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Religionisation of politics, culture and economy of the modern world

Abstract: The end of the last 20th and the first two decades of the present 21st centuries were marked by an amazing social and cultural phenomenon – a sharp increase in the role of religion in all spheres of human life. In politics, economics, culture, the religious factor plays a significant, and in many regions of the Earth, and a determining role everywhere. This phenomenon became to be unexpected for most scientists, and even for many traditional religious figures. Such influential philosophical systems of the 19th and 20th centuries as Positivism or Marxism also proceeded from the fact that religion is just opium for the people. Liberals regarded religion only as a private matter of the individual, but not a matter of society. Even conservatives viewed religion as part of the great historical tradition of their country, but not as something giving the world a transcendent idea. The secularisation of culture and politics, which began in Europe around the 17th century, seemed gradually to lead to a natural result – the complete disappearance of religion – under the influence of European culture and Western colonialism on all other continents. Since the 1970s, philosophers and political scientists have been talking about a religious renaissance in many regions of the world. The subject of the study was the religious sphere of the modern world with the rise of the Islamic movement and the Islamic revolution in Iran. The object of the study was the processes for religionising politics, culture, and economics of the modern world. The purpose of the study was to present the main patterns of the religionisation of politics, culture, and economics of the modern world. Historical, logical, analytical, and comparative methods were applied to achieve the purpose and solve the tasks set in the study. The authors used the works of prominent scientists and researchers, including A.J. Toynbee, U. Beck, P. Nolan, G.E. Lenski, C. Hackett, and E. Smith. Based on the study, the authors conclude that the resistance to globalisation under Western conditions has many directions, among which the inconspicuous protection of national culture and its spiritual basis – traditional religion – stands out. It is not by chance that not only philosophers, but also sociologists and cultural scientists started talking about the “return of ethnicity”. It is the real threat of dissolving into mass Americanised culture that motivates many citizens to turn to the sources of their national culture in principle.

Keywords: secular ideologies, inter-confessionalism, politicisation of religion, religionisation of politics, post-Christianity, liberation theology.



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Религиозация политики, культуры и экономики современного мира

Аннотация: Конец прошедшего XX и первых двух десятилетий нынешнего XXI веков ознаменовались поразительным социокультурным феноменом – резким усилением роли религии во всех сферах жизни человека. В политике, экономике, культуре – всюду религиозный фактор играет значительную, а во многих регионах Земли, и определяющую роль. Этот феномен оказался неожиданным для большинства ученых, и даже для многих традиционных религиозных деятелей. Такие влиятельные философские системы XIX-XX веков, как позитивизм или марксизм, также исходили из того обстоятельства, что религия есть всего – лишь опиум для народа. Либералы рассматривали религию лишь как частное дело индивида, но не дело общества. Даже консерваторы рассматривали религию как часть великой исторической традиции своей страны, но не как нечто, дающее миру трансцендентную идею. Секуляризация («обмирщение») культуры и политики, начавшееся в Европе еще примерно с XVII века, постепенно, под влиянием европейской культуры и западного колониализма на все другие материки, казалось, приведет к закономерному результату – полному исчезновению религии. Начиная с 1970-х гг., по мере подъема исламского движения и исламской революции в Иране, философы и политологи заговорили о религиозном ренессансе во многих регионах мира. Предметом исследования была религиозная сфера современного мира. Объектом исследования были процессы религиозации политики, культуры и экономики современного мира. Целью исследования было представить основные закономерности религиозации политики, культуры и экономики современного мира. Для достижения цели и решения поставленных в исследовании задач были применены исторический, логический, аналитический и сравнительный методы. В ходе исследования были использованы труды видных учёных и исследователей, в том числе А. Тойнби, К. Хэккетта, У. Бека, П. Нолана, Г. Ленски и Э. Смита. На основе исследования, авторы приходят к заключению что сопротивление глобализации по западным условиям имеет множество направлений, среди которых выделяется незаметная защита национальной культуры и ее духовной основы – традиционной религии. Не случайно не только философы, но также социологи и культурологи заговорили о «возврате этничности». Именно реальная угроза раствориться в массовой американизированной культуре подвигает многих граждан на принципиальное обращение к истокам своей национальной культуры.

Ключевые слова: светские идеологии, интерконфессиональность, политизация религии, религиозация политики, постхристианство, теология освобождения.



Introduction

The end of the last 20th and the first two decades of the present 21st centuries were marked by an amazing social and cultural phenomenon – a sharp increase in the role of religion in all spheres of human life. The religious factor plays a significant, and in many regions of the Earth, and a determining role everywhere – in politics, economics, and culture. This phenomenon

became to be unexpected for most scientists, and even, paradoxically, for many traditional religious figures. Until recently, many intellectuals, and ordinary citizens, shared the conclusions of the French enlighteners of the 18th century that religion is an invention of the ruling classes to suppress the masses, and religion will disappear with the progress and development of education. Such influential philosophical systems of the 19th and 20th centuries as Positivism or Marxism also proceeded from the fact that religion is just opium for the people. Liberals regarded religion only as a private matter of the individual, but not a matter of society. Even conservatives viewed religion as part of the great historical tradition of their country, but not as something giving the world a transcendent idea. It is no coincidence that the Christian democratic parties ruling in many countries of Western Europe emphasised their inter-confessional character, and personal confession of the Christian faith was absolutely not required for party members. The culture and politics secularisation, which began in Europe around the 17th century seemed gradually to lead to a natural result – the complete disappearance of religion – under the influence of European culture and Western colonialism on all other continents. Since the 1970s, philosophers and political scientists have been talking about a religious renaissance in many regions of the world with the rise of the Islamic movement and the Islamic revolution in Iran.

The subject of the study was the religious sphere of the modern world.

The object of the study was the processes for religionising politics, culture, and economics of the modern world.

The purpose of the study was to present the main patterns of the religionisation of politics, culture and economics of the modern world.

Based on the purpose of the study, the following tasks were developed:

- analyse the process for reviving religion in various regions of the world;
- analyse the essence and causes of the de-secularisation of world society at the present stage of its development;
- clarify the concept of religion with regard to the 21st-century realities;
- formulate the concept of a traditional religion for the country at the present stage of development of the world community.

Historical, logical, analytical, and comparative methods were applied to achieve the purpose and solve the tasks set in the study.

The authors used the works of prominent scientists and researchers, including U. Beck (2000), A.J. Toynbee (1947), P. Nolan and G.E. Lenski (2010), C. Hackett (2017), and E. Smith (2004).

Analysis of the process for reviving religion in various regions of the world

Since the 1970s, philosophers and political scientists have been talking about a religious renaissance in many regions of the world with the rise of the Islamic movement and the Islamic revolution in Iran. Terms such as “politicisation of religion” and “religionisation of politics” have appeared. At the turn of the century, it became clear that the “religionisation” of politics is a fairly constant factor that has covered almost all countries of the world to one degree or another. Two decades of the new century have fully confirmed this assumption.

At the turn of the century, it became clear that the “religionisation” of politics is a fairly constant factor that has covered almost all countries of the world to one degree or another. Two decades of the new century have fully confirmed this assumption.

The conflict in Ulster, which has been going on for many decades since about 1968, as well as mass Christian anti-communist movements in eastern Europe, especially in Poland, the wars that led to the collapse of Yugoslavia – all this testifies to the increasing religion role in the society’s life, even in European countries that have long experienced the process of secularisation. At the same time, it should note that religious teachings have been offering society a concrete alternative to the existing order of things at the end of the last and the beginning of this century. All the powerful secular ideologies of the last century were unable to explain the existing social problems of the country and the world and give them a rational alternative. Currently, it should repeat that religion has become one of the most important factors of politics. Without considering the religious factor, it is difficult to define the current state of development of the post-Soviet countries at all.

The revival of the religious factor in political development was already talked about four decades ago, when the revolution erupted in Iran on February 11, 1979. It should note that this was indeed a truly popular revolution, in which the bulk of the nation participated. And after all, no one could have expected that millions of people would be ready to speak under the slogans of restoring true Islamic rule of the 7th century at the end of the 20th century. However, Iran was one of the most Westernised countries in the Middle East. At the same time, it is impossible not to notice that the rise of fundamentalism is precisely taking place in the most Westernised countries. French-speaking Algeria plunged into civil war in the early 1990s, when Islamists began an armed struggle against the secular regime of the country. It may seem strange that the Islamists mostly spoke French. And it was in this language that they printed their propaganda materials.

The Islamism rise in the Middle East has long been perceived as something permanently peculiar to the region. Meanwhile, the repeated rise to power of the Hindu religious party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which largely abolished the secular nature of the republic, in billion secular India did not arouse the attention of experts as separate extremist attacks by Islamists in other countries. Currently, more than half of Latin American countries are governed by moderate or radical leftists, but inspired not so much by the teachings of Marx as by the “theology of liberation”.

Finally, communism in eastern Europe was largely crushed by the position of the Catholic Church of the time of John Paul II. Indeed, of course, some Gdansk shipyards’ strikers primarily fought for sausage, but they were hardly inspired by the free choice between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. However, Catholicism, which had a character that united all Poles due to historical conditions in Poland, really managed to rally a significant part of the nation against the Communist Party power. Currently, there are hundreds of monuments to Pope John Paul II in Poland. He is seriously considered the winner of communism in this country.

In Western countries, especially in the European Union, there is also a religious revival, although it is almost unrelated to traditional churches. Regarding the traditional religious structures of Europe, it can be stated that they continue to experience a crisis lasted for more than a century. Therefore, Europe has repeatedly been tried to declare a “post-Christian

Continent". It is significant that the draft constitution of the European Union, tried to enter into force back in 2005, did not mention the Christian roots of European civilisation at all. However, a lot was said about "rights", and first of all it was about the "rights" of various sexual "minorities". By the way, National referendums in France and the Netherlands rejected this constitution. However, the role of Christian organisations in these referendums was insignificant. Basically, the French and Dutch voted against the transformation of their countries into something "pan-European" based on nationalist or left-wing sentiments, and only to a lesser extent from religious motives.

In recent decades, a surge in religious sectarianism has been characteristic mainly for Western countries. Reports of sectarian group suicides or crimes committed by them constantly occupy the lines in mass media. In a number of Western countries, representatives of various non-traditional sects are up to 10% of the population. The surge of these religions is directly related to the fact that many traditional confessions are unable to offer acceptable answers to emerging personal and social problems.

In addition to homegrown sects, most young Europeans and Americans accept religions that are unusual for the West. The fact that at least 150 thousand native Frenchmen have become Muslims in France, and several million white Americans belong to various Eastern cults in the United States, is no longer surprising. According to various surveys, about 20 thousand Americans, 50 thousand Britons, and four thousand Germans accept Islam every year. However, the religious upsurge has more embraced the huge, and increasingly growing masses of coloured immigrants in Western countries.

Thus, the process of reviving religion in many regions of the world has been called "de-secularisation". Since "secularisation" is called a return to the secular style of politics and culture, accordingly, the prefix "de-" means the opposite process, i.e., the expansion for influencing religion on all spheres of human society.

The essence and causes of the de-secularisation of world society at the present stage of its development

The reasons for this phenomenon, regardless of its name, are diverse, but understandable. Dominating almost the entire 20th century, secular ideologies were unable to solve the problems facing society. No matter how one treats the ideologies of anarchism, communism, fascism, and Western democracy, it is obvious that none of these ideologies has achieved victory. The social consequences of the Russian Revolution, from which the proletarians of the West benefited, were eventually defeated as a result of the betrayal of their own leaders. The military organisation of German fascism did not lead to victory. Finally, Western democracy did not win at all as a result of the collapse of its opponent in the USSR. Western-style democracies were unable to respond to the problems facing humanity at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. In such cases, as always, the good old ideas of national identity, national culture, based on traditional religion, inspired by centuries of experience, are once again gaining popularity and mass support.

There is another circumstance in the de-secularisation of the modern world. Since the last decade of the 20th century, the world has been experiencing the globalisation era. It should be understood as the gradual weakening, and in the future, the complete disappearance of the sovereignty of once independent states. Indeed, for five millennia, it was the state that was the

main form of human social and political existence. However, globalisation has led to the economy, finance, and social policy of each individual country managed by unelected supranational bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and others, in other words, into the hands of an unselected financial oligarchy.

In a globalised world, no democracy is envisaged although democratic procedures remain in the form of periodic elections and multiparty system. The world ruling elite pursues a policy of eliminating the social gains achieved by the masses in Western countries. As a result, the process of disappearing the “middle class” began in the West due to the transfer of entire industries from Western countries to regions with cheap labour. National cultures and traditional religions of many countries are deliberately undermined, because the followers may oppose unification. Part of the undermining of national identity was the policy of encouraging mass immigration if mass unemployment in their country is.

As a result, the nation-state lost real control over economic, cultural, and political life, following. However, when the same American-like English language, Hollywood blockbusters, Coca-Cola and other “brands” prevail everywhere, it is not surprising that the resistance to globalisation lies in the struggle for national identity. At the same time, national identity often lies in traditional culture based on traditional religion. Thus, globalisation has only spurred the process of de-secularisation of many regions of the world.

A. Toynbee, the famous British historian of the 20th century, directly linked the emergence, development and decay of civilisations with the same processes in the religious sphere. Moreover, he believed that the processes taking place in religion are at the heart of civilisational development, and “civilizations are the handmaidens of religion” in some cases. Toynbee argued that civilisations generally “are governed by the spiritual progress of mankind” (*Toynbee, 1947*). However, long before A. Toynbee, Russian Slavophiles came to this conclusion, emphasising that the peculiarities of each cultural and historical type are primarily determined by religion. The desire to protect traditional culture is increasing in the globalisation era.

Thus, the revenge of religion is due to many quite prosaic reasons for modern development. It is quite possible that a new atheistic wave will follow in the world in the near future. However, today the ongoing de-secularisation of the world is observed. It is undoubtedly, it is one of the most important phenomena of world development.

Political movements based on religious teachings are closer to fundamentalism. This is due to the fact that believers, who are active in politics, are more critical of the traditional ruling church, believing that it is not able to defend their rights, since it usually supports the existing system. Fundamentalists condemning the official church and strongly opposed to the authorities are more able to attract the masses of active believers. On the contrary, the ruling regimes more often seek to modernise the creed to justify their power. Therefore, the world de-secularisation is largely characterised by the religious fundamentalism rise.

The concept of religion with regard to the 21st-century realities

This part of the article clarifies the concept of “religion” in regard to the realities of the 21st century. The concept is used so often and so widely that its very meaning has been lost. Religion is a factor that has existed for an incomparably longer time than politics, ideology, and the state.

No society can exist without religion. The state, public organisations, and political parties use many religious symbols in their activities and campaigning, and many religious holidays are state holidays in many countries of the world, e.g., in Russia, Christmas and Easter are celebrated at the state level as state holidays, and not as “purely” religious holidays. Church leaders in many countries are part of the political elite, the opinions of religious leaders largely determine the electoral behaviour of citizens, and senior state officials most often use religious ceremonies when taking office.

Nowadays, when there is a global transformation of the whole society, changes affecting the foundations of culture and civilisation make the problem of human identity in the sphere of religion relevant, which is also connected with the problems of modern religious society.

As the well-known Western publicist Ulrich Beck notes, “We are witnessing a metamorphosis of society, during which people are freed from the social forms of industrial society – from the division into classes and strata, from traditional family relations between husbands and wives, just as during the Reformation they were freed from the domination of the Church and moved to the forms of secular life societies” (*Beck, 2000, p. 78*). Society leaders, political technologists, ordinary citizens are increasingly turning to the most stable criteria that have proven their importance and role in preservation and survival over time. Religion is the most important factor determining the specifics and purpose of civilisation. It determines social relations.

There are objective factors, as modern Russian authors note, according to which the term “traditional religion” can be distinguished as the degree of influence of this religion on the mentality and way of life of a people or a group of peoples, on the formation and development of the state and national identity, on standards of behaviour and perception of the world. Of course, a religious organisation acquires and implements these functions with a very long existence among a significant part of the population” (*Kafanov & Mchedlova, 2009, p. 287*).

In different countries, politics, migration, the crisis of family values, the decline of social solidarity, intolerance and tolerance manifest themselves in different ways because of religious traditions. It is necessary to look at how the attitude towards religion is manifested in Europe and Russia.

It is difficult to perceive Europe as something averaged: in different states there are different proportions of people who consider themselves followers of religion. The majority of the population of countries such as Cyprus (98%), Romania (92%), and Poland (93%) declare their adherence to a certain religious trend, slightly fewer followers of certain faiths in Ireland (87%) and Portugal (80%). The smallest proportions of those who consider themselves followers of religion are in the Netherlands (41%), Sweden (32%), Estonia (28%). Russia (49%) is closer to France (50%) in this indicator. The largest share of believers who pray every day is recorded in Poland (48%), Romania (49%), Ireland (44%), Cyprus (39%), Portugal (32%), Ukraine (30%), and Slovakia (30%). Worship in these countries is important for maintaining stability and the search for national identity. Attending religious services is not so popular even in those European countries where the entire population is followers of a certain religion. The proportion of those who attend church daily does not exceed 4%.

In Russia, among the respondents, those who consider themselves to be of any religious denomination, which in the language of science is called “self-identification”, the overwhelming

majority – 87% – consider themselves Orthodox, i.e., 43% of the total number of Russians. Islam is in second place, 11% of believers, or 6% of the respondents, identify themselves as Muslims. When determining the degree of religiosity of Russians, it turned out that Russian society is rather secular. According to the European Social Survey (ESS), about half of the respondents in Russia are not religious in general, including 14% of them say that they are not religious at all, 32% probably not, 22% hesitate when determining the degree of their religiosity. The religiosity nature can be judged not only by the subjective self-identification of respondents, but also by the level of religious activity.

About a third of Russians attend religious services more or less regularly; among them, only 4% of respondents go there once a week and more often, 8% do once a month, even more the number of those who participate in public services only on religious holidays is 19%, a fourth of Russians (27%) do it only occasionally, over a third of respondents (41%) indicate that they never attend religious services.

It is more typical for Russians to have common with God through prayer. 15% of respondents pray daily; 6% do it a little less often, but at least once a week, 14% do it monthly or at least on religious holidays, 16% do it even less often. About half (46%) never perform prayer (*Kafanov & Mchedlova, 2009, p. 296*).

According to the European social research, the absolute majority in Europe are representatives of Christian denominations, which is determined by the entire history of Europe. At the same time, there are certain regions of the spread of Christianity. 85% of the followers of the religion consider themselves Catholicism in France, 97% in Portugal, 94% in Spain, 99% in Poland, 90% in Belgium. A high percentage is observed in countries such as Slovakia (83%), Slovenia (93%), and Hungary (68%).

Protestant movements are most common in Denmark (94%), Norway (97%), Sweden (89%), and Finland (84%). In Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and Estonia, the majority of believers are followers of the Orthodox Church (87%, 88%, 82%, and 64%, respectively).

The concept of a traditional religion for the country at the present stage of development of the world community

The very concept of “traditional religion for the country” is rapidly devalued nowadays. Migration processes have led to the emergence of new religions, primarily Islam: 8% in France, 6% in Belgium, 5% Sweden, 5% in Switzerland, 4% in the UK, 4% in Germany in 2006 (*Kafanov & Mchedlova, 2009, p. 291*). These data, however, are rapidly becoming obsolete due to the large-scale migration to Europe of immigrants from Muslim countries, as well as the very high natural growth of these new Europeans. In 2016, Islam is being preached by 11.1% of population in Bulgaria, 8.8% in France, 8.1% in Sweden, 7.1% in Netherlands, 6.3% in Great Britain, 6.1% in Germany and Switzerland (*Hackett, 2017; Figure 1*).

As the modern Russian researcher F.O. Pleshchunov notes, “over the past few decades, Muslims have not just become an integral part of European society. They have changed the culture of this society. Most Europeans today just have to walk through the streets of their hometown to find out what a mosque looks like, to understand the difference between traditional clothes that Pakistanis or people from the Arab world prefer to wear ...” (*Pleshchunov, 2011*).

Indians have long emigrated outside their country, resulting in large Hindu diasporas, e.g., there are over one and a half million people from India living in the UK who profess Hinduism (about the same number of British Indians by religion – Sikhs, Parsis, Christians). In London, the capital of the former British Empire, immigrants from the historical lands of India (the Republic of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) make up over 15% of the population, and it is not by chance that the city received the ironic name “Londonabad”. In 1995, the world’s largest Hindu temple Shri Swaminarayan Mandir was opened in London. According to surveys of Londoners, this very beautiful temple was included in the list of the Seven Wonders of Great Britain. In the same London, with the financial support of a member of the Beatles musical group George Harrison, a temple of one of the directions of Hinduism – Krishnaism – was opened a little earlier, in 1969. Large Hindu temples exist in the Canadian city of Toronto, in the American cities of Chicago, Houston and a number of others. Given the ongoing mass emigration of Indians to Western countries, the high birth rate in the families of Indian emigrants, as well as a large number of mixed marriages of Hindus with non-Believers, whose children are counted as Hindus, Hinduism is turning from a national religion into a world religion. It is very indicative of the fact that in a number of Western countries the number of “white Hindus” is growing, i.e., indigenous local residents who have adopted any direction of Hinduism. So, in the UK, 1.5% of people who called themselves Hindus are pure-blooded Englishmen by origin. About the same number of Englishmen and Englishwomen are married to Hindus.

There are over one and a half million Hindus in the USA. According to the conducted research, the divorce rate is lower, the level of education and income is higher among American Hindus. 48% of American Hindus have master’s or doctoral degrees. 43% of American Hindu families have an annual income of more than \$100,000. Hindus in the USA are the most law-abiding denomination. Interestingly, the Indians are the only one of the large diasporas in the United States that has not created its own ethnic mafia.

At the same time, Western political correctness prevents from calling things by their proper names. German politician Tilo Sarrazin, who wrote a book about the “self-destruction of Germany”, instead of a substantive discussion of the arguments and figures he gave, was booed as a “racist and xenophobe”. Similarly, European politicians, who publicly proclaim the need to protect the primordial, i.e., Christian European values, find themselves in a political ghetto when even the abundance of votes cast does not even lead to consideration of the alternatives they offer, e.g., the French National Front Party of Marine Le Pen. However, sometimes, politically incorrect European politicians simply die in car accidents like the leader of the Austrian nationalists Joerg Haider or at the hands of lone killers like the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn.

However, the failure of the multiculturalism policy, i.e., the hope that representatives of different religions and cultures will live together, obeying the rules of Western-type civil society, was recognised by German Chancellor A. Merkel, French President E. Macron, British Prime Minister B. Johnson. However, the recognising this fact is not able to rid Europe of tens of millions of Muslims and followers of non-Christian creeds. In general, in full accordance with the concepts of A. Toynbee, the failure of multiculturalism is an indicator that Western civilisation is no longer able to offer any ideals to representatives of the non-Western world.

Arabs in France, Pakistanis and Hindus in England, Turks in Germany are all actually new ethnic groups that have lost many features of the indigenous ethnic groups of their historical homeland, in particular, the language, but have not joined the nation that accepted immigrants. It is no coincidence that the self-identification of epy Europeans, who immigrated from outside, has the character of a “return” to their ancestral religion, for the majority – Islam. It should note that the “Islamic Renaissance” is more typical for immigrated natives of Western countries, while their own parents usually do not show religious zeal. The mothers of the majority of Muslim women, who went to street demonstrations in Paris in defense of the hijab, never wore the hijab themselves.

This is not surprising. In the form of protection of the mythologised tradition, the nationalism of new ethnic groups is manifested. As E. Smith notes, “nationalism is not at all what it seems to itself. The cultures he demands to protect and revive are often his own invention or changed beyond recognition” (*Smith, 2004, p. 74*). At the same time, Western civilisation itself can no longer attract many of its own citizens of overseas origin. After all, earlier Western civilisation carried Christianity, railways, newspapers, schools, hospitals, democratic principles. Now, mostly Western culture is associated with mass culture, same-sex marriages and Big Macs only.

According to K.W. Deutsch, nationalism plays a compensatory function, creating a sense of unity and protection of marginals in the hostile environment of a foreign society (*Deutsch, 1969*). Now new Europeans, very numerous and rooted in European countries, who continue to feel marginalized, are united by new myths, e.g., an exalted perception of the colonial past of the historical Homeland, and traditional religion in a fundamentalist wrapper, sharply contrasting “high morality” to the West that has decomposed as a result of the “sexual revolution”.

However, this is Europe’s problem. There is a significant difference in the settlement of Muslims, e.g., they live in their ancestral territories in Russia, and in Europe, Muslim enclaves represent a completely new trend that came from outside, perceived by Europeans as alien.

In Russia, Muslims, who are “newcomers” from among guest workers from the republics of the former Soviet Central Asia, have not yet demonstrated high religiosity. In Central Asia, they usually tend to exaggerate the influence of the Islamic factor, which is insignificant in fact because of 70 years of Soviet power. To compare, the results of a study of migrant women in Moscow can be cited. According to them, only 10.3% of respondents from Central Asia described themselves as very religious, including 8% of Kyrgyz women, 9% of Tajik women, and 14.1% of Uzbek women in contrast to the general religiosity in the same Arab countries (*Social vulnerability..., 2011*). At the same time, in the 1960s, when the mass immigration of Muslims to Western European countries began, guest workers were also not characterised by a high level of religiosity. However, the second and third generation of non-indigenous Europeans begin to demonstrate their belonging to the Islamic world. Therefore, in principle, Russia may also face the problem of non-integrated Muslims into society.

Discussion

In the course of the study, deep issues of the essence of the process of world community religiosity and de-religiosity in the late 20th and early 21st centuries were raised. Consequently, in the future, a more detailed analysis of these processes is required to answer the question of

influencing religious processes on the social, political, and economic life of society, its transformation and development in various social systems.

Conclusion

The factor that ensures the stability of Russian civilisation is the coexistence of different faiths. According to registration authorities, as of June 1, 2005, there were 30,325 registered religious organisations in the country belonging to 66 religious' movements (*Information on religious organisations...*, 2018). In 2013, Rosstat named 47 confessions, and combining 90 organisations into one line "other faiths". And at the beginning of 2020, more than 31 thousand religious organisations and more than 60 different denominations were registered in Russia. Such a discrepancy in figures is explained by changes in counting methods and the very delicacy of the topic of determining religiosity in a secular society.

Russian civilisation can be defined as Orthodox, and of course, no religion can compete with Orthodoxy in terms of strength and degree of influence on the history and culture of Russia, but at the same time it is impossible not to recognize the contribution, mutual influence, mutual enrichment of other religious traditions (Islam, Protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism) in the creation and protection of a common state. The coexistence in the Russian civilisation of religions that have become the basis for other civilisations is its peculiarity, an amazing feature and, moreover, a deep essence.

The resistance to globalisation under Western conditions has many directions, among which the inconspicuous protection of national culture and its spiritual basis – traditional religion – stands out. It is not by chance that not only philosophers, but also sociologists and cultural scientists started talking about the "return of ethnicity". It is the real threat of dissolving into mass Americanised culture that motivates many citizens to turn to the sources of their national culture in principle.



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Appendix




Figure 1. Estimate size of Muslim population and percent of population in 2016