise the blue-black-and-white Estonian flag provoked a nervous reaction from the demonstrators, sometimes simply beating the nationalists.

However, the bourgeois parties also demanded only the autonomy of the Estonian lands. In July, at the *Estonian National Congress*, which was attended by representatives of various political parties (except for the Bolsheviks and Social Revolutionaries), it was decided that it would be preferable to remain part of Russia on the rights of administrative national-territorial autonomy for the Estonia's development. The strength of the Estonians was given by the presence of Estonian military units.

The Russian command began to form national military units from Estonians immediately after the February Revolution of 1917. From April 1917 to February 1918, the national Estonian military units united about 35 thousand Estonian soldiers and almost 2 thousand officers. However, unlike the Latvian riflemen, the Estonian units did not particularly show themselves in battles, but this was due only to the rapid disintegration of the country.

In March 1917, the *National Lithuanian Council* was created in Russia (included the main parties, with Smetona as leader), which spoke in favour of autonomy. Finally, in the same 1917, an attempt was made to form Lithuanian units (although since 1915 the Lithuanian lands had been occupied by the Germans). These were: the 1st separate Lithuanian battalion in Vitebsk (1500 people), the Lithuanian reserve battalion in Smolensk (500-600 people), the Lithuanian battalion in Rovno (700 people), the Lithuanian battalion. Vitovt in Siberia (500 people), the

Lithuanian division of dragoons in Valka (Latvia, 150 people). In general, by the end of 1917, there were up to 3,500 military personnel in the Lithuanian national units. However, at the beginning of 1918, the Lithuanian units were disbanded.

The final chord of the battles on the Eastern Front of the First World War was the capture of the Moonsund Islands by the German troops in October 1917. For 9 days, the islands were taken by the Germans with minimal losses, while over 20 thousand Russian soldiers were captured. On the island of Moon (Muhu), 1600 Estonian soldiers were also captured by the Germans. However, the Baltic Fleet, commanded not so much by admirals as by the pro-Bolshevik Tsentrobalt (Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet), on many of whose ships red flags were raised, fought skillfully and inflicted significant losses on the German fleet. During the retreat, Russian sailors blocked the fairways with flooded ships and minefields. As a result, the German fleet was unable to break into the Gulf of Finland. However, the Moonsund Islands remained in the hands of the Germans.

Soon after the battles for Moonsund, news came that the *Provisional Government* had been overthrown in Petrograd and the power of the Soviets had been established.

## Discussion

In the course of studying the topic, a need arose for a deeper study of the following issues:

1. Methodology for searching and studying statistical data on migration changes in the Baltic countries in the period 1914-1918.
2. Clarification of the quantitative indicators of military personnel from the Baltic countries who took an active part in the hostilities on the side of the Russian army in the period 1914-1918.



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## **Universalism and Pochvennichestvo as the main directions of the philosophy of the 21st century**

*Abstract:* At the end of the 20th century, two American thinkers became the “rulers of thoughts”, each of whom expressed his opinion about the modern era - Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Francis Fukuyama published the article The End of History. This article immediately became a worldwide sensation. Samuel Huntington published an article on the basis of which he glorified his book The Clash of Civilizations. Among the scientific priorities of Russian philosophy belongs Slavophilism – a philosophical and historical concept of the fundamental dissimilarity (or even hostility) of Russian and Western civilizations. As a result, the old era with its values is ending, and the new one has not yet arrived, which marked a kind of “postmodern”. The aim of the study was to study the main directions of philosophy of the 21st century – universalism and pochvennichestvo, which formed philosophical postmodernism. Historical, comparative, logical and deductive methods were used to achieve the abandoned goal and solve the research problems. The study used materials from the works of such great philosophers of our time as Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Theodor Adorno and others. The author comes to the conclusion that the decline of Western civilization does not mean the decline of humanity as such. Today, one can observe the gradual rise not only of new countries that until recently were the periphery of the world, but also expect the rise of new philosophical teachings. They will undoubtedly be based on the philosophical justification of the originality of their civilization. These will be original national versions of “Slavophilism”.

*Keywords:* postmodernism, Slavophilism, Fukuyama, Huntington, Adorno.



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## **Универсализм и почвенничество – основные направления философии XXI века**

*Аннотация:* На исходе XX века «властителями дум» стали два американских мыслителей, каждый из которых высказывал свое мнение о современной эпохе – Френсис Фукуяма и Самуэль Хантингтон. Френсис Фукуяма опубликовал статью «Конец истории». Эта статья сразу стала мировой сенсацией. Самуэль Хантингтон опубликовал статью, на основе которой прославил свою книгу «Столкновение цивилизаций». К числу научных приоритетов русской философии принадлежит славянофильтво – философско-историческая концепция о принципиальной несходности (или даже враждебности) русской и западной цивилизаций. Как результат, старая эпоха с ее ценностями заканчивается, а новая еще не наступила, что ознаменовала некий «постмодерн». Целью исследования стало изучение основных направлений философии 21-го века – универсализма и почвенничества – которые сформировали философский постмодернизм. Для достижения оставленной цели и решения задач исследования были применены исторический, сравнительный, логический и дедуктивный методы. В ходе исследования были использованы материалы трудов таких великих философов современности как Френсис Фукуяма, Самуэль Хантингтон, Теодор Адорно и других. Автор приходит к заключению, что закат западной цивилизации не означает заката человечества как такового. На сегодняшний день можно наблюдать постепенный подъем не только новых стран, бывших еще недавно мировой

периферией, но и ожидать подъема новых философских учений. В основу их будет лежать, несомненно, философское обоснование самобытности своей цивилизации. Это будут своеобразные национальные варианты «славянофильтва».

*Ключевые слова:* постмодернизм, славянофильтво, Фукуяма, Хантингтон, Адорно.



What we are probably witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War or another period of post-war history, but the end of history as such, the completion of the ideological evolution of mankind and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government.

*Francis Fukuyama*

We are witnessing the “end of the progressive era” dominated by Western ideology, and we are entering an era in which numerous and diverse civilizations will interact, compete, coexist and adapt to each other.

*Samuel Huntington*

## Introduction

At the end of the 20th century, two American thinkers became the “rulers of thoughts”, each of whom expressed his opinion about the modern era – Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Francis Fukuyama published the article *The End of History*. This article immediately became a worldwide sensation. Samuel Huntington published an article on the basis of which he glorified his book *The Clash of Civilizations*. Among the scientific priorities of Russian philosophy belongs Slavophilism – a philosophical and historical concept of the fundamental dissimilarity (or even hostility) of Russian and Western civilizations. As a result, the old era with its values is ending, and the new one has not yet arrived, which marked a kind of “postmodern”.

The purpose of this study was to research the main directions of philosophy of the 21st century – universalism and pochvennichestvo, which formed the historical and philosophical postmodernism.

Based on the study’s purpose, the following tasks were earned:

- analyse the leading works of popular philosophers of our time;
- analyse the transformation of philosophical thought, which evolutionarily led to the emergence of postmodernism;
- give the concept of philosophical postmodernism;
- present arguments for the emergence and development of postmodern philosophical thought.

Historical, comparative, logical, and deductive methods were used to achieve the abandoned goal and solve the research problems.

The study used materials from the works of such great philosophers of our time as Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Theodor Adorno, etc.

## The results of the study

At the end of the 20th century, two American thinkers became “rulers of thoughts”, each of whom expressed his opinion about the modern era. In the summer of 1989, literally on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe (although it was clear from the developments in the Soviet Union how everything would end), American professor of Japanese origin Francis Fukuyama published an article *The End of History*. This article immediately became a worldwide sensation. F. Fukuyama, on the crest of success, quickly reworked the article into a monograph under almost the same title *The End of History and the Last Man*. The title of the article and book did not mean the end of the world. Let us recall that, according to Hegel, contradiction is the source of development. When contradictions and alternatives to the existing order of things disappear, then history ceases to flow. Now that the end point of being has been reached, i.e., the ideal to which people have striven in the course of their history has been put into practice, continuing being is no longer history in the exact sense of the word. Of course, the world continues to exist and the sequence of events continues, but History as such ceases. As F. Fukuyama himself wrote, “what, in my opinion, has come to an end is not a sequence of events, even serious and great events, but History with a capital letter, i.e., history understood as a single, logically consistent evolutionary process, considered taking into account the experience of all times and peoples. This understanding of History is most of all associated with the great German philosopher Hegel. It was made an ordinary element of the intellectual atmosphere by Karl Marx, who borrowed his concept of History from Hegel; it is implicitly accepted by us when we use words such as “primitive” or “developed”, “traditional” or “modern”, when applied to different types of human society ([Fukuyama, 2015:6](#)).

According to F. Fukuyama, there are no ideologies and philosophies left in the world that would oppose the Western system (i.e., capitalism in the economy and representative democracy in politics). If almost the entire 20th century, the Western system was challenged by a variety of powerful ideologies – Marxism, Anarchism, Fascism, all kinds of religious and nationalist theories. All of them relied on the developed philosophical teachings, had their own ideas about the world in general and humanity in particular. But by the end of the 80s. the alternative to Western values has practically disappeared. The logical end of human evolution was the complete triumph of liberal democracy. The story is thus ended.

This paradoxical thought, however, would be true only if history were a single ascending line. But the whole world history just showed that the main civilizational centers develop in different ways. This was stated by Samuel Huntington, another well-known American philosopher and sociologist, former adviser to the US Department of Defense on Russian Affairs. He also published an article *The Clash of Civilizations* on the basis of which he made the book that made him famous. According to S. Huntington, in the world after the Cold War and the Pyrrhic victory of the West, culture and various types of cultural identification (which at the broadest level are the identification of civilization) determine patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict ([Huntington, 2003:15](#)). The struggle of civilizations has taken the place of the struggle of ideologies. According to S. Huntington, civilizations differ from each other in history, language, culture, traditions, and religion. Thus, S. Huntington abandoned the clear opposition “barbarism-civilization”, which comes from the philosophy of the Enlightenment.

According to S. Huntington, at the turn of the millennium, eight local civilizations were formed in the world: Orthodox (Russia and the countries of the former USSR, Serbia, Greece), Western, Islamic, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Latin American, and potential African. The most acute and intractable conflicts in the world pass along the borders of civilizations (the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the wars in the Balkans, etc.).

However, what is interesting here. S. Huntington, who was familiar with Russian philosophical thought as a consultant on Russian affairs at the Pentagon, actually agreed with the idea of a plurality of civilizations expressed by Russian Slavophiles as early as the middle of the 19th century. So, Western philosophy at the turn of the millennium, through the mouth of its classic, came to the same conclusions as Russian philosophy.

Among the scientific priorities of Russian philosophy is Slavophilism – a philosophical and historical concept of the fundamental dissimilarity (or even hostility) of Russian and Western civilizations. These ideas were formed back in the days of Kievan and especially Muscovite Rus. This concept was embodied in the well-known theory Moscow is the Third Rome. Slavophilism acquired its “classical” form in the 1830s and 1840s. This philosophy is represented by the names of A.S. Khomyakova, I.I. Kireevsky, the Aksakov brothers and other thinkers.

The Slavophils have that world priority in philosophy that during the period of the triumph of progressive theories, they were the first to express the idea (today it is quite obvious, but not at that time) that there is no single world civilization, the symbol of which are the “advanced” countries Western Europe, and other “underdeveloped” countries must run after the West, importing Western civilization with all its roses and thorns. The Slavophils pointed to the independence of individual local civilizations.

For half a millennium, the complete economic, military and cultural domination of the West over the world continued. For almost three centuries, the most diverse, but arising from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, universalist theories dominated the spiritual sphere of all mankind. The philosophy of the enlighteners was based on freethinking (that is, there were no authorities for them) and rationalism (the desire to proceed from common sense in everything). The French Enlightenment philosophers further raised the authority of reason and science. Enlighteners developed the concept of a new society based on universal principles, ideals and values: freedom, equality, fraternity. The most important feature of this concept was a radical break with the past and striving for a “bright future” in which these ideals and values should triumph. Of course, traditional culture, from the point of view of the enlighteners, also belonged to the “remnants of the past”.

Enlightenment philosophers sincerely believed that reason would provide a solution to all the problems and tasks facing humanity. Science, the enlighteners believed, is the highest form of reason, and therefore it can give a complete rational explanation of the laws of nature. And thanks to this, nature will be conquered by man. Science will explain the nature of all relationships between people, which will make it possible to put an end to all social conflicts. In this wonderful new society, all ethnic, estate, class and religious differences between people will disappear. Finally, with the help of science, man will be able to overcome illnesses and finally be able to know himself. The man of the future will be able to put all his thoughts, deeds and actions under the control of his mind.

However, against progress and modernity, the enlighteners believed, there are old prejudices, outdated customs, primitiveness and lack of education. Enlighteners called it tradition. From the point of view of enlightenment philosophy, the very existence of folk traditions testifies to the ignorance and darkness of the people. Progress must sweep away all these traditions. At present, the concept of tradition has changed somewhat. Tradition (Lat. traditio – transmission, handing over, tradition) – historically established and transmitted from generation to generation, customs, rituals, social institutions, ideas and values, norms of behavior, etc., elements of socio-cultural heritage that are preserved in society ([Ilyicher et al., 1983:692](#)).

So, the philosophy of the Enlightenment gave us the basic concepts of our social and cultural life. Only two centuries later, under the influence of world wars, economic crises, and environmental problems, the optimism that remained from the philosophy of the Enlightenment began to dissipate. It is no coincidence that one of the modern British philosophers, John Gray, argues that by the beginning of the 21st century, the universal “Enlightenment project” had been completely exhausted. Therefore, the current provisions of Western philosophical thought are completely inadequate to the challenges of our time.

The 20th century with its world wars, mass genocide, environmental problems led to disillusionment with progress and the very belief that a person is generally capable of changing this world for the better. “After Auschwitz, poetry is impossible,” said Theodor Adorno, one of the greatest philosophers of the last century ([Adorno, 2003:322-333](#)). “The ecological crisis has devalued the great idea of transforming and conquering nature. The almost achieved victory of man over nature turned out to be in fact imaginary, tantamount to defeat. This crisis paralyzed, killed the former optimism, striving for a bright future, because the latter turned out to be too frightening. In the same way, he devalued the opened possibilities of the consumer society. It seemed to poison the positive and attractive aspects of such a society, creating a situation similar to a feast during the plague. The ecological crisis has made everything fragile, temporary, ephemeral and doomed ([Lebedev, 2013:56](#)).

Even man as a person in modern times was no longer the crown of creation. If, in the Middle Ages, it was believed that a person was created in the image and likeness of God, if after Descartes a person was considered an animal, but endowed with reason, unlike all other living beings, then after Freud a person became the same animal, living by his instincts. Even the division into men and women after the “sexual revolution” and the rise of feminism became optional. At the beginning of the 21st century, those who were previously considered perverts suddenly became “minorities” representatives who began to demand “rights” for themselves.

And, as a result, the old era with its values is ending, and the new one has not yet arrived. In a word, the “postmodern” has come.

The “postmodern” concept (as a synonym is often used the word “postmodernism”, although this is not the same thing) has turned from a philosophical term into a buzzword used incredibly widely by a wide variety of people under a variety of circumstances. As is often the case with popular words, it becomes difficult to give a concrete and generally accepted definition of what lies behind the concept of postmodernity. Postmodern is understood as both modern philosophy and the latest artistic trends ([Lebedev, 2007](#)).

Common to various national variants of postmodernism can be considered its identification with the name of the era of “tired”, “entropic” culture, marked by eschatological moods (that is, the mood of waiting for the end of the world), aesthetic mutations, the diffusion of great styles, a mixture of artistic languages. The avant-garde attitude towards novelty is opposed here by the desire to include in contemporary art the entire experience of world artistic culture by ironically quoting it ([Mankovskaya, 2000:347](#)).

In contrast to the previous era of modernity, when certain artistic styles dominated the field of culture, there is now “multiculturalism”, i.e., a multitude of genres among which (only in theory, of course) there are no dominant hegemons ([Jencks, 1989:47](#)).

In philosophy, the postmodern declares that now philosophy “denies in principle the possibility of certainty and objectivity...”, such concepts as “fairness” or “rightness” lose their meaning...” ([Bryson, 2003:12](#)).

The state of loss of value orientations is perceived positively by postmodernist theorists. “Eternal values” are totalitarian ideas, coming from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which hinder creative realization. The true ideal of postmodernists is chaos. Any semblance of order needs immediate deconstruction – the liberation of meaning by inverting the basic ideological concepts that permeate the entire culture.

Well, postmodern philosophy does not really claim to discover great truths. The philosophy of postmodernists is busy only, using the phrase of G. Hesse, “the glass beads game”, i.e., intellectual games that give nothing to either the mind or the heart. All fashionable postmodern phrases such as “deconstruction”, “simulacrum”, “delegitimation”, etc., cannot hide the fact that such a philosophy cannot explain this world and offer it a new transcendental idea. Accordingly, the postmodern philosopher is not going to offer any alternative to the current state of affairs. But it is precisely in the proposal of an alternative that development is contained. The “removal” of the contradiction means development. If philosophy recognizes that it not only cannot, but is not going to “remove” the contradiction, then this is already only the philosophy of the sophists. And in fact, just as the sophists refused to seek the truth, referring to the subjectivity of the perception of the world (recall Protagor’s “man is the measure of all things”), postmodernists argue that we can only parse “texts” without drawing any conclusions ([Lebedev, 2007](#)).

The most characteristic feature for all countries of the world in the era of globalisation is the identity crisis. What is it? This term (Lat. *idem* – “the same one”) appeared in ancient logic and meant a relationship whose members are identical to each other. However, of course, identity is not only a philosophical category. Identity in the human psyche is the ability to express in a concentrated form for him how he imagines his belonging to various social, national, professional, linguistic, political, religious, racial, and other groups or other communities. In other words, what the individual relates himself to is identity.

The era of globalisation, with its imposed patterns of Western mass culture, could not but cause an identity crisis. And it is no coincidence that the struggle in culture (and not at all street demonstrations or voting in parliaments) defines the essence of the era.

Still, it seems that the “post-era” should end soon. The world is dominated by the Western Powers, which, however, are incapable of giving mankind a great idea. Previously, the West for the non-Western (i.e., most) part of humanity caused associations with railways, steamships,

newspapers, parliaments, Christianity, universities. Now, Western values are reduced to Big Macs and the rights of sexual minorities. The rise of religious fundamentalism under these conditions is quite understandable. And this only means that the half-thousand-year domination of Western civilization is coming to an end. In the 21st century, countries such as China, India, Brazil, Nigeria, and some other countries of the recent political and economic periphery will play a leading role ([Lebedev, 2007](#)).

But what about the West itself? He enters the post-Western era. Today, the West is already completely different compared to the 1950s and 1960s, when they started talking about postmodernity. Low birth rates and high life expectancy have led Western nations to become nations of pensioners.

At the same time, Western countries are experiencing a massive invasion of non-Western peoples of the former periphery. So while the West is pursuing a policy of “Westernization” of the world, there is a process of “Westernization” of the West itself. If in the USA there are already more than 50 million Hispanics (15% of the population), in France 45% of the population are non-French, if Germany, in which there are fewer real Germans than it was in 1914, has ceased to be a nation, turning into a “living space” for newcomers from all over the world, and the city of London became the first capital of Europe in which whites became a racial minority, is it possible to talk about the bright future of Western civilization?

What follows from it? What was called Europe no longer exists. We should acknowledge this sad discovery. There is no once great civilization, no great nations that managed world affairs, discovered continents and created the current industrial world. There is only a collection of minorities: racial, ethnic, confessional, sexual. Everything else is nothing more than real estate objects of the former, once great European civilization, its material remnants ([Lebedev, 2007](#)).

The beginning of the 21st century will go down in history as a time of stagnation. Until recently, great ideologies dominated the world, offering their own alternatives to the existing order of things. Now there are no clear ideological alternatives. Various environmental, feminist and anti-globalist organizations do not claim to create global positive theories. These are not ideas for which you can give your life.

What is happening in the world is sad. Western civilization, for all its innumerable shortcomings, nevertheless ensured the phenomenal rise of mankind. Now the African and Oriental traditions that will dominate the world of the new century, are hardly able to ensure its further development. It seems that the fall of Western civilization will resemble a similar fall of the ancient world, which was replaced by the “dark ages”.

On the other hand, Russia can take a leading place in the post-Western world, unless it forgets that it is a Eurasian country with its own path of development. However, Russia must reassess its cultural heritage and develop its culture with an emphasis on its primordial traditions for this.

In our time, when there are more obese people in the world than the hungry, when completely illiterate people use computers, when standard Western primitive cultural patterns become dominant, it is the national culture, which, precisely because of its nationality, will become understandable and close to all peoples, can become driving force of cultural alternative.

## Conclusion

Summarising all of the above, we can state that the Western civilization's decline does not mean the humanity's decline as such. Today, one can observe the gradual rise not only of new countries that until recently were the periphery of the world, but also expect the rise of new philosophical teachings. They will undoubtedly be based on the philosophical justification of the originality of their civilization. These will be original national versions of "Slavophilism". However, since we are not talking about Slavic peoples at all (especially since almost all Slavic peoples consider themselves, however, unreasonably, to be part of Western civilization), it is logical to use another concept of Russian philosophical thought – pochvenichestvo. In other words, as opposed to various universalist theories that try to find the objective laws of the life of all mankind, philosophy comes with an emphasis on the native "pochva", or "soil" in English.



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### **Description of clan rulers' relations within the khanate in Northern and Central Kazakhstan in the period from the 18th to the early 20th centuries**

*Abstract:* This article reflects the results of a comparative analysis of historical sources that show the nature and characteristics of clan-ruling relations in Northern and Central Kazakhstan, which were the northern gates of the Kazakh Khanate, in the period from the 18th to the early 20th centuries. This is the period when the annexation of the Middle Zhuz took place by the Russian Empire. Traditional tribal relations of the patriarchal type are still noted in the region, based on classical nomadic animal husbandry as a special way of managing the economy of the Kazakh people. However, there are characteristic changes in tribal relations, expressed in a gradual change of the power of Genghisides. They are being replaced by sultans and volosts more loyal to the tsarist government, many of whom were from the common people. The power of the khans was abolished by the Russian colonial authorities from outside. The institutions of biys and qazis still retain their strength, and the institution of Tarkhanism are developing. The influence of imperial power on the peoples and the system of traditional family relations was constantly growing. The institution of aksakals of Kazakh society continued to retain its functional features until the 1930s. The study of the traditional organization and institution of the ancestral rulers of the aksakals is also associated with the question of Kazakh ethnicity and ethnic identity. Ethnicity, as a specific property of a certain community of people, distinguishing them from others and denoting special and characteristic cultural features, included such particularly significant elements as ethnic self-consciousness, including the idea of a common consanguineous, kinship and ancestral origin, and the historical memory of connection with a certain territory as the dwelling place of their forefathers and ancestors; corporate solidarity, built on the fundamental principles of kinship and property, with legendary family histories and dynastic traditions of the clan and tribe; spiritual values that serve to consolidate and support the interests of the unity of the ethnic corporation cluster. The consolidated ethnic environment of the Kazakh society was especially distinguished by a single common territory, common land use on a communal basis, consanguineous ethnic identity, social, cultural, and economic interconnection. The analysis of the clan structure reveals the importance of ethno-social organization in the formation of a generalized idea of the unity of an ethnic territory through the history of clan organizations, which, in turn, formed the order of communal land tenure and legitimized it.

*Keywords:* Northern Kazakhstan, Central Kazakhstan, Kazakhs, clan, zhuz, parent-ruler, maternity relations, khan, sulan, biy, hajjis, tarkhans, imperial power.

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### **Описание родоправительских отношений в рамках ханской власти в северном и центральном Казахстане в период XVIII – начале XX веков**

***Аннотация:*** В данной статье отражены результаты сравнительного анализа исторических источников, которые показывают характер и особенности родоправительных отношений в Северном и Центральном Казахстане, которые были северными воротами Казахского ханства, в период XVIII-начале XX веков. В обозначенный период происходит аннексия Среднего жуза Российской империей. В регионе по-прежнему отмечаются традиционные родоплеменные отношения патриархального типа, основанные на классическом кочевом животноводстве, как на особенном ведение хозяйства казахского народа. Прослеживаются характер изменения родоправительных отношений, выраженные в постепенной смене власти чингизидов. На смену им приходят более лояльные царской власти султаны и волостные, среди которых было много выходцев из простого народа. Власть ханов была отменена российскими колониальными властями извне. Имеет по-прежнему свою силу институт биев и кази, развивается институт тарханства. Сила и влияние имперской власти на народы и систему традиционных родоправительных отношений постоянно усиливаются. Институт аксакалов казахского общества продолжал сохранять свои функциональные черты вплоть до тридцатых годов двадцатого столетия. Изучение традиционной организации и института родоправителей аксакалов связано также с вопросом казахской этноидентичности и этничности. Этничность, как специфическое свойство определенной общности людей, выделяющее его от других и обозначающее особенные признаки и характерные культурные черты, с такими особо значимыми элементами, как этническое самосознание, включающее представление об общем кровно-родственном, родственно-родовом происхождении, историческую память о связи с определенной территорией, как обиталища их праотцов и предков; корпоративная солидарность, строящейся на основополагающих принципах родства, с легендарными фамильными историями и династийными традициями рода и племени; духовные ценности, служащие консолидации и поддерживающие интересы единства конгломерата этнической корпорации. Консолидированная этническая среда казахского социума особенно отличалась единой общей территорией, общинностью землепользования на общинных началах, кровнородственного этнического самосознания, социальной, культурно-бытовой и экономической взаимосвязью. Анализ родовой структуры раскрывает значение этносоциальной организации в формировании обобщенного представления об единстве этнической территории через историю родовых организаций, которые в свою очередь формировали порядок общинного землевладения и легитимировали её.

***Ключевые слова:*** Сарыарка, казахи, род, жуз, аксакал, родоправительные отношения, хан, султан, бий, ходжи, тарханы, имперская власть.

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## **XVIII ғ. – XX ғ. басында солтүстік және орталық Қазақстанда хан билігі аясындағы рубасылық қатынастардың сипаттамасы**

***Түйін:*** Бұл мақалада XVIII-XX ғасырдың басында Қазақ хандығының солтүстік шебіндегі рутайпалық қатынастардың сипаты мен ерекшеліктерін көрсететін тарихи дереккөздерді салыстырмалы талдауда арналаған. Бұл кезеңде Орта жүз даласы Ресей империясының

аннексиясына ілікті. Өңірде қазақ халқының шаруашылығын басқарудың ерекше тәсілі ретінде Қалыптасқан классикалық көшпелі мал шаруашылығына негізделген патриархалдық үлгідегі дәстүрлі ру-тайпалық қатынастар сақталып келді. Төре әuletтері билігінің бірте-бірте ауысуынан көрінетін отбасылық қатынастардың өзгерісі байқалады. Оның орнына патша ұқметіне адал деген сұлтандар мен болыстар келді, олардың ішінде қарапайым ортадан шыққан халық өклідері көп болды. Хан билігін ресей отаршыл билігі сырттан отырып жойды. Дегенмен, билер мен қазылар институты әлі де күшінде еді, тархандық институттар да болды. Халықтың дәстүрлі ру қатынастар жүйесіне империялық биліктің ықпалы үнемі артып отырса да, соған қарамастан, қазақ қоғамындағы ақсақалдар институты XX ғасырдың отзызыншы жылдарына дейін өзінің қызметтік ерекшеліктерін сақтап қалғанын айтта кеткен жөн. Ақсақалдар билігінің дәстүрлі институтын зерттеу де қазақтың этникалық ерекшелігі мен этникалық мәселесімен тікелей байланысты. Этникалық сипат белгілі бір адамдар қауымдастырының ерекшеле қасиеті болып табылады, оны өзге жүргіткан ерекшелендіретін өзіндік этникалық сана, белгілі бір аумақ, атабабаларының мекені сияқты ерекшеле маңызды элементтері бар. Сондай ерекшеле белгімен өзіне тән мәдени сипатты білдіреді, туыстық пен меншіктің іргелі принциптеріне негізделеді, аңызға айналған отбасылық тарихымен және ру-тайпа әuletтік дәстүрмен, этникалық корпорация кангломератының біртұтас мұдделерін нығайтуға қызмет ететін рухани құндылықтармен құрылған ынтымақтастық болды. Қазақ қоғамының шоғырланған этникалық ортасы біртұтас ортақ аумақпен, қауымдық негізде ортақ жер пайдалануымен, туыстық этникалық ерекшелігімен, әлеуметтік, мәдени, тұрмыстық және экономикалық өзара байланысымен ерекшеленген еді. Рулық құрылымды зерделеу жолымен рулық үйимдардың тарихын ашу арқылы этникалық аумақтың біртұтастығы туралы жалпылама идеяны қалыптастырудығы этноәлеуметтік үйимның маңызы анылады, бұл өз кезеңінде қауымдық жер иелену және жер иелену тәртібін қалыптастырғанын және оны заңдастырғанын көрсетеді.

*Кітап өздер:* Солтүстік Қазақстан, Орталық Қазақстан, қазақтар, рулар, жұздер, рулық басқарушы, рулық қатынастар, хан, сұлан, би, қажы, тархандар, империялық билік.

## Введение

Северный и Центральный Казахстан является в региональном отношении неотъемлемой частью истории казахского народа и ее широкого исторического наследия. Северный Казахстан считают вполне справедливо северными воротами страны и в истории культурного достояния самого народа занимает чрезвычайно важное место. Данный регион географически расположен на Казахском мелкосопочнике, которое именуется в казахской географической и топонимической традиции – Сарыарка, и прилегает к югу Западносибирской низменности. Он имеет в своем ландшафте степи и горы в бассейнах северных озер и рек Иртыш, Есиль, Тобол и Обаган. Центральный Казахстан прилегает к Северному Казахстану и представляет собой равнину, расположенную ниже до Тургайского плато.

В целом регион граничит с Западносибирской равниной, на северо-западе – с предгорьями Урала, на юге и юго-западе – с прочими казахскими регионами Западного и Южного Казахстана, расположенными на Турганском плато, а на востоке с казахскими регионами Восточного Казахстана (горными массивами Тарбагатая и Алтая) ([Даниярова и др., 2015](#)).

Следует обозначить, что данная территория была исторически заселена разными представителями казахских родовых групп и объединений, составляющие целые кочевые племенные корпорации. Данная территории имеет традиционное обозначение Орта жұз - Средний жуз, то есть, собственно, Средние степи. Слово «жұз» или «дұз» производна от слова «тұз», в значении «степь». Основным занятием в Среднем жузе являлось кочевое животноводство, образующее вместе с другими подсобными видами деятельности комплексное ведение домашней экономики, которое в истории характеризуется, как своеобразный культурный тип ведения хозяйственной жизни, сложившийся с древности в казахских степях.

В Северном и Центральном Казахстане проживали представители родов таких крупных племенных корпораций, как аргыны, кереи, кипчаки, уаки и найманы, вместе с тем, включающие группы тюре и тюленгуты. По материалам данных о землепользовании казахов, и их земельных отношениях, в XVI-XVIII веках, проживали аргыны на территории Семипалатинской, Павлодарской, Каркаралинской, Kokчетавской, Атбасарской, Акмолинской, Тургайской и Кустанайской уездах. Общим ураном – боевым кличем аргынов был «Акжол». Общим ураном – боевым кличем кереев был «Ошыбай». Общим ураном – боевым кличем найманов был «Каптагай». Общим ураном – боевым кличем уаков был «Жаубасар». Общим ураном – боевым кличем кипчаков был «Ойбас». Кереи и уаки жили в Северном Казахстане, и располагались на берегах рек Ишим и Иртыш, на западе от Алтайских гор, в Семипалатинском, в Омском, в Перовском, в Кустанайском, в Каркаралинском и Зайсанском уездах ([Киреев, 1998](#)).

## Метод

В изучении истории родоправительных отношений необходимы инструменты исторической этнографии, методология социально-культурной антропологии, приемы анализа исторических источников, а также изучение общей историографии вопроса. В этнографическом отношении изучается история и становление этнического расселения и состава населения, система жизнеобеспечения, происхождение и развитие этноса. Что касается методологии социальной и культурной антропологии, то здесь важны теории о социально-этнической системе и этнокультурных особенностях жизнедеятельности народов, социально-культурная реконструкция реальности. Источникovedческий анализ дает новые сведения об истории народа в их хронологической ретроспективе. Различные научные труды, написанные в контексте истории изучаемого вопроса, характеризуют исторические взгляды исследователей, их подходы и достигнутые результаты.

В научной историографии отдельные исследователи достаточно подробно рассматривали этно-социальную структуру казахского народа и вопросы политической патронимии. Конец XIX века и начало XX века стало периодом распада традиционных устоев этнополитического устройства в казахском обществе. Прослеживая особенности интерпретации истории общественно-социальной жизни населения степи в XVIII-XIX веков в историографии, наряду с интересными источниками и историческими фактами, приводимыми авторами, можно обнаружить и ряд несоответствий описаний с реальной жизнью и традициями народа. В трудах дореволюционных авторов, конечно же, больше живых описаний исследователей, свидетелей, включенных в степную среду, приводящих

много детальных наблюдений, и в их трудах встречаются написанные добротно очерки их истории. Статистические материалы, приводимые в них, имеют ценность, так как дают более наглядную картину истории в ее количественном выражении.

## Результаты

В начале XVIII века на территории Северного и Центрального Казахстана продолжается война казахов с джунгарами. Возникает угроза полного истребления казахского населения. В результате отдельные племена Среднего жуза перекочевывают на юг, а остальные принимают решение принять российское подданство. В 1740 году Средний жуз принимает такое подданство. Ранее принимает российское подданство Младший жуз (в 1731 году) (*Тогисбаев и Сужикова, 2009*).

Шокан Уалиханов, выдающийся казахский ученый, назвал начало XVIII века самым бедственным периодом в жизни казахского народа, а 1723 год обозначен им как страшный год погибели, так как казахи подверглись набегам джунгар, и оно получило название в исторической памяти народа как «Ақтабан шұбырынды, Алқакөл сұлама». Оно сопровождалось не только уничтожением зимовок и скота, но и погибелью большого количества людей. Все это заставляло казахов группироваться в родовые объединения (*Валиханов, 2004*).

Правители Среднего жуза в такое сложное время подверглись также давлению со стороны царизма, которое были заинтересовано в принятии казахами российского подданства. 26 марта 1752 года вышел указ царя о строительстве Новоишимской линии, которая была направлена на разрушение традиционной хозяйственной системы Казахского ханства и ее экономики, посредством ограничения территории кочевания казахских коневодов. Линия укреплений должен был соединить кратчайшим путем Омскую крепость со Звериноголовской крепостью. В центре укрепленной линии по данному направлению в июле 1752 года в местности Кызылжар была заложена крепость святого Петра, на правом берегу Ишима (ныне город Петропавловск) (*Казахский хан – Абылай: эпоха, жизнь и деятельность, 2011*).

## Обсуждения

В этот тяжелый период ханом Среднего жуза был Абулмамбет, именно он принимал вместе с Абылай султаном важные решения. Абулмамбет хан является исторической личностью и представителем династии, правящей в казахском государстве несколько веков кряду представителем чингизидов. Он родной внук знаменитого Аз-Тауке хана правителя Казахского ханства. Именно Абулмамбет хан управлял Казахским ханством совместно с Абылай султаном.

В официальной историографии Абулмамбет хан недооценен как лидер. Абулмамбет-хан не участвовал в междуусобицах с другими представителями элиты и радел за спокойствие своего. Его сильно уважал Абылай султан. После смерти Абулмамбета Абылай стал его преемником и стал верховным ханом Казахского ханства. Вначале Абылай был главнокомандующим ополчения Среднего жуза, а в 1734 году к тому же он был провозглашен ханом Среднего жуза. Но в межгосударственных переписках с Цинской империей, и с Россией, прозорливо обозначал себя всегда в качестве Абылай

султана, дабы не провоцировать другие государства на ложные представления о двоевластии в Казахском ханстве. Наряду с деятельностью Улуг хана – Верховного хана в Казахском ханстве были порой и Келте ханы, удельные правители родовых объединений, которые ответственны за определенный регион и ограничены в полномочиях. Так при Абулмамбете Ералы султан, сыну хана Младшего жуза Абулхайра, был правителем кереев, которые были одним из более крупных племен, входящих в Средний жуз ([Сүлейменов, 1969](#)).

В целом, казахские тюре-чингиизиды не относились к разряду казахских жузов, казахская поговорка гласит: «төре жұзге кірмейді», то есть тюре не входят в состав казахских жузовых корпораций, и, тем самым, они остаются нейтральной силой в социально-политической жизни казахского социума. Но, вместе с тем, существует и поговорка. «Төбесіз жер болмайды, төресіз ел болмайды», что означает, дословно: «не бывает земли без холма, не бывает страны без тюре». В данном случае смысл этой поговорки сообщает нам, что каждое большое или малое сообщество людей со организуется во главе с большим или малым лидером социума.

Такими либеральными решениями Абулмамбет способствовал, чтобы не было междуусобиц казахских чингизидов, и они были сосредоточены на текущих вопросах жизни народа. Согласно его инициативам Абылай султан освободил караванные пути из Средней Азии в Россию от набегов разбойников. В период его правления заключены были договоры о мире с бухарцами и джунгарами. В Мангистау в этот период главенствовали казахские знаменитые своим боевым духом казахская родоплеменная корпорация адаи. Основными оппонентами Казахского ханства в это время были Российской и Цинская империи с северо-запада и юго-востока.

Наиболее важным шагом хана Абулмамбета в истории казахского народа считается его плодотворное взаимодействие с Абылаем, которого он выбрал в качестве своего приемника. Абулмамбет сам признал ханом Абылайя, и сын Абулмамбета Абильфеиз уважал такое решение отца. Абулмамбет хана считают дальновидным, так как он проявил в исторической реальности сильную политическую волю. При поддержке хана Абылай противостоял набегам джунгар и усилил Казахское ханство. Кроме поддержки хана Абулмамбета для Абылай очень важную роли играла и поддержка казахских родовых лидеров и выдающихся личностей Бухара жырау Калкаман улы и Каз дауысты Казыбек бия. Благодаря их внушительной поддержке Абылай хан преодолевал противоречия родовых групп, которые так или иначе возникали в социальной среде кочевников.

Абулмамбет хан имел четырех сыновей, которые были султанами и каждый из них правил отдельными родовыми объединениями, так, например, Болат, старший сын хана, почтился за лидера в среде казахского рода алтай, которые происходили по линии куандык и относились к племени аргынов; Абульфеиз султан, второй сын хана, родом каракерев и частью рода найман, он был самым авторитетным и влиятельным султаном Среднего жуза и мог даже претендовать на ханскую должность. Тауке султан, третий сын хана был возвеличен в качестве удельного лидера среди казахских племён, входивших в Средний жуз у сиргели и сарыуйсун; четвертый сын Абултек, вероятно не успел стать султаном, так как данных о его правление казахсими родами не встречаются.

Следует отметить, что последнее упоминание о Абулмамбет хане отмечаются в числе русских источниках у К. Юсупова и У. Аслаева, в конце 1768 года, после посещения обозначенных лиц Среднего жуза (Сулейменов), а китайские источники называют Абулмамбета «старейшиной казахов» и указывают, что «при Абулмамбет хане привозилось в Китай все, со стороны Ташкента и вот уже два-три года, как границы закрыты и взаимное сообщение отсутствует ([Артықбаев, 2004](#)). Нужно отметить, что прямые потомки сыновей хана Абулмамбет имеются и в настоящие дни и проживают в Казахстане, в различных его регионах, в том числе и на Северном и Центральном Казахстане.

В начале XVIII века более авторитетным государственным деятелем в Северном и Центральном Казахстане считают хана Абылай, который происходит от старшей ветви потомков, основателя Казахского ханства, хана Жанибека. Абылай султана принимал совместно с ханом Абулмамбетом участие в 1740 году на встрече с представителями российской администрации. Абылай поддерживал постоянно связи с российскими властями, которые находились в Тобольске, Оренбурге и Петербурге.

Абылай хан в истории признан в народной среде дальновидным, мудрым и видным политиком и дипломатом, так как он смог сохранить целостность Казахского ханства в десятилетний период своего правления в качестве Улы хана Великого хана казахов в 1771 -1781 годы, когда он правил всеми тремя жузами. Этот период истории казахов характеризуется весьма стабильной политической обстановкой, расширением экономических и культурных связей с Россией и другими народами Центральной Азии. Было решены его главные условия: мир и торговля с Россией. По инициативе Абылай хана в местности Кызылжар, где он имел свою резиденцию, крепость святого Петра стал пунктом обменной торговли. Отмечается, что именно в крепости святого Петра и планировалось провести избрание Абылай на Казахское ханство с участием представителей русских властей. Но Абылай хан отказался от коронации в крепости, чтобы подтвердить легитимность своей ханской власти посредством традиционного института избрания народными лидерами – казахскими родоправителями-биями по традиции поднятия на белой коне. Вступление в ханство было произведено в его ставке без пышных торжеств.

Этносоциальные отношения и родовые общности казахов В XVIII – начале XX веков на Северном и Центральном Казахстан не отличалось от подобных отношений в других регионах Казахстана. Казахи продолжают жить по законам степного права и религиозным правовым законам священного шариата, но постепенно в социальную жизнь входят суды Российской империи.

В культурно-бытовом и конфессиональном плане у казахов по-прежнему не отмечается особенных региональных отличий, нет и языковых диалектов. В конце XVIII века в Среднем жузе, наряду с верховным ханом отмечается еще два и более правителей. Нужно отметить, российский царские власти поощряли такую форму правления и поддерживали рост численности правителей в жузе, и хотели тем самым подорвать принцип единичалия центральной власти. При этом довольно часто (вероятно, со своими умыслами) российские власти делали ставку на то, чтобы правили казахскими родами заведомо слабые правители, не имеющие сильных волевых качеств, для того

чтобы дискредитировать их перед народом и постепенно отменить ханскую власть в Казахстане.

В Среднем жузе (на территории Северного и Центрального Казахстана) просуществовала ханская власть до 1822-1824 годов. Во Внутренней Букеевской Орде, расположенной в Астраханской губернии, ханская власть просуществовала до 1845 года. Следует отметить, что в годы национально-освободительных восстаний, которые происходили на территории Казахстана в 19-м веке, были старания со стороны казахов восстановить хансскую власть, но такая попытка не увенчалась успехом.

В XIX веке известным ханом был Кенесары Касымулы, внук Абылай хана. Отмечается, что семья Касыма вела активную борьбу за получение власти в Среднем жузе, так как российские колониальные власти постоянно укрепляли свои политические позиции среди населения за счет того, что признавали в качестве правителей и султанов тех наследников из числе потомков, хана Абылайя, которые были лояльны и поддерживали царскую власть.

В Среднем жузе данного региона к 1838 году было семь внешних округов - Аягузский, Акмолинский, Баянаульский, Кокчетавский, Кушмурунский, Каркаралинский, Кокпектинский. Отдельными из них правил Кенесары Касымулы, который был недоволен царской властью и боролся за законное право иметь верховную власть не только на Севере и в Центре, но и над всем Средним жузом, а в итоге и над всем Казахским ханством. Кенесары Касымулы создает вместе с племянником Ержаном, действенное боевое подразделение из 300 вооруженных человек и начинает национально-освободительное восстание. Вместе с тем были в регионе казахские роды и племена, которые вместе с царскими властями выступали против Кенесары Касымулы.

Похоронен последний хан казахского народа, как и было принято у казахов в мечети Ходжа Ахмеда Яссаяи, в городе Туркестан.

Султанами на протяжении XVIII века были потомки всех чингизидов. Они в народе считались тюре и относили себя к аксуйек, то есть благородным, или белой кости. Знатное происхождение султанов Северного и Центрального Казахстана признавалось даже соседними народами. Их приглашали в Башкирию и среднеазиатские государства, на организованные в этих странах ханские мероприятия и даже на ханский престол.

Привилегии султанов Северного и Центрального Казахстана было оформлены в казахском азате законодательно. Освобождены были султаны от суда биев, так как судить их мог только верховный суд ханов. Были освобождены султаны и от телесных наказаний. Народ облагался штрафом даже за словесное оскорбление султана. В случае убийства султана следовало выплатить кун, который равен сумме куну за смерть 7-ми кочевников. Если султан вступал в брак с представителем простого социального происхождения, то он получал название караман. Влиятельными и известными представителями такого сословия чингизидов считаются следующие: Чокан Валиханов, Урус Султанбетулы, Султанбет торе, Касым Абылайулы, Губайдулла Уалиулы, Саржан Касымулы ([Қазақстан, 1998-2005](#)).

В 1867-1868 годы царские власти проводят административные реформы и приравнивают в правах султанов с рядовыми казахами, тем самым был нанесен большой

урон на сложившуюся веками структуру власти, основанную на социально-политических привилегиях чингизидов.

С конца XVIII века укрепляются Северном и Центральном Казахстане позиции ходжей (кожа), религиозной сословной группы властной структуры Казахстана. Ходжи всегда относились к белой кости, так как их считали потомками родственников пророка Мухаммеда. Ходжи активно занимались разъяснением и пропагандой основных положений ислама. Также ходжи несли своей деятельностью и просветительскую миссию. Нужно отметить, что все этнические ритуальные обряды (от рождения до похорон) совершались у казахов при обязательном участии ходжи или их представителей.

Также отмечался обычай приглашения ходжей из Южного Казахстана и городов Средней Азии, который издавна бытовал среди казахов. В каждом казахском роде, исходя из условий кочевой и полукочевой жизни казахского народа, было по две три семьи ходжей. Но царские власти проводили ограничительную политику свободного передвижения ходжей по территории страны. Обусловлено это было тем, что русская администрация рассматривала проводников ислама, как политику вмешательства со стороны мусульманских стран, (Турции и некоторых других). В то же время, с конца XVIII века, царское правительство оказывает поддержку исламским миссионерам из числа татар, в противовес распространения турецкого ислама. Ходжи по-прежнему были освобождены от каких-либо податей и не подвергались телесным наказаниям. Одним из выходцев из среды ходжей был известный ученый-просветитель Мухамедсалык Бабажанулы и Жусипек Шайлихслямулы.

Внутри самого казахского общества отмечались этнические группы и субэтнические группы населения. Так субэтнической группой на севере и в центре были курама. В данную группу вошли небольшие группы кочевых и иных тюркских племен (ногайцы, каракалпаки и кыргызы). Курама имели свои поселения на северных окраинах казахской степи. Более значительные группы курама были расположены в Средней Азии, в районе города Ташкента (более 50 тысяч человек).

Социальная жизнь и традиционный общественный уклад казахского народа, и его прямых предков, в позднем средневековье и в новое время формировал специфическую и своеобразную культурно-идеологическую, административно-управленческую и социально-политическую, территориальную структуру обустройства всей степи, выражавшееся, в системе родственно-родовых и союза родоплеменных организаций казахов. Такая форма организации географического пространства, тесно связанного со строгим общественным укладом жизни кочевых тюрков-степняков, сложился издревле и был традиционной формой всей социальной-политической системы, отличавшейся постоянством и стабильностью.

Российская империя вплоть до XIX века нуждалась во властных структурах, чтобы успокаивать народ. Поэтому они поддерживали такой институт, как тарханство, награждая таким статусом нужных людей. Тарханы имели также в обществе свое привилегированное положение, получали такое звание казахи за преданность и особые заслуги перед царским правительством. Впервые получил звание тархана батыр Жанибек, из Среднего жуза, согласно указу Елизаветы, Российской императрицы, в 1743

году. Он выполнял для царской администрации дипломатические миссии по возврату рабов и пленных российских подданных. Тарханы как представители родовой элиты принимали активное участие в регулировании часто возникающих конфликтов между казахами, калмыками и башкирами. Члены семей тарханов освобождались от налогов. Постепенно число тарханов снижалось и к середине XIX века их насчитывалось в Казахстане 20 человек, (так как они выполнили свою миссию).

В казахском традиционном обществе региона Северного и Центрального Казахстана в обозначенный период по-прежнему наиболее уважаемой и господствующей социальной группой оставались бии. Они были знатоками казахского обычного права, ораторами-шешен и выполняли функции судей и родовых старшин и судей. Именно бии занимались вопросами разрешения конфликтов между родами и племенами. В XVIII веке в Среднем жузе популярностью пользовался бий Каз даусты Казыбек, который помимо этого был известен и в качестве батыра. Он имел значительное влияние на ханов и султанов Северного и Центрального Казахстана. Позднее стали назначать царские власти на должность биев не потомственных или грамотных биев, а более угодных и лояльных к себе биев. Такое положение привело к тому, что у населения стало отмечаться недоверие к биям и падение их авторитета в целом, как института обычного казахского права

В XVIII-XIX веках играют по-прежнему значительную роль в Северном и Центральном Казахстане батыры: XVIII век: Богенбай батыр, Малайсары батыр, Наурызбай батыр, Кабанбай батыр, Олжабай батыр; XIX век: Агыбай батыр, Жоламан батыр, Бухарбай батыр, Наурызбай батыр, Жанкожа батыр, Иман батыр, Есет батыр. Последние боролись против Российской империи.

Рядовые кочевники по-прежнему являются свободными членами общины и отнесены к разряду представителей «черной кости», хотя понятие «черная кость» как таковое у казахов не существовало, а было лишь понятие «Қара», то есть «большинство», «масса людей». Простой народ был свободен в личном отношении, как это свойственно казаху.

Размещаются у аулов ханов и султанов поселения тюленгутов, которые выполняют роль рассыльных. Многие из них назначались ханом старшинами или управителями родов. В XVIII веке и первой половине XIX века были по преимуществу тюленгуты военными слугами. Позднее могли иметь своих делегатов не только султаны и ханы, но и бии, а также старшины.

Социальные слои населения степи имели имущественные различия. Отдельные группы казахского социума по ряду причин могут быть рассмотрены в качестве субэтнических групп. Казахские родовые объединения возникали в силу естественных причин расширения родственных семей, родовых фамилий, построенных на принципах родовой экзогамии, соединенные между собой генеалогическими узами всеобщей родоплеменной структуры. У казахов было социально и сословно дифференцированное общество. Казахский социум представлял собой сложную социальную конфигурацию, и иерархически устроенную социальную организацию. Традиционная родоплеменная группа охватывала основную часть степного населения, помимо которых в общую

социальную конфигурацию казахского этноса стали входить сословные и субэтнические группы ([Алтысбес, 2020](#)).

Имелась по-прежнему в казахском обществе и категория зависимых людей, кулы (или рабы). В Среднем жузе преобладали среди рабов в основном джунгары, алатауские кыргызы и калмыки. Никогда не мог быть рабом казаха человек по происхождению из казахского рода или племени. У кула не было права обращаться в суд биев. Девушка рабыня, принявшая ислам и ставшая женой казаха, признавалась свободной. С 1822 года казахам запретили приобретать рабов, согласно «Устава о сибирских киргизах».

Однако «Устав» не учитывал, что отдельные большие роды в силу ограниченности численности округа были вынуждены отойти в состав разных административных единиц, и наоборот, более мелкие роды были вынуждены объединиться с другими родами, чтобы составить округ. Это, в конце концов, привело к тому, что казахские роды «до того перемешались как между собой, так и с соседями, что ... иногда нельзя отыскать сходство в рассказах даже таких аксакалов, которые принадлежат к одной и той же волости, на том основании, что эти мелкие административные единицы нередко представляют смесь различных племен» ([Жиренчин, 1996:21](#)).

### Дискуссия

Изучение истории родоправительских отношений сохраняют свою актуальность, так как изучение традиционных институтов в истории казахского народа важны для научной реконструкции социальной реальности. В конце 1920-х годов новая политическая власть в лице советских большевиков, проводя политику советизации, седентаризации, насильственной коллективизации в одночасье поставила запрет на традиционные формы жизнедеятельности казахов. Это сопровождалось политикой раскулачивания казахских баев, зажиточных слоев населения. Принудительная политика отчуждения имущества и скота обернулась казахским голодомором, лишившая жизни миллионов казахов.

Исследования, связанные с изучением родоправительских отношений связаны:

1. С изучением института аксакалов в традиционном казахском обществе. В настоящий момент не существует обстоятельных, полноценных и достоверных исследований по данной проблематике.
2. Изучение традиционных институтов, как институт тюре-чингизидов, и институт аксакалов, позволит исследователям понять сущность и особенности внутренних процессов казахского социума.
3. Обобщение материалов новых, ранее мало изученных источников, в которых имеются сведения по истории родоправительских отношений, института народных лидеров династий и аксакалов откроют новые страницы национальной истории казахского народа.

## **Заключение**

Таким образом, в период XVIII – начале XX веков в северном и центральном Казахстане по-прежнему функционирует институт родоплеменных отношений, основанные на коневодстве как основной хозяйственно-экономической деятельности степняков. В данный период отмечаются значительные изменения родоправительных отношений, на смену представителям тюре-чингизидов все больше приходят более лояльные царской власти рядовые султаны из простой среды. Власть ханов отменена, так как на высшем уровне управления находятся ставленники империи. Имеет по-прежнему свою силу институт биев и ходжи, как духовных лидеров, развивается институт тарханства. Сила и влияние имперской власти на народы и традиционные родоправительные отношения постоянно усиливается.

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