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**ACTUAL ISSUES OF
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GLOBAL SCIENCES IN THE NAME OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

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Alexander Buychik, Doctor of Science in Economics, PhD of Social and Political Sciences, Chief Director for Science, Tukulart Holding, Ostrava, Czech Republic. ORCID: 0000-0002-2542-4198. Web of Science (WoS): AEV-6125-2022. Semantic Scholar: ID 1579454141.

Features of economic deformation due to the adoption of political decisions leading to the formation of economic crises of a synthetic secondary nature on the example of the sanctions policy of the European Union against Russia

Abstract: The economic analysis of political decisions is the most complex and complex due to the fact that in the course of the study it is necessary to take into account the specific features of political logic, which, in many respects, does not coincide with the implementation and transformation of economic laws and trends and puts itself above the economy. This leads to extremely negative consequences for states and regions. Political ideology, political will does not necessarily destroy the economy. Often, putting itself above the economy, it leads to the deformation of economic ties and the reduction of economic stability. Then economic crises of a synthetic secondary nature are formed, i.e., crises that could be smoothed out from the outset, subject to competent consideration of economic laws and international economic relations. The subject of the study is the sanctions economic measures of the European Union. The purpose of the study is to detect economic deformation due to the adoption of political decisions that lead to the formation of crises of a synthetic secondary nature. To achieve the purpose of the study and solve the tasks set, logical, historical, comparative and deductive methods of studying and analysing materials were used. The study used the documents of the European Commission, statistical data and publications of researchers in economic and political crises. The author concludes that the sanctions economic policy of the European Union, which also covers the EU candidate and partner states, for all its general logic, has five main and fundamental errors. These errors are so critical and obvious that they cannot contribute to the expected results. On the contrary, this sanctions policy helped Russia significantly strengthen its political position in the international arena and attract a sufficient proportion of Russian citizens to the side of the authoritarian government in order to start fundamental social transformations in the country aimed at distancing Russian society from the European community so that the principle of “sobornost” becomes again leading in social behaviour of the majority of Russians.

Keywords: economic sanctions, economic crisis, European Union, European Council, Russia, Russian annexation, Ukraine.



Introduction

The economic analysis of political decisions is the most complex and complex due to the fact that in the course of the study it is necessary to take into account the specific features of political logic, which, in many respects, does not coincide with the implementation and transformation of economic laws and trends and puts itself above the economy. This leads to extremely negative consequences for states and regions. Political ideology, political will does not necessarily destroy the economy. Often, putting itself above the economy, it leads to the deformation of economic ties and the reduction of economic stability. Then economic crises of a synthetic secondary nature are formed, i.e., crises that could be smoothed out from the outset, subject to competent consideration of economic laws and international economic relations.

The subject of the study was the sanctions economic measures of the European Union.

The purpose of this study was to detect economic deformation due to the adoption of political decisions that lead to the formation of crises of a synthetic secondary nature.

Based on the purpose, the following tasks were set by the author:

- give a general description of the sanctions packages of the European Union against the Russian Federation;
- analyse the physical-geographical and political-economic features and traditions of Russia, which had to be taken into account in the first place when making political decisions;
- identify five basic economic mistakes of the European Union in the sanctions policy towards Russia, which led to the lack of their effectiveness.

To achieve the purpose of the study and solve the tasks set, logical, historical, comparative and deductive methods of studying and analysing materials were used.

The study used the documents of the European Commission and European Parliament, statistical data and publications of researchers in the field of economic and political crises.

General characteristics of the sanctions packages of the European Union against Russia

In protest against the Russian armed forces' annexion of Ukraine, the European Union has adopted a modern method of pressure in the form of sanctions packages. This method of economic and political pressure has shown its relative effectiveness for small regional states like Iran, Venezuela, or North Korea. It cannot be argued that the methodology of sanctions packages is a modern effective tool for containing or managing the domestic or foreign policy of any state. As experience shows, states experiencing economic pressure from one coalition quickly begin to establish relations with political opponents that form a coalition for another. This is exactly what the political leaderships of Iran and Venezuela did, which drew closer to Russia and partly to China. Thus, these states managed to partially neutralise the economic problems that arose as a result of the sanctions applied against them. In this article, we do not consider the political aspects of the legitimacy of the imposition of economic sanctions by any conglomerate of countries against another state. More important for analysis are those processes that have changed and reduced the planned sanctions damage to states and thus did not lead to the expected results for the coalition, e.g., changes in domestic or foreign policy, a change of power or cardinal concessions. It is also necessary to understand that the modern sanctions practice was applied to regional small states that are significantly dependent on the resource base of the region or the whole world, do not have much influence in the international arena and cannot act as a kind of center of attraction initially for political forces, and behind them for economic resources.

In February 2022, the European Union in coalition with the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and a number of other states began to apply the technique of sanctions pressure through restrictive packages in relation to the Russian Federation.

Package 1 was accepted on February 15, 2022. It was introduced after Russia recognised the so-called Donetsk Republic and Lugansk Republic as independent republics. This package contained the following articles:

- against 351 State Duma deputies who voted on February 15, 2022 in support of an appeal to President Putin with a request to recognise the Donetsk Republic and Lugansk Republic;
- against 27 individuals and legal entities who “played a role in undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine” (including against Sergei Shoigu, Andriy Kostin, Igor Shuvalov, Maria Zakharova, Margarita Simonyan, Volodymyr Solovyov, the Internet Research, Rossiya Bank, Promsvyazbank and VEB);
- a ban on financing the Russian government and the Central Bank. Trade and investment sanctions were imposed on the DPR and LPR (*EU adopts package of sanctions in response to Russian recognition, 2022*).

This package of sanctions measures contained several directions at once, which were supposed to harmoniously link each other, given that these measures were applied immediately by a coalition of almost 30 countries of the world.

On February 24, 2022, the European Union made an addition to the first sanctions package. The European Parliament banned Russian and Belarusian diplomats and civil servants from entering their residences in Brussels and Strasbourg. Also, the European Parliament banned the access of Russian lobbyists to its premises. In addition, the European Council and European Commission “instructed to no longer accept people who represent the interests of Russia” (The EU has banned access to its organisations to lobbyists from Russia, 2022). Austria and France did not invite representatives of Russia to official events dedicated to the anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. Latvia and Lithuania lowered the level of diplomatic relations with Russia – both states expelled Russian ambassadors and recalled theirs from Russia, and also recognized Russia as a terrorist state (*The Lithuanian Seimas has recognised Russia as a terrorist state, 2022*).

In addition, the countries of the European Union launched a full-scale attack on Russian diplomats, guided either by the data of their special services or by the principle of protest against the start of a military operation in Ukraine (*Table 1*). The European Union has declared persona non grata of 19 members of the Russian Permanent Mission to the European Union (*Westfall & Simon, 2022*). From February 24 to April 5, Western countries expelled 315 Russian diplomats (*Kovalev, 2022*); in two days – April 4 and 5 – the EU countries sent more than 200 (*Arinushkina, 2022*).

The EU sanctions package 2 was adopted on February 24, 2022 and contained a large list of pressure tools:

- Russian banks are to be banned from borrowing and lending money in the EU in the future;
- Shares in Russian state-owned companies may no longer be traded;
- The acceptance of deposits from Russian citizens or residents exceeding certain values and the sale of securities denominated in euro to Russian customers is prohibited;
- The supply of spare parts and other technology to the Russian transport sectors will be cut off;
- There are additional export restrictions on dual-use goods and technologies;
- The same applies to goods and technologies that could help improve Russia’s defense and security sector;
- Sale, supply and export of certain goods and technologies for oil refining is prohibited;

- Restrictions on visa policy: Entry opportunities for Russian diplomats and businessmen will be restricted;
- Irrespective of the authorised sanctions by the EU, the German government has halted the authorisation process for the “Nord Stream 2” pipeline project (*EU Official Journal, L 54, 2022*).

Thus, the European Union has imposed sanctions affecting the financial, energy, transport, technology sectors, as well as visa policy, i.e., personal sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Defense Minister Shoigu, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Special Representative of the President Sergei Ivanov, Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, State Duma deputies and Belarusian officials, providing for the freezing of assets . The sanctions also affected the Ministry of Defense, the foreign intelligence service, and the presidential administration. A ban was announced on the supply of goods and technology, as well as the provision of financial assistance. The EU blacklist, which implies a ban on European institutions from providing them with investments, assisting in transactions with securities or other financial market instruments, as well as making deals, includes such giants of the Russian economy as Almaz-Antey, Kamaz, commercial port of Novorossiysk, Rostec, Russian Railways, Sevmash, Sovcomflot, Uralvagonzavod, Kalashnikov Concern, aerospace, aircraft and shipbuilding corporations MiG, Russian Helicopters, Sukhoi, Tupolev, Rocket and Space Center “Progress”, etc. Sanctions were imposed against Russian banks Alfa-Bank, Otkritie, Rossiya Bank and Promsvyazbank. In relation to these banks, it is prohibited to make transactions, including the purchase and sale, as well as investment, operations with securities issued after April 12, 2022. European banks were prohibited from accepting deposits from Russians and Russian companies over EUR 100,000, from selling securities denominated in euros to clients from Russia, from providing services for the sale of securities issued after April 12, 2022, and from listing shares of any Russian state-owned companies on European exchanges. The sale and leasing of aircraft, spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines, as well as aircraft insurance and maintenance, were prohibited. At the same time, a ban was announced on the sale, supply, transfer and export to Russia of goods and technologies intended for use in the aviation or space industry, as well as dual-use goods and technologies and equipment and technologies for oil refining. The EU has imposed restrictions on the export of high-tech goods and technologies for their production. As part of the second package of sanctions, the visa policy was changed for the first time, but so far only for certain groups of Russians. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided to suspend the membership of the Russian Federation in the organisation (*Romaschenko, 2022*). The Danish autonomous province of Greenland joined the sanctions (*Bresnahan, 2022*).

Package 3 was accepted on February 26, 2022. It includes 6 groups of sanctions:

- Exclusion of certain banks from “Swift”. The following Russian banks are excluded from the international payment service system “Swift”: Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Bank Rossiya, Sovcombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB), VTB Bank. These institutions shall be excluded from international financial flows and their global operations shall be restricted. No euro banknotes may be delivered to Russia (*EU Official Journal, L 63, 2022*);

- Restrictions on Russian Central Bank. It was decided to further restrict the Russian Central Bank's ability to support the ruble's exchange rate with international financial transactions. There is a ban on transactions related to the management of reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia, as well as on transactions with legal persons or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of the Central Bank of Russia (e.g., the Russian National Wealth Fund) (*EU Official Journal, L 57, 2022*);
- Establishment of a Task Force. A task force with representatives from the EU will be established to ensure a quick implementation of the sanctions and to freeze the assets of sanctioned individuals, their families and companies;
- It is prohibited to enter the airspace of the EU for Russian aircrafts (*EU Official Journal, L 57, 2022*);
- Broadcasters are not permitted to broadcast Russian media such as Russia Today (*EU Official Letter, L 65, 2022*);
- Sanctions on the maritime sector: Maritime goods and technology listed in Annex XVI, whether originating in the EU or not, may not be supplied or exported, directly or indirectly, to natural or legal persons in Russia. In addition, the list of legal persons and entities subject to restrictions on financing through loans, transferable securities and money market instruments was extended to the maritime sector (*EU Official Journal, L 81, 2022*).

Thus, the European Union froze the reserves of the Central Bank of Russia, located in the banks of the G7 countries, i.e., half of all reserves of Russia, cancelled the program of “golden passports” for investors from Russia, disconnected 5 large Russian banks from the SWIFT system. The European Union announced the expansion of the third package of sanctions. It provides for a restriction on the supply of technologies for maritime navigation and radio communications to the country. The previously introduced financial restrictions on the Russian Federation have been extended to cryptocurrencies. 160 persons were added to the list of personal sanctions – 146 members of the Federation Council who voted for the ratification of agreements with the “Donetsk Republic” and “Lugansk Republic”, and 14 oligarchs with family members. Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the EU ban on the export of maritime goods and equipment, and also expanded the sanctions list by 16 people. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council has suspended Russia-related activities in the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation. Iceland has banned Russian vessels from entering its ports or receiving services if they are catching or processing a catch from general fish stocks for which the Icelandic authorities have not agreed on a specific catch (*Jonassen, 2022*). The European Aviation Safety Agency has decided to suspend all certificates issued by it, including certificates for products, parts and instruments, as well as certificates for organisations and training devices for flight simulation, if the holder of the certificate is located or resides in Russia or is otherwise subject to sanctions. Among the companies deprived of certificates: Aeroflot, S7 Group, Volga-Dnepr, Ural Airlines, Azur and others, and also stopped licenses from a number of aircraft maintenance enterprises and for Sukhoi Superjet aircraft manufactured in Russia 100 and Tu-204.

Package 4 was accepted on March 15th. It already includes 7 groups of sanctions:

- Russia's so called most-favoured-nation (MFN) status in EU markets will be withdrawn. Thereby, important advantages that Russia enjoys as a WTO member will be cancelled.

That would allow member states to unilaterally impose tariffs and other trade barriers against Russia. Under the WTO agreement, countries would normally not be allowed to be discriminatory between their trading partners.

- The Russian state and leading elites will be blocked from trading cryptocurrencies in order to prevent the circumvention of already existing sanctions (*Statement by President von der Leyen...*, 2022)
- Export of luxury goods from the EU to Russia will be banned. These include wines, beers, cigarettes, perfumes, clothing, jewelry, etc.
- Import of essential goods from the iron and steel sector as listed in Annex XVIII from Russia to the EU will be stopped. It is prohibited to directly or indirectly provide technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives and insurance and reinsurance, related to the specified goods.
- It is agreed upon a major ban on new European investment in Russia's energy sector. Export of equipment, technologies and services for the energy sector in Russia is not allowed.
- The Russian state and Russian companies will no longer be allowed to be rated by EU rating agencies. Access to subscription services in connection with rating activities may also not be granted.
- Transactions with Russian state owned enterprises listed in Annex XIX are prohibited. This includes those enterprises which are under public control or in public hand by more than 50%, or in which Russia and its government or the Central Bank of Russia has the right to participate in profits or have other significant economic relations with or enterprises outside the Union in which more than 50% of the shares are held directly or indirectly by one of the organisations listed in Annex XIX (*EU Official Journal, L 871, 2022*).

Thus, a ban was introduced on the import of steel products into the EU. It is impossible to invest in fuel and energy companies in Russia, to export luxury goods to it. The country is no longer rated by rating agencies. The sanctions list has been expanded for individuals and legal entities. The Russian Federation was expelled from the Council of Europe. Albania, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, North Macedonia and Montenegro have deprived Russia of the most favored nation treatment in trade. Bosnia and Herzegovina has imposed a ban on the purchase, import and transport of fossil fuels. Finland suspended the delivery of commercial mail, including urgent letters and cargo, and from March 27 announced the cessation of receiving freight trains from Russia. The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites has suspended Russian user licenses and a bilateral cooperation agreement with Russia. The European Commission has provided a clarification according to which companies, the majority of whose shares are jointly owned by two or more persons included in the sanctions lists, are considered to be under sanctions. Since March 29, Poland has increased sanctions at the national level, it will "block the assets of entities that contribute to supporting the Russian invasion of sovereign and independent Ukraine". Poland also announced the withdrawal of consent to an agreement on the promotion and mutual protection of investments with Russia (*Samicki, 2022*). From April 4, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development suspended Russia's access to the bank's finances and expertise.

Package 5 was accepted on 8 April. It includes 6 groups of sanctions:

- Ban on imports of coal from Russia worth EUR 4 billion annually.
- Complete ban on transactions against four Russian banks, including Russia's second largest bank VTB.
- Ban on Russian ships and Russian-operated vessels from calling at EU ports (exceptions include certain essential goods such as agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid, and energy) and ban on Russian and Belarusian road transport companies.
- Targeted export bans of EUR 10 billion on additional certain goods and technologies to Russia (e.g., quantum computers, advanced semiconductors, sensitive machinery, and transportation equipment) to weaken Russia's technological base and industrial capacity.
- Further ban on imports of timber, cement, seafood, and alcoholic beverages (vodka).
- A ban on the participation of Russian companies in the awarding of public contracts in EU member states and an exclusion of any financial support from the Union or its member states for Russian public institutions (*EU Official Journal, L 111, 2022*).

Thus, the European Union introduced a ban on coal imports, transactions with four largest banks of the Russian Federation. Vessels flying the Russian flag, with some exceptions, are not allowed to enter European ports. The import of alcohol, seeds, wood, seafood from the Russian Federation is prohibited. Additional sanctions have been introduced against Sberbank and Alfa-Bank, imports of fertilizers have been restricted. Norway joined the fifth package of sanctions and closed its borders and ports to Russian trucks and ships.

Package 6 was adopted on May 31, 2022 and contained 5 more groups of sanctions:

- Complete ban on imports of Russian oil (crude oil and petroleum products) by sea, which accounts for about two thirds of Russian deliveries to the EU. Imports via pipelines remain possible (especially at the insistence of Hungary), but Germany and other states have already announced that they will no longer import any oil at all from Russia by the end of the year, so imports are likely to fall by up to 90%. The import ban is expected to take effect within the next six months.
- Asset freezes and travel bans against other Russian companies and individuals accused of war crimes in Bucha.
- Swift exclusion of Russia's largest bank (Sberbank).
- Ban on three major Russian state broadcasters from distributing content in the EU.
- Export control restrictions on advanced technologies to additional military-industrial establishments (*EU Official Journal, L 153, 2022*).

Thus, the work of three Russian media on the territory of the EU countries is prohibited. Sberbank, Rosselkhozbank, Moscow Credit Bank were disconnected from SWIFT. A partial embargo on Russian oil has been introduced. Sanctions have been introduced against PAO Severstal. Norway has imposed new sanctions against 65 people and 18 companies, a ban on the purchase, import or transfer of oil transported by sea, as well as a ban on the provision of technical assistance, financing and other things related to the purchase, import or transfer of oil, a ban on the provision of a number of services to legal persons or the government of the Russian Federation, such as auditing and accounting, financial advice, etc. Estonia banned the import from Russia (including private individuals) of a long list of sanctioned goods, including alcoholic

beverages, furniture, wood, fertilizers, with the entry into force of the ban on July 10 (*A ban on the import of sanctioned goods from the Russian Federation...*, 2022). Finland banned the import of strong alcohol from Russia (*Bogdanov, 2022*). Lithuania has introduced a ban on the import of cement, alcohol, timber, alcohol-based industrial chemicals and a number of other goods of Russian origin into the territory of the European Union, including transit to Kaliningrad (*Wenkina, 2022*).

Package 7 was accepted on July 21, 2022. It consists of five groups of sanctions:

- Ban on imports of gold originating in Russia under Annex XXVI and ban on remarketing and purchase of processed Russian gold. Also prohibition of technical assistance in connection with such goods. Exception applies to natural persons from the EU and their accompanying immediate family members for personal use.
- Ships sailing under the Russian flag are now also prohibited from accessing sluices in the EU territory. They are now only allowed to use sluices to leave the EU territory. Possibility of derogation if access for unloading is necessary for the completion of a renewable energy project in the Union.
- New exemption possibility of goods according to Art. 3k / Annex XXIII for medical or pharmaceutical purposes as long as there are no sufficient reasons for a military end-use. Authorization by the competent authority of the member state is required.
- Adjustment of capital market and financial-related sanctions: Prohibition on accepting deposits in excess of Euro 100,000 also from legal entities established outside the Union, more than 50% of whose shares are held directly or indirectly by Russian nationals or natural persons resident in Russia.
- Inclusion of further goods in Annexes VII (*EU Official Journal, L 193, 2022*)

Also, the port of Rotterdam stopped container traffic to and from Russia. Latvia suspended an agreement on economic cooperation with Russia, an agreement between the facilitation of mutual travel between residents of border areas with Russia and terminated an agreement with the Russian Federation on the establishment of an intergovernmental commission in the fields of economic, scientific, technical, humanitarian and cultural cooperation (*Par starptautisko vienošanos darbības apturēšanu, 2022*).

Particular damage was supposed to be inflicted on the financial sector of the Russian economy, especially on financial resources, which, in a strange way, were left on numerous accounts of state financial institutions, large public and private Russian companies in the countries of the European Union and its partners. By March 14, Belgium had frozen about 10 billion euros of Russian assets: 2.7 billion in bank accounts and 7.3 billion in frozen transactions (*Belgium freezes €10 billion Russian assets, 2022*). On March 20, France froze more than 22 billion euros of holdings of the Central Bank of Russia, 150 million euros in private accounts and real estate worth 539 million euros. The Netherlands, according to the Dutch Ministry of Finance on March 22, froze about 392 million euros of Russian assets, and Poland – 140 million zlotys. Luxembourg has frozen Russian assets worth 2.5 billion euros. On March 30, the German Finance Ministry froze 95.5 million euros on the accounts of individuals and legal entities from Russia. On April 1, Latvia froze 55 million euros of Russian assets in its banks. Thus, on April 5, the European Union estimated the volume of assets frozen by it at 35 billion euros (*Follain,*

2022). On April 29, Ireland froze Russian assets in the amount of 1.2 billion euros. In the first quarter of 2022, Credit Suisse froze 10.6 billion dollars US in Russian assets. On May 25, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Didier Reynders said that since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February, the EU has frozen about 23 billion euros of the assets of the Central Bank of Russia (*Yuriko Backes présente les derniers chiffres sur les sanctions contre la Russie 2022*). On August 2, Belgium froze Russian assets for 50 billion euros.

Thus, in early August 2022, in just 5.5 months, the European Union and the European partner countries of the European Union imposed hundreds of sanctions articles, thereby actually using the entire set of effective measures to put economic pressure on Russia. Such a huge frequency and volume of sanctions decisions as an avalanche effect could destroy the economic basis of any developing country in the world or a small developed state that does not have preferences in geographical and political positions. However, “sanction avalanches” are not an equally effective weapon against states and societies of a low inclusive nature with a huge internal resource.

Physical-geographical and political-economic features and traditions of Russia

This paragraph will consider the main features of politics, economics, ethnopsychology and sociology of Russian society, which fundamentally distinguish the Russian Federation from the category of developing countries and greatly simplify its adaptation to the “sanction avalanches”.

The main advantage of Russia is a vast territory with a large oceanic coastline that cannot be blocked. Domestic transportation of goods by land in Russia is quite expensive, but it is easily offset by the huge profits from export sales. This is a significant problem for the domestic consumption economy, because Russian enterprises gravitate towards hyper profits, so they tend to export more than sell on the domestic market.

Russia borders on land, mainly not with the countries of the European Union, but with the states of Central and East Asia, including with direct allies – Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and China. Through these countries, Russia is able to develop trade relations with the entire Asian region. At the end of 2021, Russia had a large export income with such Asian states as:

- China – 68,028.9 million dollars, or 138.4% by 2020,
- Turkey – 26,512 million dollars, or 166.4% by 2020,
- Kazakhstan – 18,477.7 million dollars, or 131.5% by 2020,
- Republic of Korea – 16,896.8 million dollars, or 135.5% by 2020,
- India – 9,128.7 million dollars, or 157.4% by 2020,
- Uzbekistan – 5,204.9 million dollars, or 111.7% by 2020,
- Iran – 3,067.9 million dollars, or 215.5% by 2020,
- Azerbaijan – 2,323 million dollars, or 112% by 2020,
- Kyrgyzstan – 2,153.7 million dollars, or 147.8% by 2020,
- Armenia – 1,893 million dollars, or 114% by 2020,
- Mongolia – 1,816.1 million dollars, or 131.1% by 2020,
- Israel – 1,737.6 million dollars, or 130.2% by 2020,
- Singapore – 1,670.2 million dollars, or 145.1% by 2020,
- Malaysia – 1,429.8 million dollars, or 136.5% by 2020,
- Tajikistan – 1,114.1 million dollars, or 140% by 2020 (*Russian Foreign Trade, 2022*).

As can be seen from the statistics presented above, most of the countries in the Asian region, with which Russia actively traded before the start of the war in Ukraine, maintain friendly partnerships and are less interested in trade with Europe than with Russia. In addition, the growth rate of exports of goods and resources to this region is impressive. It brings Asian countries even closer to Russia. This effectively minimizes the preventive border measures that the Baltic States, Finland and Poland can take. The European region has almost no resources that are needed for Asia, except for innovative technologies. However, it must be understood that the consumer resource base is much more in demand for developing countries than the technologies of the future.

In 2021, Russia's foreign trade turnover, according to the Bank of Russia, amounted to 798.0 billion US dollars (139.3% by 2020), including exports – 494.0 billion dollars (148.2%). The trade balance remained positive at \$190.1 billion (in 2020 positive at \$93.7 billion) (*Russian Foreign Trade, 2022*). These indicators (*Diagram 1*) also indicate that the Russian economy is growing strongly in terms of exports, that is, in receiving more and more income.

If we consider the structure of Russian exports for 2021, then there is a strong bias towards the fuel and energy complex and metals:

- 54.3% – fuel and energy products;
- 10.4% – metals and products from them;
- 7.7% – products of the chemical industry, rubber;
- 7.3% – food products and agricultural raw materials;
- 6.6% – machinery, equipment and vehicles;
- 6.4% – precious stones, precious metals and products made from them;
- 3.5% – timber and pulp and paper products (*Russian Foreign Trade, 2022*).

However, researchers do not rely on relative percentage data as an opportunity to drastically put pressure on the Russian economy. The Russian Federation is in second or third place in oil production after the United States and Saudi Arabia, in second place in oil export after Saudi Arabia. If we consider the mineral resources of Russia, it turns out that:

- nickel – 33%,
- gas – 32%,
- potassium salts – 31%,
- iron – 25%,
- tungsten – 18%
- zinc – 15%,
- oil – 11%,
- coal – 11%,
- lead – 10%,
- tin – 7.5%,
- uranium – 5% (*Russian Foreign Trade, 2022*).

The Russian economy is based on a huge resource base that only the United States can compete with. However, unlike the United States, Russia is trying to make the most of the export opportunities of raw materials, including grain and oil crops. On the one hand, this reduces the state's profitability per unit of goods, but on the other hand, it contributes to the

rise in the importance of Russia as a resource player that has the ability to destabilize the world market in a short time.

An important factor that shapes the Russian economy is the social factor. A Russian still genetically feels his historical formation as a part of a large society that appreciates the “power of a strong leader”, that is, Russians still respect precisely the authoritarian style of government, which can reach the absolute form of manual control of sectors of the economy by one person. Thus, over the course of the 21st century, Vladimir Putin was gradually promoted to the leader, and then absolute. His leadership role, infallibility, idealized views, belonging to the power structures and the army were gradually formed and elevated by the political elite of Russia in order to obtain permanence and guarantees of state subsidies in return for loyalty. This returned Russian society to the genetic need for “strong power”, concentration around it and even protection from external enemies. This social effect is called “sobornost” (*Vitruk & Buychik, 2021*) and has been very little studied in the US and Europe. In this regard, many forecasts and expert assessments of the collapse of the economic and political model of Modern Russia, which are logical for the West, turn out to be erroneous and lead to incompetent decisions at the highest level, further rejection of Russian society from Europe, and not vice versa, to rapprochement and obtaining effective levers of influence.

The defeat of Russian society by a high inflation rating is mistakenly considered. Relative to the countries of the European Union, the inflation rating in Russia is always much higher. Russians are quite resistant to annual inflation of 15-20%, as evidenced by statistics (*Diagram 2*). This is an objective reason why the expected social dissatisfaction of Russian citizens with the military actions of the Kremlin against Ukraine and some of the impact of sanctions against the country remains extremely weak. The use of reserve funds and tight internal banking management policies have helped to push inflation past its peak in 2022 (*Diagrams 3 and 4*). Since the most significant sanctions have already been used by the European Union, and their number has exceeded one thousand, it becomes obvious that the “sanction avalanches” have not been materializing until now.

Thus, the most important parameters of Russia’s advantage over many large developing and developed countries are the following:

- 1) a huge territory that cannot physically be blocked;
- 2) a huge mineral resource base in conjunction with the food base, which has a fundamental impact on the balance and stability of international economic relations;
- 3) low sensitivity of Russian society to inflation;
- 4) the presence of a nationally heterogeneous, but historically connected society, which does not gravitate towards inclusiveness, but genetically respects “strong power”, authoritarianism and manual control, which is part of “sobornost”.

In addition, it is important that the memory of the Second World War is strong in Russia, in which almost all of Europe opposed the Soviet Union, since the fascist army included separate corps and units of representatives of many EU countries. The US was the only country in the world that benefited economically from the war. This disposition clearly fits into the logic of the formation of the modern ideology of the Russian citizen and strengthens the authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin.

Economic mistakes of the European Union in the sanctions policy towards Russia

This paragraph will list and briefly analyse the main and fundamental mistakes of the economic part of the EU sanctions policy, which did not allow the European community to achieve significant results in achieving its goals to stop Russia's military actions against Ukraine and contribute to the normalisation of the economic situation.

1. The waves of sanctions were extremely poorly organised and formed despite the fact that a large number of economic and political analysts participated in their consideration. It was obvious that the sanctions packages could only have a deferred character. However, the Central Bank of Russia found financial reserves to stabilise the economy from those resources that were previously considered by experts to be "lost" or "stolen" by various Russian business structures close to power.
2. Sanctions packages were formed too often and in a large amount of sanctions. This allowed Russia to draw up in advance a rough list of all possible "punishment" options for a military invasion of Ukraine and prepare an international coalition of countries that will maintain economic relations with Russia in principle or effectively. Such a coalition included such major international players as China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, as well as significant regional countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, South Africa, Israel, Egypt, and Iran. It should also be taken into account that the weak policy of the European Union in Asia, Africa and South America, as well as some historical views, have contributed to the growing interest of many countries in these regions in economic integration with Russia.
3. Sanctions strike on their own critical industry structures. Maintaining the economic balance within the European Union and all of Europe has been and remains fundamental. Any sanctions against Russian oil and gas without a clearly prepared fallback in the form of international treaties were doomed to failure in stabilising the domestic fuel and energy market. It is extremely beneficial for OPEC countries to receive hyperbolic demand for any reason. In this case, there is no need to increase the extraction of energy resources, since their cost will grow much more profitable than profiting from an increase in exports under the regulation of supply and demand.
4. The fundamental mistake is the pressure on large European trading companies, which are forced to close their chains of stores and representative offices in Russia. First, Europe is losing a large share of tax revenues, which can be used both for rearmament and financial injections in industries experiencing a crisis. Secondly, this is a very significant way of outflow of large financial resources from the domestic ruble turnover of Russia. Thirdly, the departure of major European brands plays into the hands of China, India, Korea, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and Iran.
5. The alleged and planned visa blockade by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia, as well as the refusal of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Community on the facilitation of issuing visas to citizens of Russia and the European Union of May 25, 2006, deprive the European Union of the influx of Russian tourists, which will keep the flow of financial resources from the internal circulation of Russia into the internal circulation of the EU countries. In addition, the possibility of socio-political influence on Russians through tourism and advertising of the cultural values of the European community will sharply decrease.

Conclusion

Thus, the sanctions economic policy of the European Union, which also covers the candidate and partner states of the EU, for all its general logic, has five main and fundamental errors. These errors are so critical and obvious that they cannot contribute to the expected results. On the contrary, this sanctions policy helped Russia significantly strengthen its political position in the international arena and attract a sufficient proportion of Russian citizens to the side of the authoritarian government in order to start fundamental social transformations in the country aimed at distancing Russian society from the European community so that the principle of “sobornost” becomes again leading in social behavior of the majority of Russians.

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Appendix

Table 1. Results of the diplomatic attack of the European Union countries on Russia (*author: Brychik, A.*)

State	Number of expelled diplomats	State	Number of expelled diplomats
Bulgaria	73	Greece	12
Poland	45	North Macedonia	11
France	41	Estonia	10
Germany	40	Portugal	10
Slovakia	38	Romania	10
Slovenia	33	Montenegro	6
Italy	30	Austria	4
Spain	25	Ireland	4
Belgium	21	Lithuania	4
The Netherlands	17	Norway	3
Latvia	16	Sweden	3
Croatia	18	Finland	2
Denmark	15	Czechia	1
		Luxemburg	1

Diagram 1. Indicators of export, import and foreign trade balance of Russia in 2020-2021 (*Russian Foreign Trade*)





Diagram 2. Russia Inflation Rate for the last 25 years (*Russia Inflation Rate, 2022*)



Diagram 3. Russia Inflation Rate for the last 10 years (*Russia Inflation Rate, 2022*)



Diagram 4. Russia Inflation Rate from March 1, 2022 till July 31, 2022 (*Russia Inflation Rate, 2022*)



Sergey V. Lebedev, Professor, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Head of Department, Department of Philosophy, Higher School of Folk Arts, St. Petersburg, Russia. ORCID: 0000-0002-7994-2660.

Demo-totalitarianism: the Baltic version

Abstract: The purpose of the study is to define demo-totalitarianism as a social and political phenomenon in the independent Baltic countries at the present stage of development of the European community. The political history of many countries, including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), is distinguished by its originality, sharply distinguishing these countries from countries with a democratic regime. Quite democratic procedures coexist in the Baltic States, but at the same time, discrimination of so-called “non-titular” population is carried out. These regimes can be characterized as demo-tatotal. To achieve the goal set in the study and solve problems, historical-genetic, historical-comparative, actualization and chronological methods were used. In the course of the study, numerous archival and journalistic materials were used, which are freely available and do not violate the legal framework of the Baltic states. The author concludes that the change of the demototalitarian regime will not occur as a result of a people’s revolution, since the bulk of the “titular” Balts defend the status quo in order to at least see their significance in something. Due to geopolitics, the West will not notice human rights violations in the Baltics. Because of this, Baltic demo-totalitarianism will continue to exist in the foreseeable future. The author takes full responsibility for the complexity and political ambiguity of the research topic, therefore he defines it as purely scientific.

Keywords: political regime, democracy, totalitarianism, demo-totalitarianism, discrimination.



Сергей Викторович Лебедев, профессор, доктор философских наук, заведующий кафедрой, кафедра философии, Высшая школа народных искусств, Санкт-Петербург, Россия.
ORCID: 0000-0002-7994-2660.

Демототалитаризм: прибалтийский вариант

Аннотация: Целью исследования является определение демототалитаризма как социально-политического явления в независимых странах Прибалтики на современном этапе развития европейского сообщества. Политическая история многих стран, в том числе и стран Прибалтики (Эстония, Латвия, Литва) отличается своеобразием, резко отличающих эти страны от стран с демократическим режимом. В Прибалтике сосуществуют вполне демократические процедуры, но одновременно осуществляется дискриминация т.н. «нетитульного» населения. Данные режимы можно охарактеризовать как демототалитарные. Для достижения поставленной в исследовании цели и решения задач были использованы историко-генетический, историко-сравнительный, актуализационный и хронологический методы. В ходе исследования были использованы многочисленные архивные и публицистические материалы, находящиеся в свободном доступе и не нарушающие законодательную базу прибалтийских государств. Автор делает заключение, что смена демототалитарного режима не произойдет в результате народной революции, поскольку основная масса «титularных» прибалтов защищать статус-кво, дабы хотя бы в чем-то увидеть свою значимость. В силу геополитики Запад не будет замечать нарушения прав человека в Прибалтике. В силу этого прибалтийский демототалитаризм будет существовать и в обозримом будущем. Автор со всей ответственностью относится к сложности и политической неоднозначности темы исследования, поэтому определяет его как сутоубо научное.

Ключевые слова: политический режим, демократия, тоталитаризм, демототалитаризм, дискриминация.



Introduction

The political history of many countries, including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), is distinguished by its originality, sharply distinguishing these countries from countries with a democratic regime. Quite democratic procedures coexist in the Baltic States, but at the same time, discrimination of so-called “non-titular” population is carried out. These regimes can be characterised as demo-tatotal.

One of the most common concepts in political science is the word “regime”. The way the political system functions, the methods of managing society, the degree of political freedom and openness of the country is understood under the political regime. Regime (*régime* in French) means “order”. Regime is a set of norms and rules that are not recommended to be violated. It is no coincidence that there are such concepts as the regime of the day, the mode of operation of the enterprise, the mode of secrecy, bed rest, sports mode, etc. Political scientists distinguish (depending on their preferences) many variants of the regime. However, basically in science, there are such types of political regimes: democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian. At the same time, the democratic regime is initially assessed as “good”, “correct”, in direct contrast to the other two.

A democratic regime, or simply democracy, is a political regime in which the people are recognized as the only source of power, power is exercised by the will and in the interests of the people (*Бучбик, 2019*). The main thing in democracy is the turnover of power and the guarantee of the rights of the minority. It should note that due to the popularity of the word “democracy”, many political regimes have themselves democratic. In fact, democracy in no country is complete, there is where to expand democratic values.

The totalitarian regime (from the Latin *total* – universal) is characterized precisely by the universality, the inclusiveness of its power. The entire life of citizens – from birth to death – is completely controlled by the state. The main feature of totalitarianism is not the cruelty of power and not the presence of a leader, but the dominance of the official ideology. At the same time, the totalitarian regime is popular until a certain time, a significant part of society supports the regime or, at least, does not see an alternative to it. That is why the totalitarian regimes were able to withstand super-tension and achieve outstanding success. However, when the ideology is weakened, the regime can collapse somehow unexpectedly for everyone. However, totalitarianism does not appear because of the evil will of some scoundrels. The forerunner of every totalitarian regime is a weak, inefficient democracy that is incapable of solving the problems facing society. Totalitarianism conducts a kind of total mobilisation of all the resources of society to achieve certain goals.

Authoritarian regime (from the Latin *auctoritas* – power, influence) is the regime of personal power of the dictator. Today, most of the countries of the world have an authoritarian regime. A classic example of authoritarianism is when, in some exotic country, a general of the local army makes a coup and becomes a dictator. Civilian authoritarianism is also possible, when a political leader who turns into a dictator wins elections more or less legally.

However, this triad ignores many hybrid mode options. As the experience of many decades shows, outwardly completely democratic regimes periodically arise in the world, combining many elements of totalitarian regimes. In other words, society is divided into “pure”, for whom there are rights and freedoms, and “impure”, who are in an unequal position. At the same time, the principle of this inequality has been elevated to a legal law. The society is dominated by a certain totalitarian ideology, which justifies a strict division into those who are attached to the elements of democracy, and those who must obey the “pure”. Demo-totarianism can be called the political structure of the United States before the abolition of racial segregation in the 1960s, demototarianism could be called the apartheid regime in South Africa before the black majority came to power in 1994, and the structure of Israel, which rigidly distinguishes the rights of Jews and others, has clear features of demototalitarianism. Finally, the most recent example of demototalitarianism comes from the Baltic states of the last three decades. The official ideology of the United States and South Africa, before the abolition of racial inequality, was based on the idea of the superiority of the white race. The official ideology of Israel comes from the ideas of Zionism. In the Baltic States, more precisely, in Estonia and Latvia, the ideology is generally very simple: where your grandfather lived until 1940. The politics of these countries, as well as Lithuania, where there is no legal recognition of inequality, although in practice discrimination against minorities covers all aspects of life, is also influenced by the legacy of the Soviet era.

The study’s purpose was to define demototalitarianism as a social and political phenomenon in the independent Baltic countries at the present stage of development of the European community.

Based on the study’s purpose, the following tasks were identified:

- define and justify the existing political Baltic regimes;
- trace and analyse the genesis of the formation of demototalitarianism in the Baltic states;
- characterise the Baltic demo-totalitarianism through the social activity of significant members of the Baltic societies.

To achieve the set purpose and solve the tasks of the study, historical-genetic, historical-comparative, actualisation and chronological methods were used.

In the course of the study, numerous archival and journalistic materials, which are freely available and do not violate the legal framework of the Baltic states, were used.

The author takes full responsibility for the complexity and political ambiguity of the study topic, therefore he defines it as purely scientific.

The results of the study

In the West, all Baltic countries are considered democratic. And, of course, the aborigines agree with this. However, in general, it is very difficult to consider a political system in which “non-citizens” are present as democracy. Also, democracy cannot be considered independent when foreigners are appointed to the most important state posts at the request of foreign embassies.

However, in the Baltic States, everything is fine with democratic procedures in the form of elections, a free press that can draw caricatures of any presidents. In short, there is no authoritarian dictatorship in the Baltic States now, as opposed to the times of the “first independence”. However, a regime dominated by a rigid ideology and ruled for decades by the

same political grouping, where there is no independence in either domestic or foreign policy, cannot be attributed to democracy. Strangely enough, in the Baltic Republics there are much more elements of totalitarianism in political life.

In the modern Baltic States, ideology prevails not in the form of a clear doctrine, but tacitly recognised by the majority of the population, including many “migrants”, the idea of “small but proud nations” that flourished before 1940 and were subjected to Soviet occupation. Accordingly, all real or imaginary problems of the past and present are explained only by this occupation. That is why “migrants” should be officially classified as the second class of residents, Russia should pay and repent. Thus, the political regime in the Baltic Republics can be called demo-totalitarian.

The whole Baltic ideology is based on the belief that all three republics represent the only form of existence of the three indigenous Baltic ethnic groups. All politics during the period of both independencies is built in an effort to create a mono-national state of “titular” nations. But this is what makes the entire development of the Baltic republics so, let’s say, specific. The construction of a mono-national state in a multiethnic society is always a simplification and primitivization of all levels of culture, economy, politics and the humanitarian sphere that existed before it. Attempts to build a mono-national state leads to the fact that all logic and common sense disappear in the policy pursued by the ruling elite. For a long time, not only Russian, but also a few local experts believed that “sound pragmatism” would prevail in the Baltic States’ interactions with Russia, because politicians would not “chop off the heads of all the chickens laying golden eggs”. In other words, normal political leaders, regardless of what they think about their neighbors and their own residents of non-titular nationality, will be guided by common sense and develop normal economic relations both inside and outside their countries. But nothing like that happened. However, what is a normal economy when the main goal of the Baltic politicians is to oust all non-titular peoples from their own area and bring their relative numbers to a comfortable level. There have been numerous cases in history when a mono-national state was built by exterminating or expelling all “non-titular” peoples. In the Baltic States, Baltic politicians are still inspired by the memories of the expulsion of the Ostsee Germans – the former owners of the region, the extermination of local Jews and similar pleasant historical events. Is it by chance that the Baltic States treat SS veterans so reverently. The whole policy in the Baltic Republics boils down to the desire to partly expel, partly assimilate, and for the most part turn all “non-titular” people into second-class people. That is why unbearable conditions are created for local Russians. The desire to eradicate the Russian language from everyday life is especially indicative. Even if all fiction is an insignificant phenomenon in the “titular” language, and there is no technical literature at all, a nationalist will never recognise the right to the existence of another language, especially if it is a world language with which it is objectively impossible to compete.

So, the existing Baltic regimes are a demo-totalitarian ethnocracy.

An indicator of the uniqueness of the regime can be found when taking into account the recruitment of the ruling elite. There were no underground revolutionaries or even ordinary dissidents among the Baltic figures during the period of secession from the *USSR*. The pillars of the separatist movements were the first secretaries of the local republican branches of the *CPSU*, party and *Komsomol* functionaries of all levels, *KGB* officers, the local intelligentsia,

caressed by the Soviet government and created by it. In the early 90s, the share of immigrants from the CPSU and Komsomol in the political elite of the newly independent Baltic states was 58% in Lithuania, 75% in Latvia and 73% in Estonia (*Smirnov, 2020*).

Here are some biographical information about the pillars of Baltic demo-totalitarianism. In Latvia, the separatist movement was led by Anatoly Valerianovich Gorbunov, the former secretary of the Central Committee of the *CPL* on ideology, and before a long-term Komsomol functionary. In 1988, Gorbunov was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the *Latvian SSR*, immediately supported the Popular Front of Latvia and until 1993 was Chairman of the Supreme Council, and then the Seimas of Latvia. The process of Estonia's secession from the *USSR* was headed by Arnold Rüütel, a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the *KPE*, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR since 1983, who later became President of the Republic of Estonia.

In addition to the “founding fathers” of independent states, the second echelon of rulers went through a completely similar path. The example of the President of Lithuania in 2009-2019, Dali Grybauskaitė, is indicative. She made a successful Soviet career due to the fact that her father participated in the Soviet army in the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar years worked in the fire paramilitary protection of the *NKVD*, and participated in the fight against the “forest brothers”. Komsomol member from the age of 14, a student of the Faculty of Economics of the Leningrad State University. Zhdanova went to Leningrad, (and during her studies, according to some information, which the Lithuanian side completely denies, she was engaged in currency prostitution) Grybauskaitė has been teaching the political economy of socialism at the Vilnius Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the *CPSU* since 1983. In 1988, she defended her PhD thesis at the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the *CPSU*, where only the most promising party cadres promoted by the Union leadership received additional education. The topic of her dissertation was *The Relationship of Public and Personal Property in the Functioning a Personal Subsidiary Farm*. The reasons for Grybauskaitė's success in the presence of serious compromising material were explained by cooperation with the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) under the nickname “Magnolia”.

However, the “grandfather” of Lithuania, the leader of the *Sąjūdis* (movement in support of perestroika) Vytautas Landsbergis was generally a hereditary *KGB* agent. Since 1927, his father Vytautas Landsbergis-Žemkalnis was an agent of the *NKVD*, and then the *KGB* of the *USSR*. He was part of the so-called *Provisional Government of Lithuania*, created in 1941 by agents of the Third Reich, holding the position of “minister” of public utilities. After the defeat of Germany, this “minister” fled to Australia. However, since Landsbergis-Zhyamkalnis betrayed his accomplices to the Soviet special services, he received an amnesty from Lubyanka and permission to return to Soviet Lithuania.

His son began working for the “authorities” in 1955, while a student at the conservatory. Later, Landsbergis became a professor at the Vilnius Conservatory, teaching a course on Marxist-Leninist aesthetics. The Vytautas Landsbergis's ominous star rose during the period of Gorbachev's “perestroika” in September 1988, when, at a meeting (without minutes), members of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania agreed with the proposal of Eduardas Eismuntas, the *KGB* chairman of the Lithuanian SSR, to recommend a professor-musicologist as the leader of the *Sąjūdis* (*Shved, 2019*).

The fact that almost all the “founding fathers” of the independent Baltic republics were associated with the *KGB* is evidenced by the data on Lithuania. According to the *KGB* archives in Lithuania, in 1940-1991, about 118 thousand people, who lived or served in Lithuania at that time, collaborated with the *MGB-KGB*. Until April 11, 1990, 36,237 intelligence files were destroyed. 8,539 cases of *KGB* agents were taken from Lithuania to the *USSR* (*The Lithuanian politician proposed to publish a list of persons who collaborated with the KGB, 2017*). However, in modern Lithuania, they are afraid to publish information about those who served the “office”. It is no coincidence that there are constant “erasures” and sometimes complete destruction of cases that can ruin the reputation of quite a few Lithuanian politicians, cultural figures and businessmen.

There are similar data for Latvia. Back in August 1991, after the dissolution of the *LSSR KGB*, all the documentation of the committee was in the hands of the Latvian authorities - lists of employees and informants, a card file, etc. And this data was immediately hidden. As a result, only 27 years later, at the end of 2018, the *KGB* file cabinet was still open to the public (*LPSR VDK dokumentu arhīvs*). Among the thousands of people who, for various reasons, ended up in this card index, the names of well-known opposition politicians, including Russian-speaking ones, were also found (*Karamzin, 2018*). At the same time, the Seimas deputies have repeatedly argued that people close to power could remove the names of the most famous figures from the *KGB* card index in advance. It is clear that after 27 years this information was no longer of interest to voters.

The last *KGB* head in the *Estonian SSR*, Rein Sillar, after three decades of silence, spoke about what happened in the last years of the *KGB* in Estonia: “I worked in the *KGB* for 20 years and I did not see any struggle for freedom anywhere!”. According to Sillar, “We had thousands and thousands of agents. Imagine if everyone knew what their fathers and mothers once did ...” (*Minnik, 2021*).

In Soviet times, a very important lift for a career was kinship with the Baltic communist leaders. But as soon as the winds of change began to blow, these relatives of the Baltic Reds immediately began to act against the life work of their ancestors. Thus, a huge role in the restoration of Soviet power in Estonia in 1940 was played by Johannes Lauristin, who died in 1941. His daughter Marya Lauristin made a good Soviet career by defending her dissertation at Moscow State University. In 1988, she became one of the leaders of the Estonian Popular Front, and after independence, she took over as Minister of Social Affairs in the early 1990s. Here, the daughter of a communist pursued a completely cannibalistic social policy that caused mass demonstrations in slow-moving Estonia. Maryu Lauristin’s half-brother, Jaak Allik, the son of an outstanding revolutionary, one of the founders of Soviet Estonia in 1940, was the Minister of Culture of Estonia. Andres, the grandson of Jaan Anvelt, an outstanding Estonian revolutionary, the organiser of the Estonian Labor Commune of 1918, was the Minister of the Interior of Estonia, organising the persecution of dissidents. Egils Levits, the 10th president of Latvia, was the great-grandson of the revolutionaries of 1905 and the son of a prominent pro-Soviet figure, Jonah Levits, who became a state commissar (minister) of the government of Soviet Latvia in the summer of 1940. Of course, Egils began to pursue a policy directly opposite to what his ancestors fought for.

Similar processes were typical for cultural figures. Thus, among the classics of Lithuanian literature of the Soviet period of history, the personality of the great writer Antanas Venclova (1906-1971) stands out. In August 1940, he signed the *Declaration on the Entry of Lithuania into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, was the People's Commissar of Education of the *Lithuanian SSR* in 1940, wrote the anthem of this republic. However, his son named Thomas, also a man of letters, became a dissident. Although his dissidence is quite doubtful, family ties in a small republic are a significant thing, but Thomas went into exile. Later he returned to "Free Lithuania" and became an official writer, betraying all the ideals of his father. However, Thomas is the winner of many prestigious awards and honorary titles.

The first president of Estonia, Lennart-Georg Meri, could well consider himself a victim of the Soviet regime, having been deported to Siberia at the age of 12. However, he made a name for himself in literature, becoming a writer and screenwriter, quite favored by the authorities. But as soon as the "perestroika" began, Meri immediately turned into an ardent nationalist. At the same time, in his Russophobic rage, he spoke complete nonsense, such as: "Soviet rule in Estonia was nothing like the British rule in India in the good old days, sung by Kipling. The Russians presented themselves as a "nation of masters", they behaved like the SS, and not like ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers" (*The unwise policy of Tallinn..., 1993*). That is really someone who, but the Russians have never suffered from the "people-master" complex. It is just that everyone judges others according to their own depravity.

However, in the conditions when the recent Soviet partocrats proclaimed the doctrine of "continuity", that is, the continuity of the existence of the Baltic states after 1940, it was urgently necessary to nominate the offspring of the leaders of the "first independence" to the national leaders. For this reason, in 1993, Guntis Ulmanis, the former director of the Riga House of Life, became the President of Latvia. He had no merit, except for the fact that Guntis was the great-nephew of Kārlis Augusts Vilhelms Ulmanis, the dictator of the "first Latvia". However, Ulmanis Jr. did not distinguish himself in anything special in the presidential post.

However, the years go by. And now the representatives of the "elite" from among the Soviet partocrats, who became "democratic" politicians, began to pass on their position by inheritance. The grandson of the sinister Sajūdis leader Vytautas Landsbergis became the Lithuanian foreign minister. It is quite possible that, according to family tradition, he is also a Russian intelligence officer. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and later the Prime Minister of Estonia, Siim Kallas, was pleased to see that his daughter Kaja Kallas became the leader of the Reform Party by inheritance and then automatically became the Prime Minister of Estonia. Edgar Savisaar, who played a big role during the Estonian Singing Revolution, who held a number of ministerial posts, the mayor of Tallinn and a former prime minister, can also be happy for his son Erkki, who became the Minister of the Environment in 2021.

Meanwhile, the Baltic regimes, while proclaiming themselves democratic, completely adopted some features of the Soviet totalitarianism they so cursed. In particular, in Lithuania there is a personality cult of Vytautas Landsbergis. This is reflected, in particular, in whole epics about the life and struggle of the leader Sajūdis, the "father of the nation" and a *KGB* agent. Thus, the wife of the "father of the nation" Grazyna Rucite-Landsbergienė, together with the director Agne Marcinkevičiūtė, created the trilogy *Vytautas Landsbergis: Thoughts and Creativity*.

But this seemed to her not enough, and she prepared another series of films called *A Fracture at the Baltic* (in the center of the story is the same main character). In 2003, the son of Landsbergis made a tape with the eloquent title *The Whole Truth About My Father*. Russian director Alexander Sokurov made the former chairman of the Seimas of Lithuania the main character of his film *A Simple Elegy*. Documentary film *Mr. Landsbergis. Destroy the Evil Empire*, dedicated to the former Chairman of the Seimas of Lithuania, received the main prize of the *IDFA 2021* film festival in Amsterdam. It is noteworthy that this project was funded by the State Lithuanian Film Center (*Ilyashevich, 2021*). The running time of the film is no less than 246 minutes! Some Sajūdis activists are indignant that Landsbergis alone gets all the glory, and demand to glorify themselves as well.

As a rule, the Baltic figures, in response to sarcastic remarks about the nepotism of their politicians, snap that in many countries there are dynasties of politicians. You can remember the Kennedy clan or the Bushes in the United States. And, on this basis, they conclude that the Baltic republics are not at all post-Soviet countries, but originally European countries, which for some reason were occupied for almost their entire history. But after all, it is in the post-Soviet countries that one can see everything that is characteristic of the modern Baltic regimes – the absolute predominance among the ruling elite of people from the *CPSU* and the *Komsomol*, *KGB* officers, the formation of a closed caste society with low social mobility, limited communication between the elite and the people, the inheritance of one's social status, the oppression of ethnic minorities. So no matter how the Baltic politicians proclaim their belonging to the “West” and do not refer to “continuity”, all the same, the three Baltic republics are precisely post-Soviet formations. Another thing is that many features of the “post-Soviet” in the Baltics are not so bright. In any case, they do not yet pass on the presidential throne by inheritance, and do not rename the city in honor of their leaders. In general, everything is modest in the Baltic.

According to a modern prominent specialist in the history and economy of the Baltic states, Doctor of Economics, N.M. Mezhevich, the economic reality of the Baltics is “the liberal Anglo-Saxon model, with post-Soviet corruption, deindustrialization in the Eastern European style, North Korean ideologisation and North European self-identification” (*Mezhevich, 2016*).

The demographic problems of the territories newly annexed to the *USSR* in 1940 greatly complicated the economic and social development of the Baltic states. Under these conditions, Soviet political and economic leaders were forced to organize in Estonia and especially in Latvia a large-scale use of labor from all over the *USSR*. Lithuania, which had quite normal demographic development during the Soviet era, was able to make do with its own labor force, and therefore avoided large-scale migration. However, a particularly large influx of migrants arrived in Latvia. So, according to the 1989 census, for 1961-89. in Latvia, the net increase due to migration was 371,900 people. They were predominantly ethnic Russians and largely almost entirely Russian-speaking.

After the so-called *Restoration of Independence* in 1991, the entire population of the Baltic states is divided (and at the official level!) into two rigid categories – “titular”, that is, as it were, indigenous nationalities, and “migrants”, they are also “Russian-speaking”. According to official history, the titular ones are the original and permanent residents of the Baltic countries, and the Russians are only “migrants” who have come in large numbers. To begin with, it should be pointed out that there is simply no clear definition of indigenous peoples in the United Nations

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Thus, autochthonism (originality) of a particular population often becomes a matter not of the work of scientists, but the fruit of the work of politicians, lobbyists and interested parties.

Immediately after the declaration of independence, the authorities of the new Baltic countries introduced the concept of “non-citizens” (in fact, restricting the rights of all migrants). These racial laws effectively placed “non-citizens” in a position reminiscent of the legal status of “non-Aryans” in the Third Reich.

On February 6, 1992, the Estonian Supreme Council issued a Decree restoring the 1938 Estonian Citizenship Law. In accordance with the Decree, only persons who had citizenship on June 16, 1940 and their direct descendants were automatically considered citizens. As a result, only about 120,000 out of almost 470,000 Russians were able to become automatically Estonian citizens. Persons who resettled in Estonia after its entry into the USSR in 1940 could only acquire citizenship through the naturalization process. The official Estonian name for “non-citizens” is “persons of undetermined citizenship” (Est. määratlemata kodakondsusega isik).

The Law on Citizenship of Latvia was adopted on July 22, 1994, according to which the totality of original citizens consists of persons, who were citizens of Latvia before June 17, 1940, as well as their descendants who have passed registration. As a result of the application of this Law, only about 280,000 out of almost 900,000 Russians received citizenship.

“Non-citizens” are discriminated against at all levels. For example, in Latvia there are 70 differences in the rights of citizens and non-citizens: restrictions on holding positions in various sectors (state, private and public sectors) – 19, 8, and 11 differences, respectively; restrictions on the right to property – 9 differences; restrictions on private entrepreneurship – 6 differences; social rights – 3 differences; other rights – 14 differences. And after Latvia joined the *EU*, a number of classes (13 in total), still inaccessible to non-citizens of Latvia, became available to *EU* citizens. In particular, this concerns the right to stand as a candidate and vote in local elections, which is allowed for *EU* citizens with six months of residence in Latvia. However, it is still forbidden to non-citizens, most of whom are local natives, and most of the rest have lived in the country for more than 30 years. All this apartheid, of course, is not seen point-blank by “human rights activists” and “European democracies”.

Even in prisons apartheid is carried out on a national basis. The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Estonia has introduced mandatory marking of prisoners in republican prisons. The Latin letter “C” on the prison uniform denotes those who speak Estonian as their native language, the letter “B” – those who, at the very least, can express themselves, and the letter “A” – those who know only a few words. Prisoners who do not speak Estonian at all were left unmarked (*Nikiforov, 2012*).

At the same time, although the official propaganda of Estonia and Latvia states that Russians are discriminated against only on the grounds that they arrived in the republics after 1940, this is all nonsense. Thus, in 2013, the Saeima of Latvia adopted a law according to which the right to dual citizenship of Latvia is provided only for ethnic Latvians. In other words, the descendants of Latvian emigrants from the Russian Empire, who left long before 1918, who never lived in “free Latvia” during the “first independence”, who do not speak Latvian at all, can count on obtaining Latvian citizenship without any problems. And this is in contrast to the Russians, who were born and worked all their lives in Latvia, and who remain “non-citizens”.

Quite rarely, some Russians from the Baltics still get citizenship solely because of their celebrity. So, the citizenship of Latvia was received by the ballet dancer Mikhail Baryshnikov, a native of Riga, but who came from a military family. In other words, the classic son of the “occupiers”. At the same time, Baryshnikov left Riga during his school years, so he did not have any “experience” of living in Latvia. However, since Baryshnikov became world famous, the Latvian Seimas in 2017 unanimously voted to grant him Latvian citizenship.

Meanwhile, Western democracies, as they say, do not see discrimination against Russians and the existence of the institution of “non-citizens”. The international organization *Freedom House*, headquartered, of course, in Washington, regularly reporting which countries in the world are “free”, which are “semi-free”, and which are completely “not free”, constantly classifies the Baltic republics as free countries. Russia, on the other hand, always refers to “not free” countries according to the *House of Freedom* methods.

In Lithuania, there is no such apartheid at the official level, although in the domestic sphere it blooms and smells. However, it is very difficult to call Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians “titular” nations. Title has always assumed independence, and the Baltic peoples for most of their existence were only in complete subordination. The truly titular peoples in the Baltics are the Russians, as well as the disappeared Baltic Germans and, to some extent, the Poles of Lithuania.

So, the distinction between natives and migrants remains very clear, and the authorities of the Baltic republics are doing everything to make this distinction more noticeable. Aborigines like to emphasize their “Europeanness”, referring to the architecture of their cities (although they did not build them), to the Protestant and Catholic religions (although most of them are not religious). The tradesman complex in the nobility contributes to frankly boorish antics. For example, Latvian banker Girts Rungainis stated that Russian “is not the language of culture” (*In Latvia, a banker called Russian “the language of savages”, 2018*). The Latvian supposedly writer Didzis Sedlenieks announced that Russians are “beings of the lowest intellectual level” (*Latvian science fiction writer... , 2018*).

In Lithuania, one of the Sajūdis leaders, Romualdas Ozolas, announced that Russians are nationally debility, and called Russian dances by gorilla dances. The chairman of the capital faction of the Conservative People’s Party (*EKRE*) of Estonia, Mart Kallas, called the Russian-speaking inhabitants of the country human garbage. He stated this on his Facebook page. In 2017, a member of the *Latvian Seimas*, Edvīns Šnore, on the pages of the newspaper *Neatkarīga Rīta Avīze*, compared Russians with “lice” who still do not want to leave Latvia: “If you let a Russian louse into a fur coat once, you can’t take it back. Indeed, we see that visitors, as well as local Russian-speakers, who in Soviet times denigrated, scolded and slandered Latvia, still do not leave Latvia back” (*Guryanov, 2017*).

Everything is being done to take root Russophobia in the “titular” Balts from childhood. In Latvia, the novel of the writer Gunars Anatolijs Janovskis, who fled from Latvia together with the Nazis in 1944, was introduced into the curriculum of school literature teaching. In this “work” that schoolchildren are studying, there are such lines, however, as if they belonged to an Estonian: “If you meet a Russian, then talk to him as if you were standing in a window on the second floor, and he was knee-deep in mud and shit because the difference between Russian and Estonian is so great. Be polite and icy kind, sometimes even smile. Do not hit him in the

face, but look down on him and you will see how afraid he is of you. The dog is so afraid when he hears the slightest harshness in the owner's voice, and the Russian with his narrow soul is still nothing but a slave beaten with whips by the Tatars" (*"Russian is a slave beaten with whips"...*, 2019). However, we should leave the assessment of such derogatory words about any people to specialists to comment on these revelations of a representative of the people, who himself was beaten with German whips for seven centuries.

In 2022, during a period of sharp aggravation of the international situation caused by the Ukrainian crisis, Baltic politicians began to speak out against the Russians especially viciously. For example, Veiko Spolitis, a member of the Latvian Seimas, called Russian diplomats in Geneva by "primates". In a comment to the tweet, the ex-president of Estonia Ilves immediately leaned in and corrected his colleague: "Veiko, you write about "primates", but Homo sapiens are also primates, Russians are unworthy of this. I would prefer the word "monkeys" (*Isfakhan*, 2022). Both Baltic politicians showed not only their Russophobia, but also their general level of development. Recall that monkeys, in fact, are primates, lemurs, tarsiers, bats are also primates, a person also belongs to the order of primates. It turns out that if the Balts are not primates, then who are they according their logics?

However, the Baltic cultural figures sometimes outperform politicians in their speeches. The famous Latvian theater director Alvis Hermanis stated in 2022 that:

"1. It is still difficult for the West [the Balts also consider themselves part of the West for some reason] to realise that the Russians are a completely different civilization. This is an optical illusion. They only look European on the outside. Their behavior has little in common with Western civilization. I emphasise, they are not second-class people, they are simply arranged differently.

2. In the case of Russia, it is impossible to talk about the subject of society. On that earth there was never a society in the sense that we understand it. One that is capable of self-organization. There has always been for centuries only a crowd or biomass, which obeyed one person. And hoping for the opposite is a waste of time.

3. It is a mistake to assume that the Russian people are not responsible for the imperial aggressive behavior. Quite the opposite – with the liberation from all sorts of Stalins and Brezhnevs, nothing changes and everything starts from the beginning. Because the idea of imperialism comes directly from the people themselves.

4. We must also honestly admit that Russian oppositionists are still only in very rare cases Russians by nationality. As we can see even now, these are mostly Jews, or Georgians, Tatars and others. Yes, there are Russians among them, but not many.

5. The Russian psychological cocktail (in most cases) consists of two main elements – an inferiority complex and megalomania. Or the eternal victim syndrome plus the mystical consciousness of exclusivity. Diverse work for psychotherapists.

6. The responsibility of Russian culture is a very debatable issue. Because most of Russian culture really inspired the people that Russians are endowed with a special spirituality that is somehow not inherent in other peoples, and therefore it is higher than others. Also, the famous phrase "great Russian culture", which many people continue to use, including oppositionists, also points to imperial complexes. I have never heard, for example, the expression among Italians – "great Italian culture". I had a lot of contact with Russian artists, and manifestations

of cultural chauvinism and arrogance, unfortunately, are present even among the most sane” (*Granderator, 2022*).

One should not think that all this Russophobia is only a phenomenon of today. During the years of “perestroika”, the Estonian “professor” Tiit Made, angrily wrote to the Russians: “Who is a true Russian? Russians lived for centuries under the Mongol or Tatar yoke, and therefore Russians are still ethnically a mixed nation... Tatars and Mongols invaded Russian villages in their time, exterminated and captured the male population, raped Russian women. Therefore, today the Russian people are so mixed with those people who once raped Russian women. Hence this aggressiveness, the need to show strength and passing off other people’s successes as their own” (*Made, 1989*). The same Tiit Made back in the mid-1990s urged ultranationalists not to rush to part with the “occupiers”, they say, who will serve the Estonians? However, all this is just a manifestation of the Freudian complexes of small nations that had neither a great past, nor a wonderful present, and no future.

“Migrants” love to tease the Balts, given their lethargy, unsubstantiated claims to a special culture and a complete lack of a sense of humor. As an example of the Baltic (specifically, Estonian) “humor” we can give the following example. In 2007, the Ministry of Education of this country approved humorous collections for teaching children 12-13 years old. Here are some jokes taken from these tutorials: “Which animals are the most common in Estonia? Answer: Russians. Or here is another joke: “Why do Russians wear straw hats? Answer: they always put straw on the manure. The manuals mentioned above are full of such “humor” (*Ivanova, 2007*). However, the Estonians themselves did not think of this. They collected all this in collections of American racist jokes about blacks (after all, blacks in the American South a century ago really wore straw hats, unlike all the inhabitants of Estonia, where the climate is slightly different).

And the general director of the Estonian Language Inspectorate, Ilmar Tomusk, published a children’s book about a 14-year-old boy named Johannes, who does not understand why it is necessary to learn Russian... However, one day, a teenager watches how drunk Russians who do not understand either Estonian or English are beaten kicking a little boy and trying to take his phone away from him. Since Johannes was a big and strong guy, he punches drunk Russians in the teeth, comes home and tells his parents that now he understands why it is necessary to learn Russian – in order to explain to drunk Russians what they will get in the teeth for now (*Kolebakina, 2011*).

In these “jokes”, one can see not only Russophobia, but also the hidden desire of the farm laborers to feel like big gentlemen. This is still a syndrome of peoples who at once moved from a plow state to an industrial state under the influence and leadership of strangers. Thus, we can assume that hence the hatred of their civilisers comes from.

However, while Russian children in Latvia are forcibly driven into the Latvian educational environment, Latvian parents themselves are horrified by the quality of textbooks and school programs in Latvia in the “state language”. There is a plot from a Latvian textbook: a discussion of the size of the boy penis. However, there are also such masterpieces as the problem from the Latvian mathematics textbook: “9 apples grew on an oak tree” (*Dzadan, 2020*). The desire to reduce education to Russophobia led to the complete decline of full-fledged education in general.

Separate sober-minded intellectuals from among the aborigines who are trying to point out that a rigid division of the country's population into two categories will lead to a crisis and, ultimately, to the death of these states, are subjected to real persecution. It was only in 2009 that the respected lawyer Chancellor of Justice of Estonia Indrek Teder proposed to change the national approach in state ideology to a civilian one, then the media immediately launched a hysterical campaign against him, accusing him of almost an attempt on the very existence of the Estonian nation. Of course, the Chancellor of Justice immediately corrected himself. In July 2012, he stated that the Russian language of education was contrary to the Estonian Constitution. However, if it goes on like this, the nation is doomed without him.

As the modern author P.M. Koryavtsev notes, "it is quite obvious that the hostility (often turning into hatred) towards Russia and the "Russian-speakers", characteristic of a significant part of the titular nation's representatives in the Baltic republics, is not caused by any guilty actions of the object of hostility (since it manifested itself long ago) to any repressive measures, which in almost all cases were retaliatory on the Russian side), but is completely irrational in nature and is a specific feature of their worldview. Further, it is necessary to take into account that the "Russian-speaking" population of the Baltic states is in fact no less "indigenous" than representatives of the titular nations or the same Baltic Germans, and therefore the Baltic rhetoric about the "occupiers" that has become familiar is frankly speculative in nature. In general, the anti-Russian policy of the Baltic states is caused by reasons of a completely non-constructive nature, and apparently one should not count on its sanity and the prospects for a reasonable correction, given Russia's arbitrarily loyal attitude towards them. These circumstances should be taken into account at all levels of interethnic communication – from interstate to personal" (*Koryavtsev, 2005*).

In general, the anti-Russian policy of the Baltic states is caused by reasons of a completely non-constructive nature. So, apparently one should not count on its sanity and the prospects for a reasonable correction, given Russia's arbitrarily loyal attitude towards them. These circumstances should be taken into account at all levels of interethnic communication – from interstate to personal.

The Latvian and Russian publicist Alexander Gilman writes about the possibility of Russian resistance to the policy of discrimination: "The most important value for any Latvian is the statehood of Latvia. Therefore, a reciprocal step suggests itself: to demonstrate that for us, the Russians of Latvia, this statehood has no value" (*Gilman, 2020*). If half of the population of the country does not see any value in the existing statehood, then this statehood will not last long.

Conclusion

Demo-totalitarianism is not noticed in the Baltics only because it is beneficial to countries that ambitiously call themselves the "free world". In the conditions of the liquidation of almost all industry and a considerable part of agricultural production, the Baltic countries can offer the powerful of this world only one thing - their policy of following in the mainstream of the owner. And this policy can only be a Russophobic policy. Such countries, which are trying to trade their "unfortunate historical fate" for the lack of some kind of their own images of the future, simply once again prove the meaninglessness of their existence from a historical point of view. However, it is not necessary to expect that the change of the demo-totalitarian regime will occur

as a result of a people's revolution, since the bulk of the "titular" Balts defend the status quo in order to at least see their significance in something. Due to geopolitics, the West will not continue to notice human rights violations in the Baltics. Because of this, Baltic demo-totalitarianism will exist in the foreseeable future. But still, sooner or later, the regimes will be changed as a new generation of Russians rises in the Baltics, who have no feeling of humiliation towards the titular Balts, who constantly say that they were "occupied in 1940, and from which parents suffered. Young Balts, who have no access to almost all social elevators, except for the opportunity to emigrate, are also able to fight for a change in the existing regime. All this makes Baltic demo-totalitarianism doomed to collapse.

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Milena Aleksieva, Professor, PhD in Pedagogics, Theory and Methodology of Physical Education Department, “St. Cyril and St. Methodius” University of Veliko Tarnovo, Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria.
ORCID: 0000-0002-3537-3312. Semantic Scholar: 119254696.

The development of coordination abilities in basketball lessons by applying the game approach

Abstract: In literature on sports most authors define agility as a human motor quality and as a function of the degree of development of other motor qualities. The relationship of agility to other motor qualities as well as to motor habits is undeniable. Swiftiness, precision and springiness by means of which complex coordination motor actions are mastered and performed are the concrete measurements of agility as a motor quality; they are also characteristic of the technique of the basketball game, since in it most movements are extremely open and versatile. The important role of anticipation largely requires special work with the complex system of nerve-related processes, which are dynamic and flexible to the external environment. This provokes the suggestion to develop perception, anticipation, decision-making ability, automation and consistency of activities by means of the game approach in the basketball lesson.

Keywords: basketball, game approach, coordination, technique, swiftiness, agility.



Милена Алексиева, професор, доктор, Теория и методика на физическото възпитание, Великотърновски университет “Св. св. Кирил и Методий”, Велико Търново, България.
ORCID: 0000-0002-3537-3312. Semantic Scholar: 119254696.

Развитие на координационните способности в урока по баскетбол със средствата на игровия подход

Абстракт: В спортологичната литература повечето автори определят ловкостта като двигателно качество на човека и като функция от степента на развитие на останалите двигателни качества. Свързаността на ловкостта с останалите двигателни качества, както и с двигателните навици, е неоспорима. Бързината, точността и икономичността, с които се овладяват и изпълняват сложни в координационно отношение двигателни действия, са конкретните измерители на ловкостта като двигателно качество, както и са характерни за техниката на играта баскетбол, тъй като в нея повечето движения са изключително отворени и разностранни. Важната роля на антиципацията в особена степен изисква специална работа със сложната система от нервни процеси, динамични и гъвкави към външната среда. Това провокира предложението за развитие на възприятията, антиципацията, способността за вземане на решения, автоматизацията и последователността на действията със средствата на игровия подход в урока по баскетбол.

Ключови думи: баскетбол, игрови подход, координация, техника, скорост.



Introduction

In literature on sports, most authors define agility as a human motor quality as well as a function of the degree of development of other motor qualities. V. Gavriyski, for example, claims “... that it is a matter of a perfect motor habit of gradual accumulation of adequate motor

programmes, which at a given moment can be applied according to the requirements. High, perfect coordination of movements lies not at the basis of the so-called motor quality of agility, but at the basis of the motor habits created by training, at the basis of movement technique” (*Gavriysky 1982:828*).

According to Zhelyazkov, “Agility is a person’s ability to coordinate their movements and activities in time, space and effort adequate to the motor task” (*Zhelyazkov 1986:182*).

M. Smochevsky claims that “the complexity and the degree of generalization of the so-called motor quality *agility* make it difficult to differentiate the designation, as well as the special improvement of the coordination abilities that determine performance. As a component of motor abilities, coordination abilities meet the requirement for perfection, precision, finesse and amplitude of movements. There is an inextricable link between coordination ability and performance technique. Technique defines the components of movement, and coordination can combine these components more quickly and sparingly” (*Smochevsky 2001:18*).

D. Dasheva and T. Zhelyazkov point out that “an important moment for revealing the essence of agility is the issue of its relationship to other motor qualities as well as with motor habits. Despite the differences in the methodological approach, the results of the research show that muscular strength, speed qualities, flexibility and to a certain extent endurance are parametrically related to agility – on the one hand, it depends on the level of the mentioned qualities and, on the other hand, it plays an important role in their realization.” (*Zhelyazkov & Dasheva 2002:196*)

I. Peltekova defines the term *agility* as mobility, nimbleness, swiftness, dexterity, adroitness. “It is a combination of skills that include coordination, speed, strength, endurance, flexibility, adroitness. With the help of agility training the athlete’s ability to maintain balance under changing circumstances is improved; the speed of execution of individual movements, coordination and strength is improved as well.” (*Peltekova 2014:38*)

Swiftness, accuracy and springiness, by means of which one masters and performs coordination complex motor activities, are the concrete measurements of agility as a human motor quality.

The mobility and dynamism of the nerve-related processes in the cerebral cortex appear to be the physiological basis of agility; from a psychological point of view, it is closely related to the completeness of perception, the swiftness and accuracy of complex reactions characterizing the so-called anticipation – the ability to anticipate the reflection of reality, which applies especially to the basketball game.

According to M. Aleksieva, in contrast to the restricted, stereotypical actions, in basketball most movements are extremely open and diverse. The simplified model of perceiving information, processing it by the central nervous system and bringing it to the reproduction of movement is too short. In all cores of this model, problems occur in sports play.

The perception of information is hampered. Good perception in the game situation is restricted psychologically because the analyser (e.g., the eye) has only limited capacity for success (time for optical search, registering the speed of the object, etc.). It is essential to separate what is important from what is unimportant in the diverse complex of information because the capacity of perception is limited.

In addition, the processing of information is also extremely difficult as it is under time pressure; movement in a game should be performed within a learned or memorized movement program. In terms of difficulty, the optimal program should be selected related to perception in the shortest time resulting in a situationally appropriate movement program. The basis for successful behaviour in a game is the movement pattern, which is the skeleton for the variety of movements required by the game.

The reproduction of information also cannot be stereotypically programmed into the sports game due to sudden influence from outside (e.g., it can be from a teammate as well as an opponent). Changes in the programme are necessary. Correct perception is crucial, related to selecting the most relevant of various pieces of information, i.e., the use of the so-called selective attention. The opportunity to find the respective movement program as quickly as possible and, through internal and external feedback, to effect modification and variation at all levels of processing is needed. The more similar programs exist, the better movements can be adapted to the required situations (*Aleksieva 2012:46*).

What has been discussed above triggers the attitude to work, namely to develop from an early-age perceptions, anticipation, ability to make decisions, automation and consistency of actions that are the hallmark of the good player.

Methodology

The proposal for games focusing on the development of coordination abilities of students in the physical education and sports lesson with the theme of basketball employs the game approach. These games have been approbated in practice and prove to be attainable for most of the students who are at the stage of improving their techniques of catching and passing, dribbling, shooting on the move, as well as the tactical activities of choosing a position in attack and defense.

1. The Circle: Inside and Outside (Fig. 1)

The game is suitable for the preparatory part of the physical education and sports lesson with the theme of basketball. It focuses on catching and passing, as well as on choosing a position in offense.

The students form two concentric circles in the basketball court; those in the outer circle are given balls. At a signal by the teacher, each student from the inner circle chooses which student with a ball from the outer circle to go to and receive the ball from, then returns it to him, goes back to the inner circle and again goes on to receive the ball from another player in the outer circle; all the time the movement is in a running motion, preferably moving with your back in the direction of the movement when returning to the circle. The basic rule is that they are not allowed to receive the ball from the same passer from the outer circle. Another important rule is that when someone is already heading towards a particular player with the ball, a second student is not allowed to head towards them; they need to look for a free player with a ball. The method of passing is regulated in advance – with two hands from the chest, with one hand, overhead, etc.

After a certain number of plays (or after everyone in the inner circle has received the ball from everyone in the outer circle with the specified pass), the students' places change – those from the inner circle become passers and those in the outer circle become receivers.

2. *Reject the Shipment* (Fig. 2)

The game is suitable for the preparatory part of the physical education and sports lesson with the theme of basketball. It focuses on catching and passing, as well as moving in defense.

The students are divided into four groups of five or six people and positioned away from the baskets in the court, forming a circle. Each group is given one ball. Two students without balls are positioned around the central circle. On one sound signal by the teacher, the students in each circle begin passing the ball to each other in a pre-specified clockwise manner; on two signals by the teacher – counter-clockwise, and on the pass command, the student who is in possession of the ball at the time of the command should pass it to a player in the opposite column (along the length of the court) without giving either of the two students the chance to cross the pass or touch the ball during the pass. If this happens, the student who misplaced the pass takes the place of the student in the centre of the court and the other student takes their place in the respective circle. If the distance between the two groups is long for such type of pass, the circles may take a position closer to the central line.

3. *Take It or Bring It* (Fig. 3)

The game is a relay game and is suitable for the main part of the PE and sports lesson with the theme of basketball. The focus is on catching and passing, dribbling, and motion in offence. In addition to developing agility, the game also facilitates the development of the endurance quality.

Students are divided into two or three teams, which are divided into two sub-groups and positioned opposite behind pre-drawn lines parallel to the foul lines of the basketball court. Three (or more) cones (or hats) are arranged between them, on the first two of which tennis balls are placed.

The game starts with the first student in the column who has a basketball, and after a signal by the teacher, starts dribbling to the first cone, takes the tennis ball, moves it to the cone that has no ball, repeats the same movement with the other two cones without stopping the dribble, then continues dribbling to the first student on the opposite column and passes the basketball hand in hand. They perform the same movement. The play continues until all students have moved from one column to the opposite column. The winner is the team that completes the task in the shortest time. If a tennis ball falls off the cone, the player who has failed to accurately place it on the cone should go back and place it again.

A variation of the game can take place if there are more cones and the players return to a cone that has no tennis ball before moving to the opposite column.

4. *Agile Waiters* (Fig. 4)

The game is a relay and it is suitable for the main part of the physical education and sports lesson with the theme of basketball. It focuses on catching and passing, dribbling, and moving in offence.

Students are divided into a minimum of three teams that stand in a column on the starting line parallel to the foul line of the basketball court facing the other basket. The first person in each column has a basketball in their hands. Cones or other landmarks (minimum five in number) are lined up in front of each column, and four hats are lined up almost to the end line, with the wide part facing the floor and one facing the opposite way, containing four tennis balls. At the start signal marking the beginning of the game by the teacher, the first person in each column starts dribbling, gets over the cones changing the leading hand, reaches the tennis balls and without changing the dribble takes one of them and places it on the first hat, then takes a second ball, places it on the second hat, etc., then returns again dribbling to the left of the column and passes the ball to the second person hand in hand.

They start dribbling, get over the cones in the same way, but when they reach the hats, they have to take the tennis balls one by one and place them in the hat, which has the wide base up. They return in the same way.

The third player repeats the movement of the first, the fourth of the second, and so on. The team whose players have performed the activities and have stood in their original alignment position is the winner.

Basic Rules:

- The basketball is led by the outer hand against the cones.
- The dribble does not stop during the handling of the tennis balls.
- The return dribble is done in the same way (e.g., left only) for all columns to avoid collisions.
- If a tennis ball is not placed on a hat or falls off, the player should return and place it again.

5. Fisherman and Fish (Fig. 5)

The game is a relay and is suitable for the main part of the physical education and sports lesson with the theme of basketball. The focus is on catching and passing, dribbling, and moving in offence.

Two students “fishermen” are positioned on the central line off the central circle of the basketball court, spinning a long rope. Two columns of students (“fish”) are positioned behind a starting line parallel to the free-throw line, with the first in each column having the ball. After the starting signal, the first in the columns dribble to the central circle, pass under the spinning rope, touch the far line of the central circle, without stopping the dribble, pass by the opposite student, who is spinning the rope on the outside, then dribble over the three cones with a change of lead hand, shoot on the move, control the ball, continue dribbling to the second student in the column and pass it to him hand in hand.

The winner is the first team to score 11 baskets (each accurate shot counts as one point).

After the game has been played and the score of the game has been recorded, the students line up on the other side of the foul line so they can execute the shot on the fly with their left hand as well.

Variations of the relay game may have different requirements in terms of dribble changes as well as types of finish at the basket.

Basic Rules:

- The basketball is led with the outer hand in relation to the cones.
- The dribble does not stop during the pass under the spinning rope.
- The return dribble is done in the same manner (e.g., left only) for all columns to avoid collisions.

Conclusion

Research shows that swiftness and agility training need to follow the specificity principle, showing that linear speed exercises lead to improvements in speed directly with a slight transition to agility and vice versa. It is therefore important to train these elements as separate components to ensure that speed and agility are at maximum.

The suggested games are designed not only to improve coordination abilities, but also to help improve students' stopping ability, change of direction, and footwork skills so necessary for the game of basketball. Physical activity is short to moderate, very intense with limited rest. Patterns of typical basketball movements are used, emphasizing the change of direction and the variability of the situation. In this way, the greatest movement efficiency is achieved with the respective appropriate levels of stability and mobility, form and technique.

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Appendix




Figure 1. The Circle: Inside and Outside




Figure 2. Reject the Shipment




Figure 3. Take It or Bring It




Figure 4. Agile Waiters




Figure 5. Fisherman and Fish

Sergey V. Lebedev, Professor, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Head of Department, Department of Philosophy, Higher School of Folk Arts, St. Petersburg, Russia. ORCID: 0000-0002-7994-2660.

The phenomenon of “soft power” and its main problems in Russia

Abstract: The concept of “soft power” has firmly entered into wide scientific use. Even more often this concept is used by politicians. Numerous scientific works of domestic scientists are devoted to the study of these reasons. However, it cannot be said that over the next decade, Russian social sciences have made great progress in the study of “soft power”. It should recognise that it is still premature to speak of any clearly formulated theory of soft power. The author of the article tries to highlight the problems of professional education of future artists in the field of Russian traditional art as one of the most important elements of Russia’s soft power. The author uses historical, comparative, formal-logical and content-logical methods of scientific research. The logic of the article was determined by the following aspects: analysis of the main definitions of the concept and application of “soft power”; it is shown that the history of the use of soft power is much older than the appearance of the term soft power itself; the theory of A. Gramsci about “cultural hegemony”, which considers the use of soft power as the bonds of society, is considered; a good example of the use of soft power by such a country as Argentina is shown; the features of the insufficient effectiveness of Russia’s soft power are analysed.

Keywords: soft power, cultural hegemony, bonds of society, Russia, Gramsci, Putin, Joseph Nye.



Сергей Викторович Лебедев, профессор, доктор философских наук, заведующий кафедрой, кафедра философии, Высшая школа народных искусств, Санкт-Петербург, Россия.
ORCID: 0000-0002-7994-2660.

Феномен «мягкой силы» и его основные проблемы в России

Аннотация: Понятие «мягкой силы» прочно вошло в широкое научное употребление. Еще более часто это понятие используют политические деятели. Изучению этих причин посвящены многочисленные научные работы отечественных ученых. Однако нельзя сказать, что за последовавшее десятилетие российские общественные науки далеко продвинулись в исследовании «мягкой силы». Следует признать, что говорить о какой-либо четко сформулированной теории мягкой силы пока преждевременно. Автор статьи пытается выделить проблемы профессионального образования будущих художников в области русского традиционного искусства как одного из важнейших элементов мягкой силы России. В данной статье применены исторический, сравнительный, формально-логический и содержательно-логические методы научного исследования. Логику статьи определили следующие аспекты: анализ основных определений понятия и применения «мягкой силы»; показано, что история применения мягкой силы значительно древнее появления самого термина мягкой силы; рассмотрена теория А. Грамши о «культурной гегемонии», которая рассматривает применения мягкой силы в качестве скреп общества; показан удачный пример использования мягкой силы такой страной, как Аргентина; разобраны особенности недостаточной эффективности мягкой силы России.

Ключевые слова: мягкая сила, культурная гегемония, скрепы общества, Россия, Грамши, Путин, Джозеф Най.



Introduction

The “soft power” concept has firmly entered into wide scientific use. It is even more often used by politicians. In Russia, among practical politicians, the concept was used by President V.V. Putin, in his campaign article *Russia and the Changing World*. He defined soft power as “a set of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy goals without the use of weapons, but through informational and other leverage” (*Putin, 2012a*).

On July 9, 2012, speaking at the Meeting of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of Russia Abroad, V.V. Putin called on Russian diplomacy to make more active use of “soft power” in their work. This means “to promote one’s interests and approaches by persuading and attracting sympathy for one’s country, based on its achievements not only in material, but also in spiritual culture and the intellectual sphere”. He noted that “the image of Russia abroad is not formed by us, therefore it is often distorted and does not reflect either the real situation in our country, or its contribution to world civilization, science, culture, and the position of our country in international affairs is now covered as it is one-sided” (*Putin, 2012a*).

On February 12, 2013, “soft power” was officially included in the new concept of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy as “a comprehensive toolkit for solving foreign policy problems based on the capabilities of civil society, information and communication, humanitarian, and other methods and technologies alternative to classical diplomacy” (*Kuznetsov, 2018*).

Since that time, the Russian leadership has created a number of institutions whose task was the integrated use of “soft power” tools in foreign policy – the Rossotrudnichestvo agency, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Foundation for Supporting the Development of Public Diplomacy named after A.M. Gorchakov, as well as a number of think tanks and expert platforms. Information channels have been created, such as the RT TV channel, the Rossiya Segodnya news agency, the Sputnik information multimedia service, which, as soft power tools, are designed to present the world with an alternative viewpoint on international events that corresponds to Russia’s foreign policy interests (*Ageeva, 2016*).

However, it cannot be said that over the next decade, domestic social sciences have made great progress in the study of “soft power”. Numerous dissertations have been defended on this topic (mainly on Western soft power). In 2015, two monographs, which collected analytical articles by domestic researchers on the theoretical and practical aspects of the “soft power” concept, were published (*Borisova, 2015*).

The reasons for this are manifold. Numerous scientific works of domestic scientists are devoted to the study of these reasons. Nevertheless, it should recognise that it is still premature to talk about any clearly formulated theory of soft power. The article’s author tries to contribute to the study of the soft power phenomenon and especially to highlight the problems of professional education of future artists in Russian traditional art as one of the most important elements of Russia’s soft power.

The author uses historical, comparative, formal-logical and content-logical methods. The use of the historical method makes it possible to study soft power in its historical forms in previous historical eras and different countries. The comparative method of research means comparing various objects (phenomena, ideas, etc.), highlighting what they have in common, on the basis of which the classification and typology of the phenomenon under consideration

is carried out. The use of formal logical methodology allows us to study the theoretical and methodological foundations of soft power in various aspects. The content-logical method is used to involve in the analysis of soft power from the standpoint of the conceptual tools of social philosophy and political science.

The logic of the article was determined by the following aspects:

- analysis of the main definitions of the concept and application of “soft power”;
- it is shown that the history of the use of soft power is much older than the appearance of the term soft power itself;
- the theory of A. Gramsci about “cultural hegemony”, which considers the use of soft power as the bonds of society, is considered;
- a good example of the use of soft power by such a country as Argentina is shown;
- the features of the insufficient effectiveness of Russia’s soft power are analysed.

Definition of “soft power”

The interpretation of the word power as “strength” is not sufficient. This word can also be expressed as “influence”, “authority”, “submission of others”. Actually, the author of this term, the American sociologist and political scientist Joseph Nye considered “soft power” precisely as a kind of power as authority. According to Joseph Nye, power is the ability to change the behaviour of others to get what you want (*Egorov, 2017*). Joseph Nye elaborates that it is “the ability to do something and control others, or force them to do things that they would not do without coercion” (*Bratersky & Skriba, 2014*). There are three main ways to do this: coercion (stick), payment (carrot), and attraction, the same “soft power” (*Vasilyeva, 2015*). Joseph Nye noted that in our information age, power based on coercion is gradually receding into the background, giving way to the power of attraction (*Ageeva, 2016*).

It should be noted that Joseph Nye (born 1937) is not an armchair theorist; on the contrary, he has vast experience in practical political activity, holding high government positions and directly influencing the country’s politics. In 1970-90s. Nye has served as Assistant Under Secretary of State for Security Support, Science and Technology, also served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Joseph Nye combined these positions with teaching and research activities in a number of Western universities. Many of Joseph Nye’s students hold key positions in many Western countries. Based on his vast practical experience and theoretical knowledge, the scientist outlined his ideas about cultural influence in the dissemination of American leadership in the 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. In this book, Joseph Nye first introduced the category of “soft power” into scientific circulation.

The scientist’s book came out at the most opportune moment – in 1990, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the socialist system in Europe collapsed and the death agony of the USSR began. It was the attractiveness of the Western system and way of life that played a huge role in these events. Mickey Mouse defeated Karl Marx.

In his next book published in 2004, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, Joseph Nye made this interesting judgment: “If Napoleon, who spread the ideas of the French Revolution, was obliged to rely on bayonets, now, in the case of America, the inhabitants of

Munich, as well as Muscovites, themselves strive for the results achieved by the leader of progress” (Nye, 2004), i.e., the USA.

Many countries spare no expense to promote their culture abroad. Thus, in terms of spending on financing international cultural programmes, France ranks first in the world. Every citizen of France (including old people and babies) spends in the form of taxes on the promotion of French culture abroad 17 dollars a year! This is four times more than second-placed Canada, followed by the UK and Sweden (Bobylo, 2014). No less significant is the fact that the annual official report of the German federal government notes that “foreign policy in education and culture is now the supporting pillar of German foreign policy” (Lansbina, 2014).

At the same time, soft power cannot be reduced only to the promotion of one’s culture abroad. Soft power is not only a political instrument of the state, but also a certain ability to be used in any capacity. The “soft power” of each country is based primarily on three resources: its culture (especially its most attractive aspects), its political ideals and values, and the effectiveness of its foreign policy.

Modern Russian researcher O.G. Leonova considers soft power an instrument of covert management of international processes. Such management, according to the researcher, has its own characteristics. First, the influence of the subject of control, due to its attractiveness for the object of control, is transformed into the desire of the controlled to act in a certain way. Secondly, such a hidden influence does not yet have a well-formed and well-established system of methods and methods of control. That is why the ability to manage in such a way that the object of management does not feel external pressure is called art (Leonova, 2013). She gives the following list of the main soft power tools:

- information flows;
- political PR aimed at a foreign audience;
- global marketing;
- positioning of the country in the global hierarchy;
- the language of the country and the degree of its popularity in the world;
- people's (public) diplomacy;
- tourism, sports and cultural exchanges;
- education system and student (youth) exchanges;
- the ability to conduct information wars;
- migration policy; national diaspora;
- dialogue of cultures (Leonova, 2013).

According to O.G. Leonova, “soft power” is a concentrated expression of a country’s national idea in conjunction with its mission in the global world (Leonova, 2013). In other words, any country should have its own national idea (or dream), realised by using soft power among other things. And thanks to the effectiveness of its soft power, to have a positive image in the world.

The soft power effectiveness often helps to recover the state economic. P.S. Gurevich notes that “The image contains a huge practical meaning. It has not only political dividends, but even an economic effect. No state will invest in the economy of a country that does not inspire

respect or trust. It is also impossible to reap political benefits if the country is not recognized” (*The image of Russia in the modern world, 2010*). Thus, soft power is also a serious economic factor.

Soft power in history

Joseph Nye in his writings and interviews repeatedly emphasised that he only introduced the “soft power” concept into science. According to a modern Russian researcher, “the term proposed by Joseph Nye described not a fundamentally new, but a long-existing phenomenon, which, however, had not previously had a generally accepted academic definition” (*Panova, 2012*). Joseph Nye managed to clearly shift the focus from a general analysis of contemporary social transformations to the field of international relations and the interactions, which take place in them (*Emelyanova, 2018*).

As a “soft power” phenomenon, it has existed for thousands of years. Any rising power strives to arouse (and often does arouse) a feeling of envy and admiration in all its neighbours. It is not surprising that even in the second millennium BC. the petty princelings of the Middle East tried, even in small things, to copy the architecture and artistic style of hegemonic countries such as Egypt or Assyria. At the same time, strong powers tried to establish the cultural characteristics of their country among the conquered peoples. Thus, cultural expansion is historically the same phenomenon as military and economic expansion.

Alexander the Great played an outstanding role in history not only as a great commander. It is no coincidence that Alexander was a student of Aristotle. In history, there were many conquerors who devastated, burned, and killed everything. Alexander also devastated, burned and killed. But still the Macedonian king acted not only as a conqueror. He sincerely sought to spread Greek culture to the east, where his new numerous subjects lived. The cultural fusion of the Greeks and the eastern countries’ inhabitants, conquered by the invaders, would also mean their complete merging into one whole. Alexander built cities in the conquered lands (only he built 74 cities with the name Alexandria). At the same time, the king built not just cities, but Greek cities with all the architectural features, with palestras and gymnasiums, and with a polis structure. Following the victorious army of Alexander, many thousands of Greek settlers rushed to the east. However, in addition to Greek settlers and children from mixed marriages in the eastern lands, a large number of so-called. philhellenes (who love Greek). So called very numerous natives of Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, India, who could not resist the charm of Greek culture. Philhellenes had Greek names, spoke Greek, and led a Hellenic lifestyle. So, literally in a matter of decades, a large-scale Hellenisation of the East took place. From the Bosphorus to India, Greek was spoken, cities were built in the Greek manner, Greek customs triumphed. First of all, the upper classes of local societies and the urban population were Hellenized. Of course, there was also a reverse influence of local cultures on the dominant Greek, but this influence became noticeable in the conditions of the Hellenistic era end.

Alexander’s empire died with him. However, the cultural impact of the Hellenisation of the East was enormous and lasting. The era of Hellenism (the three hundred year period between the campaign to the east of Alexander the Great and until the fall of the Greek kingdoms formed on the lands of his empire as a result of Romans’ conquest) was one of the most outstanding periods in the history of world science, art, and philosophy.

If not for the spread of Greek culture to the east by Alexander, then Greek civilization would have remained in history as a local one, such as a very interesting and original civilization of the Etruscans. The soft power of Greek culture conquered the conquerors of the Greek world – the Romans. In addition to direct borrowings of Greek literary genres and architectural styles, the Romans even began to endow their gods with the features of the Olympian gods of Greece. As the great Roman poet Horace wrote: “Greece, taken prisoner, captured the wild conquerors” («Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit»).

Cultural expansion in the Middle Ages realised through missionary activities to spread religion. The adoption of a new dogma automatically led to the assimilation of a new culture. In the Middle Ages, Europe was a collection of a huge number of small and tiny feudal estates, but at the same time, European unity was conditioned by a single Catholic religion and Catholic culture.

In modern times, politicians also appreciated the importance of the cultural influence of their country on their neighbours. The French king Louis XIV (1643-1715), although he fought many wars with different results, nevertheless achieved French influence over all of Europe with the help of culture. From Lisbon to St. Petersburg, the French language, French fashion, architecture, cuisine, lifestyle began to dominate. Throughout the 18th century, France suffered defeats in wars, lost most of its colonies, but continued to reign culturally on the continent. Any artistic style, any change in dress, any new theory that came from France, immediately became “their own” in all European countries. The cultural hegemony of France continued into the 19th and much of the 20th century. It was only after World War II that the dominance of American soft power began.

Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony”

The original concept of soft power (without the use of this term) was created by the prominent Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci. In the 1930s, based on the turbulent political events of the first third of the century, A. Gramsci created the “cultural hegemony” concept. Previously, hegemony was considered only military, economic, and political predominance. Not without the influence of Gramsci, the “hegemony” concept expanded to denote the cultural predominance of a certain class within the country and the culture of a certain state among other states. According to Gramsci, the power of any ruling class rests not only on violence, but also on the mutual consent of the entire society. The ruling class, by influencing the general ideas, spiritual values, morality, religion accepted in the culture of society, imposes its own worldview as a generally accepted cultural norm and a generally valid ideology recognized by all. A necessary component of the functioning of the state, A. Gramsci believed, is the achievement of cultural hegemony, where civil society and the ruling elite are in a state of agreement through a common cultural and ideological state. The result is a strengthening of the existing social, political or economic position of society ([Lester, 2020](#)). Cultural hegemony in the ideological superstructure, A. Gramsci believed, thus opposing orthodox Marxism, has a greater influence on the formation and establishment of a new political order than control over the economic basis. As we can see, the cultural hegemony of certain social forces in the country, whose basic cultural values are tacitly recognised by the majority of society, provides the country with stability. Conflicts of all kinds within society proceed smoothly, within the generally accepted

rules of the game. Thus, cultural hegemony manifests itself as a soft power within the country and society.

However, every social revolution must be preceded by a cultural revolution that would undermine the cultural hegemony of the ruling class. So, long after the fall of the Bastille, the educated society of France and almost all European countries was dominated by the ideals generated by the Enlightenment philosophy. The former feudal-Catholic ideology lost its authority and completely lost its hegemony. A man, who proclaimed the infallibility of the Pope among the “educated public” or defended absolute monarchy on the basis of divine right, caused only sneers. Similarly, in Russia, already from the second half of the 19th century, long before 1917, socialist theories of the most diverse trends gradually began to prevail – populist, Marxist, anarchist, etc. 87% of the votes (including 58% received by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 24% by the Bolsheviks, 5% by the Mensheviks, as well as the rest of the left-wing parties of national minorities) (*Lebedev, 2007*). However, only the Bolsheviks were not afraid to take responsibility for power.

It can be assumed that precisely the conquest of cultural hegemony is the main goal of soft power. However, at the same time, it must be taken into account that it is a soft power manifestation that forces the enemy to recognise someone else’s cultural hegemony.

Argentine example to successfully apply soft power

Many countries of the world are concerned about the development of their soft power. At the same time, some countries, which cannot be called too rich and influential, have managed to achieve a lot in popularising their image in the world through soft power. In particular, one can cite the successes of such a country as Argentina. According to the Russian diplomat in Argentina Ya.A. Burlyai, this South American country uses its soft power very successfully: “The Argentines managed to present their homeland as an attractive Latin American country, home to a highly cultured people who profess traditional Christian values. Achievements of world famous figures of national science and culture, literature and art played a big role in this. Argentina’s success in education, health and sports is also well known” (*Burlyai, 2017*). Thanks to such historical figures as politician Evita Peron, revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara, football players Diego Maradona and Lionel Messi, writer Jorge Luis Borges and Pope Francis I, Argentina is a very “recognisable” country in the world. Few people outside the country can name the Argentine president (especially, since 32 people were replaced in this post in 1946-2021). On the economic front, Argentina can only boast of three defaults in 20 years of the 21st century. However, this country is known and loved in the world thanks to its soft power.

The cultural symbol of the country is the tango. In 2009, at the 4th session of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee, the tango was included in the list of the intangible cultural heritage of mankind (*Decision of the Intergovernmental Committee*). The government of Argentina is making great efforts to popularise dance abroad. FM radio stations broadcasting tango music receive subsidies from Argentine diplomatic missions. December 11 (the birthday of the famous singer, the “tango king” Carlos Gardel), with the active participation of the Argentine diplomatic missions abroad, is celebrated as World Tango Day. Also, the government of Argentina provided great support to the filming *Evita* based on the musical of the same name by E.L. Webber in 1996. The film starred such celebrities as Madonna, A. Banderas, etc. The film not

only received many prestigious awards, but also caused a surge of interest in Argentina. In one year after the release of the film, the number of tourists to the country has increased several times.

Argentine figures, promoting the art of their country abroad, always emphasise that Argentina is a country of immigrants. The foreign origin of many great Argentines is not only not hidden, but, on the contrary, is cited as an example of creative integration into “Argentinianness”. In fact, the “tango king” Carlos Gardel was a Frenchman, the composer A. Piazzolla was born in an Italian family, the Croatian H. Vucetich became the creator of fingerprinting, and the Hungarian L. Biro was the creator of a ballpoint pen. However, all of them are rightly considered primarily Argentines.

Thus, Argentina has managed to make the most of its soft power. The cultural achievements of Argentina far outweigh its economic or military role in the world.

Лун problems на Russian soft power

According to the report of the international rating group *The Soft Power – 30*, making up the annual lists of the 30 most influential countries in terms of the global impact of soft power, Russia ranked 30th (last) place in 2019. The first 5 places were occupied by France, Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, and USA (*McClory, 2020*). It should note that in 2019, when the rating was compiled, a frenzied propaganda campaign had not yet been waged against Russia. On the contrary, the successful holding of the World Cup and a number of other sporting events aroused favourable interest in Russia, which had a positive effect on the country’s rating.

Other rating studies give similar results. In a highly authoritative ranking of the world’s leading countries in terms of “soft power”, prepared by the *Center for Public Diplomacy* of the University of Southern California and *Portland PR Agency*, Russia ranks 26th, after Greece, Poland, and China. The rating is headed by France, Great Britain, and the USA (*Kuznetsov, 2018*). The position of each country in this ranking is formed from such characteristics of international attractiveness: entrepreneurship, public administration, culture (including also sports), education, digital technologies, and global influence. Thus, it should recognise that Russia does not apply its soft power well.

Of course, the rating compilers, who unwittingly or consciously transfer their political preferences and their national egocentrism to the rating, themselves can be blamed for this. The British newspaper *Daily Mail* also constantly ranks the 20 countries with the strongest “soft power”. It is not any wonder that the UK itself leads the TOP 20.

At the same time, it is difficult, if not impossible, to single out the criteria for determining soft power. As J. Nye wrote, “If you talk about hard power, then you can say that I have 10,000 main battle tanks, and you have only 1000, thus stating that “the presence of these resources means that I am 10 times stronger than you”... When it comes to soft power, we must consider the resources that we can attract. As a consequence, we can look at opinion polls as a kind of surrogate to answer the question “Are they really attractive?”. There is a problem with measuring any type of power. With a soft one, it’s a little more difficult, since its resources are intangible” (*Borison, 2020*).

Of course, many ratings, when assessing soft power, pay enough attention to such positions that cannot be considered objective. For example, the *Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index*,

developed by the Russian Moscow School of Management Skolkovo, groups variables according to 3 positions:

- global image (export of media products, the number of Olympic medals won, interest in learning the language of a particular country, the number of citizens of the country in TOP 100 most influential people according to Time magazine, respected companies in the world);
- global reputation (index of freedom, rule of law, electoral activity, emissions into the atmosphere);
- global integration (tourism, immigration, university rankings, spread of English language acquisition) (*Borisov, 2020*).

According to all these indicators, Russia is far from being in the forefront of the rating.

However, it should take into account that none of the listed ratings refers specifically to indicators that actually characterize the country's soft power. It is clear that in the context of the dominance of Western news agencies and social networks in the world media, it is Western countries that will be in the forefront in terms of the number of media products exports and the number of citizens in the TOP 100 most influential people according to Time magazine. Scandals related to attempts to deprive Russian athletes of honestly won Olympic medals and an outright ban on Russian news channels (e.g., RT and the Sputnik news agency) are just evidence of the struggle against Russia's soft power.

However, it must be admitted that for all the biased ratings, Russia very little uses its soft power in the world.

This is especially unfortunate given that Russian is the fourth most influential language in the world (*Antonova, 2021*). Russian is the second most popular language on the Internet, after English. The Russian language is the fourth in terms of the number of translations from it. Classical Russian literature is still recognised and taught in most educational institutions of the world, Russian animation in just a few years has become very popular in many countries of the world. All European and American champions of the traditional family, as noted by French researchers, welcomed Putin's position on this issue (*Laruelle 2014*).

And yet, in many countries, a negative attitude towards Russia prevails with ignorance of Russian culture. At the same time, the image of Russia in the eyes of foreign citizens continues to decline. So, according to the *Pew Research Center*, back in 2012 (i.e., even before the events in Crimea), the image of Russia deteriorated in almost all Western countries. In the US, only 37% of Americans had a positive attitude towards Russia (down 12% compared to 2011), Spain – 36% (down 10%), Great Britain – 38% (down 12%), Germany – 33% (down 14%), France – 36% (by 17%) (*Bobylo, 2015*).

Some foreign researchers admit that the role of Russia in the information and ideological sphere has become more visible in recent years, largely due to the wider coverage of the global audience through social networks, the *Russia Today* channel and the *Sputnik* agency. However, they doubt Moscow's ability to compete on equal terms with leading Western countries (*Borisov, 2020*). J. Nye himself at the end of 2014 expressed the opinion that Russia had almost no soft power left that it could use (*Nye, 2014*). Some Russian researchers agree with this opinion. They believe that Russia "almost irretrievably lost its rather significant potential of "soft power", which it inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union... This resource was (and still remains

in part) quite significant, it includes in themselves: the information and cultural influence of Russia on the CIS countries, the possibility of unhindered distribution of products of the Russian television and film industry, musical works (albeit sometimes of not very high quality), the scientific and educational attractiveness of Russian universities” (*Lebedeva & Faure, 2009*).

Of course, it is not absolute true. The very fact of the demonstrative acceptance of Russian citizenship by many Western cultural and sports figures is already an indicator of Russia’s soft power. The main problem of the spread of Russia’s soft power lies in the fact that Russia occupies a defensive position in the global competition between the soft power of different countries. Russian soft power is interpreted by Russian politicians as a counterpower, that is, a reactive and defensive action directed against American and European soft power (*Laruelle, 2014*). The existing vagueness in the wording and setting of goals and objectives in official regulatory documents also significantly weakens Russia’s soft power. So often the Russian leaders, calling for the use of Russia’s soft power, have not themselves decided the Russian culture side that should be put at the heart of the country’s cultural policy.

As the modern Russian researcher I.V. Lyabukhov noted in 2012, “ today, the real image policy of the Russian Federation is mainly large-scale one-time actions, the positive effect of which is not lasting, and the scattered work of a number of individual actors who, pursuing a single good goal, act chaotically, which minimises a positive result” (*Lyabukhov, 2012*).

Conclusion. Reasons for the weakness of Russia’s soft power

The impact of soft power cannot be unlimited. The natural limiters of the soft power action are the civilizational incompatibility of “consumers” of foreign soft power. Already at the level of archetypes of national consciousness, certain phenomena of economic, political, or cultural life realising expansion from the outside are rejected. In Russia, e.g., there is a complete rejection by society of many “values” imposed from the West. At the same time, Russian researcher A. Tsygankov notes that Russian “soft power” has a number of undeniable advantages over Western competitors and China in Eurasia. And Russian advantages are precisely in the field of values (*Tsygankov, 2013*).

Russia has never cared about its cultural influence. Bouts of interest in everything Russian and “style russe” periodically arose in various Western countries, but each time not for long. So, in 1814-15, after the defeat of Napoleon, a fashion for the Cossacks arose in Europe. The “cossaque” hairstyle appeared, and gourmets appreciated the taste of “vodka”, but all this lasted for several years and was forgotten. A new attack of Russophilism swept France and some other European countries at the beginning of the 20th century, which was the result of the activities of S. Diaghilev and his *Russian Seasons*. Perhaps, Diaghilev was the only Russian figure who purposefully and skillfully promoted Russian culture abroad. It is impossible not to admit that the passion for everything Russian really swept Europe on the eve of 1914. Russian ballet, the pictorial avant-garde, the music of Vasily Andreev’s orchestra – all this really took possession of Europe. However, this period was very short.

On the other hand, the West was dominated by an idea depicting Russia as a “kingdom of the whip”, a “prison of peoples”, an “Asiatic wild autocracy”, ignorant rude masses of the people, an empire striving for conquest, owing all its power to the beneficial intervention of

Western culture. The words “Siberia”, “hard labour”, “whip”, “Cossacks”, “pogrom”, etc., have become iconic concepts for Western liberals.

It is significant that only 20 Russian words were mentioned in the dictionary of the French Academy of 1835: *cossaque* (Cossack), *kabak* (tavern), *knout* (whip), *pop* (pop), *steppe* (steppe), *tsar* (king), and some others (*Bragina, 1978*). In the following decades, the acquaintance of the West with Russian realities did not advance much. In the Littré-Bajan dictionary of 1910, 26 Russianisms were noted, including the words *pogrom* (riot), *nihilist*, *katorga* (hard labour / galleys). By the way, the word “nihilist” is Latin, “pop” is Greek, “knut” is German, and “katorga” is Turkish, but they were considered primordially Russian. It should also note that in order to designate the more positive features of Russian life in the West, they preferred to use precisely Western terminology, even if it was not able to convey the Russian specifics of phenomena.

After the October Revolution, the Bolshevik leaders, who denied the “old-mode” culture, paradoxically contributed to the development of the avant-garde in the West, but Russian traditional art, despite the prizes for products from Palekh, did not have an impact on world artistic development. However, in this particular case, it is necessary to evaluate the Soviet government for the fact that it has preserved and even increased traditional artistic crafts.

After the Second World War, the cult of everything Russian again arose for several years all over the world. The song *Katyusha* has become a worldwide hit, and in a number of countries, for example, in Japan, it has become a folk song. However, soon the outbreak of the Cold War quickly put an end to any interest in the West in Russian art in general, and in traditional applied art in particular. Unfortunately, the Soviet leaders, presenting their Western guests with Palekh caskets, and without fail presenting the Orenburg downy shawl to women leaders, completely lost sight of the possibility of using Russian traditional art products as soft power. However, for many Soviet people, jeans and Coca-Cola have become a symbol of some other sweet life. Of course, the Western lifestyle with its undercooked meat (“steak”), moldy cheese, snails and *sivukha* (“whiskey”) was promoted as a symbol of familiarisation with something great, which all backward peoples with an incomparably greater culture should be equal to, but unable to promote it. So, the West defeated the Soviet Union on the cultural front. Hollywood, with its fictional characters, turned out to be much more effective than tank and air armadas.

Therefore, Russia should learn a lesson from those events and correctly understand the essence of “soft power”.

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Daniil I. Piskarev, Head of the educational project “P-phenomenon”, Moscow, Russia.

Application of a letter of credit in the fuel business

Abstract: Trade in petroleum products has specific features that radically distinguish this type of business from other foreign trade transactions. Working in the fuel business is very difficult, because the spot market is very volatile. Almost every contract exceeds the approximate cost of 2 million dollars US. Also, it should be remembered that oil is taken into account in barrels during production, but in trade it is taken into account both in barrels and in tons. This article discusses the important elements that make up foreign trade contract work in the fuel business, as well as the use of a letter of credit in oil trading. The purpose of the study is to show in practice the use of a letter of credit and its role in the fuel business. Currently, a small number of scientific papers have been published on the application of a letter of credit in the fuel business. The author concludes that in the fuel business, haste will be a bad helper in the conclusion and execution of contracts. Details that are overlooked, even the most insignificant and unprincipled, can become an obstacle when disclosing a letter of credit.

Keywords: oil trading, letter of credit, oil, trade, fuel business, tanker.



Даниил Игоревич Пискарев, руководитель образовательного проекта «P-phenomenon»,
Москва, Россия.

Применение аккредитива в топливном бизнесе

Аннотация: Торговля нефтепродуктами имеет специфические особенности, которые кардинально отличают данный вид бизнеса от других внешнеторговых сделок. Работа в сфере топливного бизнеса очень сложна, ведь спотовый рынок весьма изменчив. Практически каждый контракт превышает примерную стоимость в 2 миллиона долларов. Также, нужно помнить о том, что нефть при добыче учитывается в баррелях, но в торговле ее учитывают как в баррелях, так и в тоннах. В данной статье рассматриваются важные элементы, составляющие внешнеторговую контрактную работу в сфере топливного бизнеса, а также применение аккредитива в нефтетрейдинге. Цель исследования – показать на практике использование аккредитива и его роль в топливном бизнесе. В настоящее время опубликовано небольшое количество научных работ, посвященных применению аккредитива в топливном бизнесе. Автор приходит к выводу, что в топливном бизнесе спешка будет плохим помощником при заключении и исполнении контрактов. Детали, которые упускаются из виду, даже самые незначительные и не принципиальные, могут стать препятствием при раскрытии аккредитива.

Ключевые слова: нефтетрейдинг, аккредитив, нефть, торговля, топливный бизнес, танкер.



Introduction

The relevance of this problem lies in the fact that in the process of preparing a trade transaction, a trader uses the established forms of trade contracts. In these contracts, only some data changes, such as: the description of the goods, its quantity, the method of payment and the

terms of delivery. It is this information that becomes a source of risks when drawing up a contract.

The subject of the study is the properties of the letter of credit form of payments in the fuel business.

The purpose of the study is to show in practice the use of a letter of credit and its role in the fuel business.

Based on the study purpose, the following tasks were set:

- show the distinctive features of this type of business;
- show the role and impact of a letter of credit in the fuel business;
- consider the components of foreign trade contract work in the fuel business: the description of the goods and their quality, the terms of delivery of the goods, the conclusion and execution of the ship's freight contract, payment methods for the goods;
- consider possible problems arising in the fuel business.

Currently, a small number of scientific papers have been published on the application of a letter of credit in the fuel business.

Product quality description

Since almost all calculations in the fuel business are made with the help of a letter of credit, the parties to a foreign trade contract must strictly adhere to the rule of exact correspondence of all information entered into the documents: in the bill of lading, in the letter of credit, and in the contract, all data must fully correspond to each other (*Karashev, 2014*).

However, despite this, there are still quite often a lot of problems due to the description of the quality of the goods. Often, the contract and letter of credit stipulate the quality of petroleum products according to one rule, and in the bill of lading it is indicated according to completely different ones. It would seem obvious that the description of the quality of the goods should be identical in both documents, which in practice often does not happen. There is a need for an emergency replacement of documents, even if the main parameters of the product are specified, such as: water content, number of bacteria, density. At the same time, the maximum permissible values may differ slightly in the applicable standards. However, if this technical information gets into the instructions for the letter of credit, then any deviation will become the basis for the bank's rejection of the document. Thus, we can conclude that it is not necessary to resort to excessive detailing of the description of the goods in the documents.

It is not very difficult to persuade the tanker captain to make changes to the bill of lading, but it can be extremely problematic to perform this operation physically. There are cases when to replace the originals of the bill of lading bearing the captain's handwritten signature, it was necessary to hire a helicopter, or to start a ship on a transit port raid. The seller suffered unplanned losses, but this is nothing compared to the delay in payment for the goods for a month or more. The losses occurred despite the fact that both names denote the same product.

Also, problems may lie in the difference in the name of the goods in the documents. One name is international, and the second is intended for the domestic Russian market.

Methods, conditions, problems of delivery of goods

It is generally assumed that in the fuel business, the main money is earned between FOB and CIF (*Lorenzon & Baatz, 2012*). FOB and CIF are the two main types of delivery in which the goods are purchased from the manufacturer on FOB terms, that is, the port of shipment, and sold on CIF terms, that is, the port of destination. Earnings on freight and related operations alone can bring a professional trader up to three dollars for each ton of goods. At the same time, in the case of delivery of goods on CIF terms, it is assumed that the goods are sold at the port of destination. Indeed, according to this delivery condition, the seller is obliged to charter a vessel and pay for transportation to the port of destination, but the goods are considered to have been transferred to the buyer at the time of loading at the port of departure. At that moment, all responsibility and all risks passed from the seller to the buyer. Nevertheless, the buyer always checks the quality of the delivered goods and in case of serious deviations may simply not accept it, although the goods are already considered delivered. However, in practice, it is customary to inspect the quality of light petroleum products up to three times: during ship shipment and at the port of destination, before unloading, and in some cases “en route”. In order to minimize the risks of quality loss, the seller and the buyer nominate inspection companies that issue a quality certificate, which is a quality guarantee in case of disagreement.

The problem of both choosing a vessel for transportation and the principles of building a freight policy is quite acute for traders. One of the main problems in the fuel business is the problem of the optimal sales contract and cargo characteristics of a chartered vessel. Usually, an oil trader is bound by long-term contractual obligations with producers of petroleum products. The essence of such contracts boils down to the fact that the trader is obliged to buy a certain amount of goods from the manufacturer within a certain time. Very often it is necessary to put the ship under loading, without having reliable information about who exactly will be the buyer, and what size of the batch he wants to buy. There is a situation of a slightly different kind – the buyer already exists and his need is clear, but there are free vessels in the operational vicinity that differ significantly in tonnage from the vessel of the required carrying capacity. In such a difficult situation, it is necessary to persuade the client to accept, in fact, a batch of a larger or smaller volume than the option in the contract allows. The trader needs to be able to avoid paying for the dead freight of the vessel or the risk of under-delivery of a relatively small batch of goods.

The vessel can be chartered for one flight, for several consecutive flights, as well as for a long-term lease. The tactics of tonnage chartering is primarily determined by the type of relationship between a trader and a seller of petroleum products. If there is a long-term contract with the manufacturer or processor, under which the trader is obliged to regularly buy back certain volumes of goods, it is more logical to charter a vessel for a long time period. In such a situation, it is reasonable for a trader, in order to fix freight rates for a long time period, to conclude a freight forward contract in addition to the charter.

In the market of crude oil and petroleum products transportation, there is no attachment to any specific proforma charters. Independent charters are being developed by various tanker fleet operators. Both large operators and smaller firms have their own proforma charters. Flight charters are very popular with small carriers. But if oil traders do not make special requirements for the proforma charters, then there are quite a lot of requirements for bills of lading issued

for each specific flight. The bill of lading of the corresponding charter party is used for the registration of a specific transportation of each consignment, and it is mandatory in the order form, that is, the bill of lading is negotiable. The defense capability of the bill of lading is mandatory, due to the fact that the goods are either sold “en route”, or a letter of credit form of payment is used for payments for the goods. Often both of these factors are combined. In the event that the parties have agreed on a letter of credit form of settlement, bills of lading are issued by order of the issuing bank of the letter of credit (*Semikova, 2014*). The registration of a bill of lading for the transportation of oil and petroleum products has a number of specific features that are not found in bills of lading for the transportation of general cargo, dry bulk cargo or containers.

For example, for a clearer identification of the carrier, the SCAC code (Standard Carrier Alpha Code) must be specified in the bill of lading for tanker transportation, and expanded. The expanded code also allows you to determine the nationality of the carrier. The mandatory indication of the SCAC code may be due to the fact that tanker bills of lading usually do not contain information about the carrier company, only about the vessel. The bill of lading must be signed by the ship’s captain, and not only the position of the signatory is indicated, but also his first and last name. Banks should be considered the source of this very specific requirement. Regarding the conditions for identifying the person who signed the bill of lading, there is only one requirement: the person who signed the bill of lading must be clearly identified as a carrier, captain or agent.

The bill of lading, regardless of the applicable pro forma charter, always contains standard reservations about the unknown, made by the captain. The essence of these reservations boils down to the fact that the captain tries to protect the carrier by all possible legal means from any possibility of claims from the shipper. It is believed that such reservations do not affect the purity of the bill of lading, despite the complete denial of information about the cargo being transported. Very often, a trader appeals to the ship’s captain to put the date of issue of the bill of lading on the bill of lading earlier than the actual date of loading. This situation is called anti-diting, and the unsecured bill of lading itself is known as “friendly”. The shipper seeks to obtain a “friendly” bill of lading in order to have evidence that the goods sold under the contract have been transferred to the carrier for transportation, thereby the seller has fulfilled his obligations under the contract. As a general rule, the carrier is obliged to issue a bill of lading at the time of acceptance of the cargo for carriage. Issuing a bill of lading before receiving the cargo is considered as an unusual and illegal action of the carrier. Such a bill of lading is considered illegal in transport practice. After all, in fact, we are talking about the issuance of a commodity-free document. The rule on issuing a bill of lading only after the cargo is received by the sea carrier can be considered as a legal guarantee of the protection of the bill of lading’s turnover. If it is proved that the bill of lading was intentionally issued with anti-diting, then by right it can be declared invalid.

The issuance of a “friendly” bill of lading, as well as the issuance of cargo without a bill of lading, or for an incomplete set of originals of the bill of lading refers to the personal risk of the ship’s captain. In such cases, in order to partially protect the captain, the shipper issues him a special letter guaranteeing the absence of any claims against the captain personally, the ship or the carrier. Such a letter is called a “letter of trust”. The practice of issuing cargo without handing

over the originals of the bill of lading or an incomplete set when transporting oil cargo is very common, much more common than when transporting dry and even more containerized cargo. And this is another feature of the fuel business. A trader buys goods from a seller, almost always using a settlement with a letter of credit. At least one copy of the bill of lading goes to the bank to disclose the letter of credit. On the way, the goods are usually resold, often more than once. But it is impossible to change the bill of lading, due to the lack of a complete set of documents, so you have to ask the carrier to issue the cargo with an incomplete set of originals or without the original bill of lading at all. The shipper transmits to the carrier a “letter of confidence” in which he asks to deliver the cargo to the named recipient and guarantees the absence of any claims against the captain personally, the ship and or the carrier. Usually, a “letter of trust” is accompanied by a bank guarantee, according to which the carrier will receive serious monetary compensation if someone presents a complete set of originals of the bill of lading and demands delivery of the cargo to him.

When making a decision to issue a bill of lading retroactively, or to issue cargo for an incomplete set of originals of the bill of lading, the ship’s captain takes a risk and this risk is known to him, and the consequences are clear. However, captains almost always meet oil traders halfway and accept a “letter of confidence” from them. In today's realities, this has become a common practice.

International trade in crude oil and petroleum products plays a huge and fundamental role for the economies of different countries. However, the technology of contract work in oil trading contains many aspects that fundamentally distinguish this type of trade from trade in other types of goods.: You should never overload the contract and the instructions for the letter of credit with technical details and figures. It is quite enough that the parties have carefully and accurately described the quality of the goods in the annex to the contract. The rejection of some indicator will mean that the bank will reject such a document, and the process of receiving money for the goods can become very complicated and take a long time. All Russian producers of crude oil and finished petroleum products sell their products mainly on FOB terms (*European Business Statistics methodological manual for STS – 2021*), losing very significant money on this, which becomes the earnings of foreign trading firms. The execution of the contract of sea transportation takes place using the proforma charter, usually offered by the carrier. There are no specific requirements for the content and form of the charter. Traditionally, settlements are made using a letter of credit, which imposes certain conditions on the registration of the bill of lading of the charter party. Unlike other types of tram transportation, a bill of lading for oil cargo is recognized as clean even if the captain refuses to confirm the weight, quantity, quality, condition and volume of the cargo.

Another feature of the fuel business is that a trader’s representative may not always be physically present at the port of loading. To represent their interests, oil traders hire freight forwarders who work with cargo and documents at the port of loading (*Kovalev & Yatsenko 2016*). Consequently, another block of problems arises, which is closely related to the mistakes of freight forwarders. Traders very often make mistakes in the names, grades and labeling of petroleum products, in the quality and quantity of goods. The elimination of these problems requires time, effort, and sometimes material costs. To minimize such risks, the trader should:

- 1) carefully select the forwarder;

- 2) clearly define in advance the range of issues and tasks that are transferred to the forwarder;
- 3) within the limits of the assigned powers, the forwarder must receive from the oil trader not only all the necessary information, but also extremely clear instructions on the appearance and content of documents that will have to be born with the direct participation of the forwarder;
- 4) all problems that have arisen when the forwarder departs from the instructions received must be eliminated by the forwarder himself, and if this is not possible, then at his expense. This point should be clearly reflected in the contract of the transport expedition.

There are also many problems with the date of the bill of lading. More precisely, with the correspondence of this date and the deadline for the execution of the contract for the purchase and sale of petroleum products. According to generally accepted practice, the date of shipment of the goods, and therefore the date of execution of the contract, is the date of the bill of lading. It is necessary to understand that it is objectively impossible to ensure the arrival of a vessel at the port of loading strictly on a specific day and hour. Therefore, in all standard proforma charters, a time period is stipulated – the earliest and latest dates when the vessel should be loaded. The latest date is called “cancelling”. A vessel that has submitted a notice of readiness even an hour before the onset of cancelling is considered to have arrived on time and is subject to acceptance. Participants in a foreign trade transaction should know this principle.

Required documentation

The formation of a set of documents is another very common problem, because it is not only a set of requirements, but also the ability of the seller to form it from documents suitable for each specific situation.

The standard set for a tanker with cargo usually consists of the following documents:

- 1) a bill of lading drawn up in a specified number of originals and copies;
- 2) quantity certificate – a document indicating the weight amount of cargo loaded on the tanker;
- 3) quality certificate – a document indicating the quality of the cargo;
- 4) timesheet – a complete report on the time spent loading the tanker;
- 5) cargo manifest – a document that brings together data on all bill of lading shipments loaded on a tanker. The manifest is required for the procedure of customs clearance of the vessel and the cargo on it at the port of destination;
- 6) ship inspection certificate;
- 7) notification of the readiness of the vessel;
- 8) receipts of the captain or his representative in receipt of documents (*The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits...*, 2007).

Documents 2, 3, and 6 are prepared by independent surveyors hired by the interested party. These documents are very important, and their availability is almost always mandatory. They will be included in the set that the sender will have to provide to the bank for the disclosure of the letter of credit.

Conclusion

Thus, it is seen that in the fuel business, haste will be a bad helper in the conclusion and execution of contracts. Details that are overlooked, even the most insignificant and unprincipled, can become an obstacle when disclosing a letter of credit.

Also, it is necessary to involve only professionals who know how to act in a particular situation in their own practice. Specifying the deadline date of shipment in the contract, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of extending the period if objective reasons arise that prevented the timely completion of loading on time. In the case of a letter of credit form of settlements, it is necessary to charge the issuer of the letter of credit to make changes to the terms of the letter of credit upon the occurrence of such reasons, with their documentary certification. Also, do not overload the instructions for the letter of credit with technical details. It will be enough that the parties carefully describe the quality of the goods in the contract. The deviation of any indicator in the instructions to the letter of credit, although it can be settled by the parties to the contract among themselves, however, the bank will not accept such a document, which will complicate the process of receiving money for the goods.

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